Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-f74b6a6cded69988d4e1c9ce9ecd18d3
- Auteurs
- Dorota Leczykiewicz
- Année déclarée
- 2026
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- book-chapter
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T02:45:57.229233+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T02:45:57.229233+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Abstract This chapter offers a critical evaluation of the dominant theoretical approach used by scholars to account for the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, referred to in the chapter as the ‘interpretation framework’. The evaluated approach relies on the idea of ‘interpretation’ as the theoretical framing for the EU Court’s reasoning across the full range of its judgments, including those where traceability to written law (EU Treaties or EU secondary law) is obviously or meaningfully lacking. The interpretation framework as a theory of the EU Court’s reasoning suffers from several weaknesses which disqualify it as a descriptive theory. The most important of them are the unsuitability of the adopted law-application model and the inconsistency of the legal validity standard implicit in the analysis. On the more normative side, there is the framework’s deficiency in accounting for the Court’s judgments as law-making events, inadequate engagement with substantive reasons, and the associated reduction of legal reasoning to purely formalistic moves. As a result of these deficiencies, the interpretation framework offers a very thin conception of judicial propriety, incapable of calling out situations of judicial overreach. The chapter argues that the framework must be rejected and replaced by a more meaningful account of the EU Court’s relationship not just with the written layer of EU law but with all relevant legal standards, including those stemming from national legal traditions.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7147635686
- DOI
- 10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- Chapitre d’ouvrage
- Types déclarés par les sources
- book-chapter
- Éditeurs
- Oxford University Press
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Description bibliographique du livre
- Éditeur
- Oxford University Press
- Date de publication déclarée
- 2026-04-01
Disponibilité non établie
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Dorota Leczykiewicz. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
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- APA
- Dorota Leczykiewicz. (2026). Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
- Chicago
- Dorota Leczykiewicz. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. Oxford University Press. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
- ISO 690
- Dorota Leczykiewicz. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-f74b6a6cded69988d4e1c9ce9ecd18d3/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
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