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Explaining Theoretical Disagreement

Identification

Public canonical key
radar:r-76e37dcd030fbd2b1109b651f362f707
Authors
Brian Leiter
Reported year
2026
Reported language
en
Source type
book-chapter
First detected
2026-11-13T12:51:18.502000+00:00
Last metadata observation
2026-11-13T12:51:18.502000+00:00
Last HTTP verification
Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

University of Chicago

Reported affiliation countries

US

Documentary abstract — original language

Abstract Positivists, according to Dworkin, have no satisfactory account of what he calls “theoretical disagreement” about law, that is, disagreement about “the grounds of law” or what positivists would call the criteria of legal validity. Positivism, the objection goes, cannot offer an explanation that preserves the “face value” of theoretical disagreements, because the only intelligible dispute about the criteria of legal validity is an empirical or “head count” dispute, that is, a dispute about what judges are doing, and how many of them are doing it. Positivism, however, has two explanations for theoretical disagreement, which “explain away” rather than preserve the “face value” disagreement. According to positivists, theoretical disagreements are either (1) disingenuous, in the sense that the parties, consciously or unconsciously, are really trying to change the law—they are trying to say, as Dworkin puts it, “what it should be” not “what the law is,” or (2) simply predicated on error because parties to the disagreement honestly think there is a fact of the matter about what the grounds of law are, and thus what the law is, in the context of their disagreement, but they are mistaken, because, in truth, there is no fact of the matter about the grounds of law in this instance precisely because there is no convergent practice of behavior among officials constituting a rule of recognition on this point. Particular attention is given to the best explanation for Riggs v. Palmer in light of the actual historical context of the decision and other opinions by the Riggs judges in contemporaneous cases.

Identifiers

OPENALEX
https://openalex.org/W3124956630
DOI
10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
MAG
3124956630

Documentary context

Documentary family
Book chapter
Source-reported types
book-chapter
Publishers
Oxford University Press

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Book bibliographic description

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Reported publication date
2026-01-07

Access status unknown

Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1

Cite this reference

Brian Leiter. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003

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APA
Brian Leiter. (2026). Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
Chicago
Brian Leiter. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Oxford University Press. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003
ISO 690
Brian Leiter. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. 2026. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003

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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-76e37dcd030fbd2b1109b651f362f707/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed

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Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197749852.003.0003

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