UDTR Global Rights of Nature Radar

How Should the Law Treat Future AI Systems? Fictional Legal Personhood versus Legal Identity

Identification

Public canonical key

doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.14964

Authors

Alexander, Heather J. · Simon, Jonathan A. · Pinard, Frédéric

Reported year

2025

Reported language

en

Source type

preprint

First detected

2026-11-09T19:04:47.980334+00:00

Last metadata observation

2026-11-09T19:04:47.980334+00:00

Last HTTP verification

Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

Université de Montréal

Reported affiliation countries

CA

Documentary abstract — original language

The law draws a sharp distinction between objects and persons, and between two kinds of persons, the ''fictional'' kind (i.e. corporations), and the ''non-fictional'' kind (individual or ''natural'' persons). This paper will assess whether we maximize overall long-term legal coherence by (A) maintaining an object classification for all future AI systems, (B) creating fictional legal persons associated with suitably advanced, individuated AI systems (giving these fictional legal persons derogable rights and duties associated with certified groups of existing persons, potentially including free speech, contract rights, and standing to sue ''on behalf of'' the AI system), or (C) recognizing non-fictional legal personhood through legal identity for suitably advanced, individuated AI systems (recognizing them as entities meriting legal standing with non-derogable rights which for the human case include life, due process, habeas corpus, freedom from slavery, and freedom of conscience). We will clarify the meaning and implications of each option along the way, considering liability, copyright, family law, fundamental rights, civil rights, citizenship, and AI safety regulation. We will tentatively find that the non-fictional personhood approach may be best from a coherence perspective, for at least some advanced AI systems. An object approach may prove untenable for sufficiently humanoid advanced systems, though we suggest that it is adequate for currently existing systems as of 2025. While fictional personhood would resolve some coherence issues for future systems, it would create others and provide solutions that are neither durable nor fit for purpose. Finally, our review will suggest that ''hybrid'' approaches are likely to fail and lead to further incoherence: the choice between object, fictional person and non-fictional person is unavoidable.

Identifiers

OPENALEX

W7106382361

DOI

10.48550/arxiv.2511.14964

Documentary context

Documentary family

Working paper

Source-reported types

preprint

Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.

Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1 · Record 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2511.14964
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W7106382361

Documented bibliographic relations

Source-declared references and links; they do not establish legal support or UGLC qualification. Up to 20 outgoing references are displayed.

• openalex:w1489372415 · CITES
• openalex:w1566228890 · CITES
• openalex:w2017143689 · CITES
• openalex:w2087710120 · CITES
• openalex:w2477904491 · CITES
• openalex:w2479712795 · CITES
• openalex:w2751850041 · CITES
• openalex:w2767123365 · CITES
• openalex:w2803922748 · CITES
• openalex:w2902571063 · CITES
• openalex:w3016157467 · CITES
• Collecting the Public Perception of AI and Robot Rights · CITES
• Property ownership and the legal personhood of artificial intelligence · CITES
• openalex:w3116193612 · CITES
• openalex:w4245212886 · CITES
• openalex:w4254539977 · CITES
• The River’s Legal Personhood: A Branch Growing on Canada’s Multi-Juridical Living Tree · CITES
• openalex:w4319751403 · CITES
• openalex:w4386113651 · CITES
• openalex:w4388565190 · CITES

0 incoming references within the detected corpus

Documentary status

Relevance pending

Library

This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.