Against Algorithmic Clarity: Law Beyond Specification
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-e7d1ff34b89549abaf745a65df2f287c
- Auteurs
- Joseph Erickson · Michael J. Gregory
- Année déclarée
- 2025
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- article
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T09:37:09.495317+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T09:37:09.495317+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Institutions déclarées par la source
University of South Carolina · Clemson University
Pays d’affiliation déclarés
US
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Abstract As algorithmic tools increasingly assist in legal decision-making, they impose structural demands that often conflict with the normative character of law. Legal concepts must be translated into computational form to function within algorithmic systems, and such translation requires increased conceptual specificity. This paper argues that the specificity demanded by these systems undermines a core virtue of legal reasoning: its principled vagueness. We identify two primary concerns with algorithmic specification. First, the authority problem, that algorithmic categorization is achieved through extra-legal processes that lack interpretive authority. Second, the openness problem, that the elimination of vagueness undermines the ‘open-texture’ of the law, a crucial feature that allows it to be responsive to moral and social development. In response, this paper defends legal vagueness not as a flaw to be corrected, but as a jurisprudential strength. Drawing from Gadamerian hermeneutics, we contend that legal meaning emerges through dialogical interpretation, rather than static definition. Vagueness is what allows legal language to remain responsive, contested, and morally alert. Rather than optimizing algorithmic systems for clarity and determinacy, we propose design principles that support productive vagueness. These include underspecification, interpretive pluralism, and mechanisms for contestability. In the criminal law context in particular, where concepts like ‘culpability’ and ‘risk’ resist compression into fixed categories, computational tools must be carefully constrained. The goal is not to eliminate vagueness but to preserve its function as a vehicle for collective interpretive engagement.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4415723236
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11196-025-10379-5
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- article
- Types déclarés par les sources
- article
- Éditeurs
- Springer Science+Business Media
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Joseph Erickson; Michael J. Gregory. Against Algorithmic Clarity: Law Beyond Specification. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-025-10379-5
JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·
APA, Chicago, ISO 690 : formats bibliographiques fondés sur les champs disponibles. OSCOLA / Bluebook : données structurées uniquement ; aucune conformité juridique complète n’est revendiquée sans vérification des éléments nécessaires.
- APA
- Joseph Erickson; Michael J. Gregory. (2025). Against Algorithmic Clarity: Law Beyond Specification. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-025-10379-5
- Chicago
- Joseph Erickson; Michael J. Gregory. Against Algorithmic Clarity: Law Beyond Specification. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-025-10379-5
- ISO 690
- Joseph Erickson; Michael J. Gregory. Against Algorithmic Clarity: Law Beyond Specification. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-025-10379-5
Warning: Undefined array key "last_link_verified" in /home/clients/e27d81e12f04d2bfd747aa264540ac56/sites/_UDTR_APP/legal_library_reference.php on line 31
UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Against Algorithmic Clarity: Law Beyond Specification. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-e7d1ff34b89549abaf745a65df2f287c/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
Données de cette version figée
Dossiers et relations documentaires
Rôles des sources
Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-025-10379-5
Un lien vers une autorité ne prouve pas à lui seul une affirmation juridique. Les résumés et les textes intégraux restent soumis aux conditions de leur source.
Statut documentaire
Pertinence à examiner
Bibliothèque
Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.