UDTR Global Rights of Nature Radar

Demand for Artificial Intelligence in Settlement Negotiations

Identification

Public canonical key

radar:r-28147e70baae44b3e270eee62a2b321f

Authors

Joshua S. Gans

Reported year

2026

Reported language

en

Source type

article

First detected

2026-11-14T02:19:22.053860+00:00

Last metadata observation

2026-11-14T02:19:22.053860+00:00

Last HTTP verification

Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

University of Toronto

Reported affiliation countries

CA

Documentary abstract — original language

When prediction by artificial intelligence (AI) substantially resolves trial uncertainty, a party purchasing a prediction from an AI supplier will disclose the prediction if it is in their favor and not otherwise, which signals the outcome to the other party. Thus, the trial outcome becomes common knowledge. However, this implies that the parties will settle rather than purchase the AI prediction. When parties have differing prior beliefs regarding trial outcomes, these differences are resolved only if the prediction is purchased and utilized. In this case, the AI prediction will be purchased in equilibrium. Different allocation rules awarding all trial costs to the losing party (the English rule) or having each party bear their own costs (the American rule) can impact the demand for AI during settlement negotiations, but this demand interacts with the expectations regarding whether a settlement will occur in the absence of an AI prediction.

Identifiers

OPENALEX

https://openalex.org/W7225395653

DOI

10.1086/735891

Documentary context

Documentary family

article

Source-reported types

article

Publishers

University of Chicago Press

Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.

Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1

• Document · https://doi.org/10.1086/735891

Documentary status

Relevance pending

Library

This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.