UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

The Analogy between Natural Persons and International Persons in the Law of Nations

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.2307/787249

Auteurs

Edwin DeWitt Dickinson

Année déclarée

1917

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

article

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:04:47.915121+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:04:47.915121+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

The analogy between natural persons and international persons was one of the main premises upon which the science of international law was founded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.It was assumed that there existed a close resemblance, for many purposes, between the legal rights and duties of natural persons, subjects of municipal law, and the rights and duties of those juristic persons which are the subjects of international law.In one form or another the analogy was invoked constantly from the time when the law of nations first became a subject of juristic speculation and practical significance.The early conceptions of the nature of international society were based upon it.It furnished one of the essential premises in that process of reasoning by which the law of nature was applied to nations.It justified wholesale borrowing from the Roman jus gentium.It has had an immeasurable influence upon the subsequent development of international law, having been appealed to in later years as a reason for transplanting into the law of nations many concepts, principles, and rules borrowed outright from various systems of municipal law.An examination of the writings of the great publicists, particularly those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, reveals something of the extent to which we are indebted to this analogy for almost everything that is regarded as fundamental in modern international law.Such a study shows that the analogy has had a significant influence in contributing to determine (I) our conception of the nature of international society, (2) our conception of the nature of the persons who compose that society, (3) our conception of the nature of the law applicable to that society, (4) the actual content of that law, and (5) the classification of the content of that law.It may be objected by members of a profession trained to look for law primarily in sources other than text-books and treatises 'Victoria, Relectiones undecim (Salamanca, 1565).First published at Lyons in 1557.See Barth~lemy in Les fondateurs du droit international

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W2766193565

DOI

10.2307/787249

HANDLE

2027/mdp.35112102584531

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Doctrine

Types déclarés par les sources

article

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2 · Document 3

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.2307/787249
• Handle · https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102584531
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W2766193565

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Statut documentaire

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Bibliothèque

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