Explaining Theoretical Disagreement
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-76e37dcd030fbd2b1109b651f362f707
- Auteurs
- Brian Leiter
- Année déclarée
- 2026
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- book-chapter
- Première détection
- 2026-11-13T12:51:18.502000+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-13T12:51:18.502000+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Institutions déclarées par la source
University of Chicago
Pays d’affiliation déclarés
US
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Abstract Positivists, according to Dworkin, have no satisfactory account of what he calls “theoretical disagreement” about law, that is, disagreement about “the grounds of law” or what positivists would call the criteria of legal validity. Positivism, the objection goes, cannot offer an explanation that preserves the “face value” of theoretical disagreements, because the only intelligible dispute about the criteria of legal validity is an empirical or “head count” dispute, that is, a dispute about what judges are doing, and how many of them are doing it. Positivism, however, has two explanations for theoretical disagreement, which “explain away” rather than preserve the “face value” disagreement. According to positivists, theoretical disagreements are either (1) disingenuous, in the sense that the parties, consciously or unconsciously, are really trying to change the law—they are trying to say, as Dworkin puts it, “what it should be” not “what the law is,” or (2) simply predicated on error because parties to the disagreement honestly think there is a fact of the matter about what the grounds of law are, and thus what the law is, in the context of their disagreement, but they are mistaken, because, in truth, there is no fact of the matter about the grounds of law in this instance precisely because there is no convergent practice of behavior among officials constituting a rule of recognition on this point. Particular attention is given to the best explanation for Riggs v. Palmer in light of the actual historical context of the decision and other opinions by the Riggs judges in contemporaneous cases.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W3124956630
- DOI
- 10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
- MAG
- 3124956630
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- Chapitre d’ouvrage
- Types déclarés par les sources
- book-chapter
- Éditeurs
- Oxford University Press
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Description bibliographique du livre
- Éditeur
- Oxford University Press
- Date de publication déclarée
- 2026-01-07
Disponibilité non établie
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Brian Leiter. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
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- APA
- Brian Leiter. (2026). Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
- Chicago
- Brian Leiter. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Oxford University Press. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
- ISO 690
- Brian Leiter. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
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