Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-f74b6a6cded69988d4e1c9ce9ecd18d3
- Authors
- Dorota Leczykiewicz
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- book-chapter
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:45:57.229233+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:45:57.229233+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract This chapter offers a critical evaluation of the dominant theoretical approach used by scholars to account for the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, referred to in the chapter as the ‘interpretation framework’. The evaluated approach relies on the idea of ‘interpretation’ as the theoretical framing for the EU Court’s reasoning across the full range of its judgments, including those where traceability to written law (EU Treaties or EU secondary law) is obviously or meaningfully lacking. The interpretation framework as a theory of the EU Court’s reasoning suffers from several weaknesses which disqualify it as a descriptive theory. The most important of them are the unsuitability of the adopted law-application model and the inconsistency of the legal validity standard implicit in the analysis. On the more normative side, there is the framework’s deficiency in accounting for the Court’s judgments as law-making events, inadequate engagement with substantive reasons, and the associated reduction of legal reasoning to purely formalistic moves. As a result of these deficiencies, the interpretation framework offers a very thin conception of judicial propriety, incapable of calling out situations of judicial overreach. The chapter argues that the framework must be rejected and replaced by a more meaningful account of the EU Court’s relationship not just with the written layer of EU law but with all relevant legal standards, including those stemming from national legal traditions.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7147635686
- DOI
- 10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- Book chapter
- Source-reported types
- book-chapter
- Publishers
- Oxford University Press
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Book bibliographic description
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Reported publication date
- 2026-04-01
Access status unknown
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Dorota Leczykiewicz. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
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- APA
- Dorota Leczykiewicz. (2026). Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
- Chicago
- Dorota Leczykiewicz. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. Oxford University Press. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
- ISO 690
- Dorota Leczykiewicz. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU: Challenging the Interpretation Framework. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-f74b6a6cded69988d4e1c9ce9ecd18d3/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198983002.003.0004
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Documentary status
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