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Open-Source Moon: A Technical Framework for Intelligent Development of Extraterrestrial Bodies Based on Sensor Dispersal and Golden Consensus

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Clé publique
radar:r-c42d1ce41e08fa3f71e33e4a02e5fc3e
Auteurs
Chen, Qin
Année déclarée
2026
Langue déclarée
en
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Institutions déclarées par la source

MicroIoT (Fuzhou) Network Technology Co., Ltd.

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

Open-Source Moon: A Technical Framework for Intelligent Development of Extraterrestrial Bodies Based on Sensor Dispersal and Golden Consensus Abstract: The exploration and development of the Moon and other celestial bodies currently depend heavily on State-led, integrated space missions that are costly, slow, and difficult for the public to join. To address this situation, this paper proposes “Open-Source Moon”, a technical framework that applies the open-source philosophy to the intelligent development of extraterrestrial bodies. The framework treats the Moon as a large developer platform that all of humankind can program collectively. Following the progressive principle of “information first, from the outside in, from sensing to action”, it transforms the Moon layer by layer into a “smart planet” that can be programmed as a whole, and it organizes global participation through open-source protocols and the contribution-securing mechanism of “Golden Consensus”: massive numbers of low-cost, standardized micro sensors are first dispersed over the lunar surface to form a distributed sensing network whose nodes are beacons and hotspots; delay-tolerant networking (DTN) and a predictive compensation mechanism then overcome the one-way communication delay of about 1.28 s; and a small-machine cooperation ecosystem, LEGO-style combination of medium-sized machines, and finally unmanned factories and lunar computing carry the staged evolution from sensors to a “smart planet”. Based on the self-similar allocation principle and the Schelling focal point, which secure and incentivize decentralized contributions, a “Golden Consensus” system founded on the golden ratio (φ ≈ 1.618) is proposed: explorers receive 61.8% of the development-rights return (of which a further 2.8% is set aside as a “common allocation” for public facilities), and 38.2% is designated as socially shared. A model with 880 000 cornerstone nodes is set up, in which a distributed ledger establishes ownership of contributions and keeps tamper-proof records. Verifiable engineering models of network coverage, link budget, energy budget, and delay compensation are established, and the compatibility of this approach with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, as well as the general applicability of extending it to other celestial bodies such as Mercury and Mars, is demonstrated. This study provides a feasible technical route and governance framework for public participation in the development of extraterrestrial bodies. Keywords: Lunar Landing; Human Lunar Landing; Open-Source Moon; sensor network; smart planet; Golden Consensus; delay-tolerant networking; lunar development; citizen science; Outer Space Treaty; Human Spaceflight 1. Introduction 1.1. Background and Motivation For more than half a century, the exploration of extraterrestrial bodies has taken the form mainly of large, integrated, State-led missions. After Apollo 17 in 1972, crewed spaceflight remained confined to near-Earth orbit for a long time, until Artemis II completed a crewed lunar flyby (without landing) in April 2026 [1]. On 22 February 2024, the Odysseus lander of Intuitive Machines achieved the first soft landing on the Moon by a commercial spacecraft [2], marking the beginning of the era of commercial lunar landings. However, the development and launch cost of a single mission is still on the order of tens of millions to hundreds of millions of US dollars, and most of the failure risk is concentrated in the powered-descent and landing phases. From the soft landing of Chang’e-3 in 2013 to June 2025, there were 14 soft-landing attempts on the lunar surface worldwide (Table 4): six full successes, three partial successes (in which the attitude or mission capability was impaired after landing), and five failures. According to public reports retrieved for this study, no new lunar landing attempt had occurred in 2026 as of October 2026, and the launch schedules of missions such as Blue Moon MK1, IM-3, Chang’e-7, and Blue Ghost 2 have all been postponed [3]. Lunar landing is extremely difficult technically; crewed lunar landing in particular has been hailed as “the jewel in the crown of human technology”. Analysis shows that the failure of a lunar lander often stems from a problem in a single local component, yet causes the entire mission to fail or to be degraded. This situation reflects three structural constraints. The first is single-point failure: a monolithic spacecraft integrates all functions into a single landing event, so the failure of any step in the descent phase causes the entire mission to fail. The second is a high entry threshold: development, launch, and operation are concentrated in a few national agencies and companies, and schools, the public, and countries without an aerospace industrial base find it hard to participate. The third is a lack of information: high-density, long-duration, multi-site in-situ data on the surface mechanics, dust, thermal, and radiation environments of landing areas are lacking, so the siting and design of the medium and large facilities required for subsequent lunar construction rely on extrapolation. In addition, fixed stationing faces the risks of moonquakes, micrometeoroids, and lunar dust; the area of perpetual-daylight zones is limited; and in-situ resource utilization is not yet mature. Evidently, for a few major powers to “fill the lunar surface” with stations in the short term would exceed the resources available and would serve little purpose; the overall picture is one in which “individuals cannot reach it, it is too costly to undertake, top-level engineering is inaccessible to the public, and humankind’s progress into space is extremely slow.” To address the slow pace of innovation and iteration in aerospace, an unsustainable cost structure, and the difficulty of fully mobilizing the intellectual resources of all humankind, this paper proposes the opposite path: through open subcontracting, large numbers of low-cost, interconnectable micro sensor nodes become the protagonists of an “initial large-scale lunar landing”—neither humans nor sophisticated robots, but simple and diverse sensors. Guided by the principle of “information first”, the sensor network is used first to turn the Moon into a “sensing planet”; once information confidence reaches the required level, small effectors and large and medium-sized machines are introduced step by step, and reasoning is finally superimposed to make it a “smart planet”. This sequence is consistent with the history of human exploration—sailing along nearby coasts, observing from the open ocean, probing the shoreline, and finally landing ashore—and also accords with the way the information infrastructure of Earth was built up, with sensors deployed gradually at its base layer. From the standpoint of exploration methodology, traditional strategies tend toward direct landing and construction, following the sequence of “landing first, sensing afterwards”, which runs counter to the historical experience of exploring new continents. Humankind has never lacked scientific means of understanding extraterrestrial bodies, but it lacks a systematic path that “breaks complex tasks down, opens them to the public, and lets information drive action”. The core judgment of a technical framework that applies the open-source philosophy to the intelligent development of extraterrestrial bodies is that the exploration and construction of an unfamiliar celestial body should follow the progressive principle of “from the outside in, from the shallow to the deep, sensing before acting”, should involve all humankind, and should share its results. This paradigm does not replace national-level and large-corporation space programs but serves as a complementary parallel route: the former can be responsible for large infrastructure such as large-rocket launches, deep-space communication relays, and crewed lunar landings, while the latter, with an open-source distributed system, is responsible for wide-area sensing, massive low-cost detection, and verification through public innovation, and the two routes reinforce each other. Taking the Moon as an example, this paper advocates treating the Moon as a large developer platform that all of humankind can program together, with “information first” as the top development priority, rather than blindly establishing large-scale settlements directly on unknown land. First, massive numbers of low-cost micro sensors are dispersed over the lunar surface to establish an interconnected network of beacons and hotspots; within the signal coverage areas, small mechanical units are deployed and combined to form mobile detector swarms that can be tailored to the environment; large and medium-sized machines and facilities are then introduced through standard interfaces and gradually evolve into factories, living areas, and an autonomous transport system, until the Moon finally becomes a “smart planet” with sensing, communication, consensus, and computing capabilities. This path can also be extended to other rocky bodies such as Mercury, Mars, and Phobos. 1.2. Limitations of the Existing Centralized Route The current lunar landing and lunar stationing routes led by major powers and large institutions face the following structural constraints in the transition to “participation by all and sustained development”: (1)     Resource constraint: humans can neither occupy the entire lunar surface with crewed presence in the short term nor need to; crewed missions have extremely high costs and technical thresholds and are difficult to replicate in large numbers. (2)     Spatial constraint: the area of lunar perpetual-daylight zones (regions near the poles with continuous illumination) is very limited, and competition around such small areas is of limited significance. (3)     Engineering constraint: lunar landing is technically difficult and risky, and the cost of landing and take-off is high; in the past, many landing missions failed during the powered-descent phase [3]. (4)     Time constraint: building a lunar base takes a long time and is costly, and the travel of personnel is inconvenient. (5)     Environmental constraint: fixed stationing faces the risks of moonquakes and micrometeoroids; lunar dust causes continuous wear on moving mechanisms and interfaces and is highly harmful to human health, especially the respiratory system, and protection is costly. (6)     Resource-utilization constraint: the extraction, processing, and manufacturing of in-situ resources (ISRU) are unlikely to mature immediately in the near term, and the conditions to support long-term self-sustained development are not yet in place. (7)     Ambition constraint: it cannot satisfy the long-term ambition of the human community to expand beyond Earth and lacks foresight. 1.3. Contributions of This Paper In response to the above limitations, the contributions of this paper include: (a) the first systematic proposal of a staged model for the intelligent development of celestial bodies centered on “sensor dispersal—information first” (Section 3); (b) the establishment of verifiable engineering models for network coverage, link budget, energy budget, and delay compensation (Section 4); (c) the proposal of a “Golden Consensus” system for contribution attribution and incentives based on the golden ratio (Section 5); and (d) a demonstration of the compatibility of the open-source route with existing legal frameworks such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, together with an executable multi-party participation mechanism (Sections 6 and 7). 2. Related Work 2.1. Lunar Exploration and Commercial Lunar Landings Since the beginning of the 21st century, lunar exploration has shown a clear trend toward commercialization and internationalization. NASA initiated the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program in 2018, procuring lunar-surface delivery services from commercial companies through fixed-price contracts [4]; its first mission, IM-1, was carried out by Intuitive Machines’ Nova-C class lander Odysseus, which soft-landed on 22 February 2024 in the Malapert A crater region near the lunar south pole [5]. However, traditional lunar landers are highly integrated monolithic devices; they are expensive, and a single-point failure leads to the failure of the entire mission, while a limited payload can cover only a very small area. On the scientific side, several discoveries have provided clear targets for “information first”: in 2009, the LCROSS lunar impact experiment detected water ice and a variety of other volatile substances in the permanently shadowed region of Cabeus crater [6]; Japan’s SELENE (Kaguya) spacecraft identified lunar skylights in regions such as the Marius Hills in 2009 [7], and subsequent orbital radar sounding by SELENE (2017) further confirmed the existence of intact lava tubes [8]. These findings indicate that the true distribution of key resources and shelters such as water ice and lunar caves (lava tubes) can be fully characterized only through massive, long-duration in-situ observations—precisely the role for a distributed sensor network. 2.2. Distributed Space Systems and Delay-Tolerant Networking Miniaturization and constellation formation are important directions in the evolution of space systems. Small-satellite constellations for Earth observation have demonstrated the effectiveness of “trading quantity for coverage and redundancy for reliability”; in deep-space communication, delay-tolerant networking (DTN) uses a store-and-forward mechanism to ensure reliable data delivery over long-delay, intermittent links [9]. The one-way delay of the Earth–Moon link is about 1.3 s [10], far lower than that of the Earth–Mars link (4–24 min), but it already exceeds the range of immediate feedback of conventional interactive teleoperation and requires predictive compensation and autonomous decision support. 2.3. Citizen Science and Socialized Engineering Astronomy is one of the most successful fields of citizen science. The Galaxy Zoo project invited the public to classify online the morphologies of nearly one million galaxies from the Sloan Digital Sky Survey, obtaining more than 40 million individual classifications from about 100 000 participants, and its classifications are closely consistent with those made by professional astronomers [11]. In Planet Hunters, members of the public identified exoplanet candidates in Kepler data [12] and took part in the discovery of the anomalous light variations of KIC 8462852 [13]. These facts show that fragmented, low-threshold public contributions, once organized in a standardized way, can fully surpass the labor of a few experts in scale, produce first-class scientific results, and give rise to new discoveries (such as unexpected objects like Hanny’s Voorwerp); this provides a direct precedent for “breaking lunar-surface exploration tasks down for the public”. The distributed open-source paradigm of this paper relies on a verifiable, tamper-proof consensus system and no longer takes states and corporations as the only actors; the contributions of individuals, schools, and civil teams can all be attributed in a decentralized way, thereby motivating broad public participation, and it is suggested that the approach be extended down to youth education organizations. 2.4. Decentralized Consensus and the Internet of Things On the information-technology side, distributed ledgers represented by cryptocurrencies have demonstrated the feasibility of “consensus and incentives without a trusted third party”; Nakamoto’s blockchain [14], the Byzantine generals problem and practical Byzantine fault tolerance [15,16], and Merkle hash trees [17] laid the technical foundations of decentralized ledgers; the idea of an equal-weight-node (equal_nodes) ledger already has a public white paper [18]. Schelling’s focal-point theory [19] and Ostrom’s governance of common-pool resources [20] provide game-theoretic and institutional-economic grounds for the design of allocation rules; the Mailtopia project, oriented toward decentralized e-mail, the Internet of Things, and consensus, further introduced such mechanisms at the device-network level [18]. The “consensus module” envisioned in this paper—an open-source Internet-of-Things terminal with a built-in consensus ledger that is verifiable and able to control small electromechanical devices across celestial bodies—is precisely the transplantation of these ideas to lunar-surface devices. The specific approach is as follows: (1) provide a six-level progressive architecture of “sensing–nerve–effector–organ–system–whole”, with stage gates that use information confidence as the criterion; (2) give engineering schemes for nodes, deployment, and network growth, checked by calculations of impact deceleration, link, and seeding throughput; (3) establish numerical models of landing statistics, diversification reliability, mass and cost, percolation connectivity, and delay prediction; (4) design a two-layer ledger and the “Golden Consensus” allocation criterion, and test their applicable boundaries with numerical models; and (5) demonstrate the path by which this paradigm is compatible with current space law, and present scenarios, a roadmap, extensions, and limitations. 2.5. Miniaturization and Open Space The CubeSat standard has brought space practice into university teaching [21]; KickSat explored chip-scale satellites through crowdfunding [22]; UPSat and SatNOGS demonstrated an open-source-hardware satellite and a global network of volunteer ground stations [23]. On the lunar surface, although JAXA’s SLIM lander landed in an abnormal attitude, the small probes LEV-1 and LEV-2 (SORA-Q) that it released before landing still operated successfully [24], which is direct empirical evidence that “release before touchdown” can reduce the impact of a single-point failure. 2.6. Communications, Navigation, and Networking The LunaNet interoperability framework [25], the delay/disruption-tolerant networking (DTN) architecture, and Bundle Protocol version 7 [26,27] provide a standards basis for interconnecting heterogeneous lunar-surface nodes. Random geometric graphs and continuum percolation theory [28–30] give a mathematical description of the connectivity of wireless ad hoc networks. 2.7. Outer Space Legal Framework Current international space law rests on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty [31] (see Section 6 for details). The Treaty provides that outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation, but it does not prohibit private parties or scientific groups from conducting exploration of extraterrestrial bodies, nor does it prohibit participants from holding interests in “exploration data, self-developed hardware, and engineering contributions”. In 2020, eight founding nations led by NASA signed the Artemis Accords, which established principles such as safety zones, transparency, and interoperability for lunar development [32]; as of the end of September 2026, 76 countries had signed [33], but the Accords are a political commitment rather than a legally binding international treaty and have not been registered with the United Nations. The 1979 Moon Agreement, although it makes more detailed provisions on the use of lunar resources, has limited effect because the major space-faring nations have not ratified it [34]. The open-source route must find an executable position within the above frameworks; this paper discusses the compatibility of an open-source model of celestial-body development with existing space-law frameworks such as the Outer Space Treaty and clarifies the underlying logic by which the ownership-consensus mechanism does not violate existing international law. According to the search conducted, no implemented paradigm has been found that integrates “public openness, sensors first, progressive construction, and a consensus ledger” into a unified “information space”, and no systematic study has been found that provides both computable models and a legal pathway at the same time. 3. Conceptual Model: From Sensors to a Smart Planet 3.1. Biological Analogy and System Layering The formation of a complete living organism in nature offers an intuitive analogy for the informatization of celestial bodies: sensing (sensors)—nerves (information pathways)—effectors (small, unitized machines)—tissues and organs (large and medium-sized machines)—functional systems (ecosystems composed of facilities)—a complete organism (the planet), while the software system running through all of them is the “soul” of the organism. It grows and expands step by step, rather than having the facilities of an entire planet built at one time; large-scale infrastructure should not be committed directly before the environment of the celestial body has been adequately sensed. Engineering this analogy yields the layered architecture of the Open-Source Moon system (Fig. 1): the sensing layer, composed of massive numbers of micro sensors, beacons, and beacon rovers, is responsible for “feeling”; the network layer, composed of beacon–hotspot interconnection, relay constellations, and DTN, is responsible for “nerve conduction”; the consensus layer, composed of cornerstone nodes and the Golden Consensus ledger, is responsible for “value memory”; and the application layer, which carries autonomous transport, unmanned factories, human communities, and lunar computing, is responsible for “behavioral execution”. The Earth side provides teleoperation, a simulation sandbox, large-model training, and a game and education platform; the two sides are connected by the Earth–Moon link (one-way delay of about 1.28 s) and, through the data grounding line, are “grounded” and “earthed” and share a unified clock. Fig. 1. Layered architecture of the Open-Source Moon system 3.2. Six-Level Architecture for Celestial-Body Development The six-level architecture (Fig. 2, Table 1) is as follows: L0, sensor nodes; L1, beacons, hotspots, and channels; L2, small machines (effectors) assembled from nodes; L3, large and medium-sized machines and facilities; L4, functional systems composed of factories, transport, and habitats; L5, the smart planet after the integration of reasoning. Fig. 2. Information-first six-level progressive architecture and stage gates Table 1. Six-level architecture and stage gates Level Biological analogy Lunar counterpart Stage gate (G6 is the completion criterion of L5) L0 Sensing Receptor Micro sensor nodes (thermal, radiation, microseismic, magnetic, illumination, dust) G1: lunar-grade ground tests passed; lower posterior bound of the on-Moon survival rate meets the target L1 Nerve Neural pathway Beacons, hotspots, channels, and block-local ledgers G2: mean network degree exceeds the percolation threshold; hotspot areas operate stably for one complete day–night cycle L2 Effector Effector Small machines assembled from nodes, slow-moving shuttle carts, micro rovers G3: cooperative ecosystem (power supply, relay, rescue) mutually mapped between the sandbox and the lunar surface L3 Organ Tissues and organs Medium and large machines, power stations, assembled platforms G4: confidence in site parameters ≥ 95%; pilot facilities meet unmanned-operation targets L4 System Functional system Unmanned factories, autonomous transport, habitats G5: ecosystem is self-sustaining; faults can be repaired remotely L5 Whole Complete organism Smart planet (software as the soul) Final-state indicators: global programmability, mutual Earth–Moon mapping, information tapestry 3.3. Staged Evolution Model (P0–P5) Following the logic of “sensing first, acting afterwards”: first, large-scale micro sensors are deployed on the lunar surface (especially in areas with ample sunlight and good communication conditions) to establish a primary sensing network; second, interconnection among the sensors forms signal coverage areas and establishes “beacon” and “hotspot” links; then, small mobile detectors are deployed within hotspot areas to verify the technology and to refine how they cooperate; next, once experience has matured, medium-sized machines are introduced for regional construction (the facilities form symbiotic cooperation, for example by taking charge, respectively, of energy supply, communication relay, rescue execution, and maintenance tasks); finally, through the fusion and expansion of multi-regional networks, the Moon as a whole is transformed into a facility-equipped, informatized body. This paper divides the intelligent development of the Moon into six stages (Table 2, Fig. 3): P0 Ground preparation (0–2 years): Design and manufacture micro sensor modules of various functions and types, commission a unified channel, and verify networking on the ground; write the initial version of the Earth-side operating system, connect the sensors to it so that they follow the deployment rules, and establish value consensus; all indicators must meet the lunar-grade standard for spacecraft. P1 First dispersal (2–5 years): Send the sensors to the Moon, where they settle on rocky surfaces according to the deployment rules (with priority given to long-daylight zones with ample sunlight), network with one another, and establish beacons and hotspots; sensor consensus is established through protocols, information is “grounded” via Earth, and Ver. 1.0 is completed. P2 Regional networking (5–10 years): Remotely commission the networked modules and refine the initial version; sense the environment, collect lunar-surface information, and exchange data to build a lunar-surface model; data results are consolidated within the system by technical means into value consensus; at the same time, the system is opened to commercial use on Earth—for example, to game teams—to build a digital world set in a real lunar environment (simulated lunar landing, lunar construction, etc.), allowing immersive experience of lunar engineering in a gamified way and thereby achieving sustained profit and, in turn, its distribution. P3 Machine evolution (10–20 years): Equipment is given standardized interfaces so that sensing modules can be embedded in it to provide environmental awareness; on the basis of a mature cooperation mechanism among small unit machines, attempts are made to combine them into medium-sized machines, evolving large-scale construction capability in a LEGO mode; suitable special landforms (such as impact craters and lunar tunnels) are selected for focused survey; and delay is compensated by predictive algorithms, gradually realizing an information picture that advances from the “Moon’s next second” to the “Moon’s next minute”. P4 Facility intelligence (20–50 years): Deploy lunar computing in lunar caves (lava tubes) and build unmanned factories and autonomous transport systems, achieving “programming and modulation of the planet” from the local to the global scale. P5 Habitable migration (50–70 years): Once information and technology have accumulated sufficiently, carry out habitability retrofitting to support large-scale human migration. The core advantage of this path is that every step is reversible, iterable, and fault-tolerant. Local failures do not cause the failure of the entire mission and instead supply feedback data for system optimization. It should be emphasized that, in the great majority of stages, the “protagonists” of this route are neither humans nor large robots but sensors and information facilities; crewed entry is scheduled for the later period, when information is sufficient and the technology has been verified as mature, while in the early period there is only a small amount of contact. Fig. 3. Staged evolution roadmap (with biological analogy; times are schematic, optimistic estimates) Table 2. Staged evolution roadmap (P0–P5) Stage Time (years) Main tasks Key milestones Biological analogy P0 Ground preparation 0–2 Sensor development, ground networking verification, Ver. 1.0 protocol All indicators meet the lunar-grade standard Sensing P1 First dispersal 2–5 Release in perpetual-day zones, beacons and hotspots, information “grounding” First hotspots networked and operating Nerve P2 Regional networking 5–10 Lunar-surface modeling, game/sandbox platform, small-machine ecosystem Coverage areas operate autonomously Effector P3 Machine evolution 10–20 Medium-sized machines, LEGO-style assembly, lunar-cave exploration Machine cooperation ecosystem takes shape Tissues and organs P4 Facility intelligence 20–50 Lunar computing, unmanned factories, autonomous transport Holistic programming of the whole Moon Functional system P5 Habitable migration 50–70 Habitability retrofitting, large-scale migration Human residence Complete organism 3.4. Definition and Measurable Indicators of the Smart Planet This paper defines a “smart planet” as a celestial body that possesses the capabilities of global sensing (sensor coverage), global interconnection (networking), value consensus (ledger), edge computing, and reasoning and autonomous execution (a machine-cooperation ecosystem), and whose state can be programmed and modulated externally through standard interfaces. Five categories of measurable indicators are accordingly given: (1) sensing coverage, that is, the proportion of the lunar surface area covered by networked beacons; (2) number of nodes and consensus scale, that is, the number of cornerstone nodes and the volume of ledger data; (3) autonomy level, that is, the proportion of tasks that can be executed autonomously within a region—the higher the degree of socialization, the greater the probability of success in jointly withstanding the harsh environment through the night period; (4) number of open interfaces, that is, the number of standard services and data interfaces that third parties can call; and (5) inter-body grounding (Grounding Line): however information is broadcast, it is grounded, delay-corrected, legally equipotentialized, and so on, with Earth as the basic reference point, and timestamped (this not only resolves the relativistic time differences caused by the different gravity of different bodies but also establishes the benchmark for data ownership and for a root-level index backup of human civilization). 4. System Architecture and Engineering Models 4.1. Comparison with Existing Technical Paths Most existing lunar-development concepts directly plan large permanent bases and in-situ resource extraction facilities, presupposing long-term human residence on the lunar surface; such schemes demand a very high degree of completeness of early information on the environment of the celestial body. However, there are still many gaps in basic environmental data such as lunar terrain, radiation, lunar dust, and lava tunnels, and carrying out large-scale infrastructure construction directly under conditions of insufficient information entails enormous engineering risk. Their exploration mode is essentially of the “sperm-entering-the-egg” type: a single decisive landing (or impact) serves as the apex of the mission; if it succeeds, “fertilization” occurs, and if it fails, everything is lost. This mode places extremely high demands on technical maturity, system reliability, and resource input, and it does not tolerate trial and error. The “Open-Source Moon” paradigm, by contrast, adopts a “yeast-sprinkled-onto-dough” strategy: large numbers of low-cost, fault-tolerant units are scattered across the target environment and, relying on suitable environmental conditions and an inherent logic of expansion, are left to “ferment” and “rise” on their own. The initial conditions need not be perfect; a correct direction and a suitable environment suffice to start a positive-feedback loop. This paradigm is a form of distributed collaborative exploration among citizens, does not conflict with national space programs, and can serve as a complement to national-level lunar projects, jointly improving basic lunar environmental data. Table 3 compares the two types of paths with respect to historical missions. Table 3. Comparative analysis with historical missions Dimension Traditional centralized missions Open-Source Moon paradigm Cost per mission Hundreds of millions to billions of US dollars Millions to tens of millions of US dollars Failure risk Concentrated; a single-point failure causes failure of the whole Dispersed; local failures do not affect the system as a whole Coverage A single point or a small area; the scientific output and coverage of a single mission are extremely limited Gradually expanding to the global scale Participation threshold Extremely high (only a few countries/institutions) Low (individuals, schools, and small and medium-sized enterprises can all participate) Iteration speed Slow (intervals of several years to more than a decade between missions) Fast (continuous iteration, rapid optimization) Sustainability Depends on continued large-scale investment Self-sustaining (incentive-driven) From the perspective of engineering philosophy, this shift means a paradigm transition from reliability first (pursuing the success of a single mission through redundancy and precision design) to recoverability first (ensuring the continuous operation of the system as a whole through diversification and fault-tolerant design). A single large rover can cover only a very small part of the lunar surface, so its observational breadth is insufficient; once the equipment is damaged, detection activity in the corresponding area ends directly. For the same launch mass, the spatial coverage and continuous monitoring duration of a single large probe are far lower than those of a cluster of large numbers of distributed micro sensing units, and, together with a distributed engineering-coordination system, detection breadth and continuous monitoring duration can be greatly increased (a sensor cluster is a “fault-tolerant distributed system”: large numbers of devices are scattered over the broad lunar surface, and the damage of individual units or the failure of detection in local areas does not affect the operation of the overall network). 4.2. Landing History Statistics and Single-Landing Success Probability Table 4 lists the 14 lunar soft-landing attempts from December 2013 to June 2025 (excluding Peregrine in January 2024, whose propulsion system failed en route to the Moon so that it never entered the landing phase). “Full success” means that the spacecraft landed and essentially achieved its mission objectives; “partial success” means that the spacecraft survived after landing but with seriously impaired attitude or mission capability (SLIM, IM-1, IM-2); all five failures occurred in the descent and landing phase or in the orbit-lowering maneuver preceding it, consistent with the judgment that “faults mostly occur in the landing phase, and local damage causes overall failure”. Table 4. Lunar soft-landing attempts, 2013–2025 # Mission Date Outcome # Mission Date Outcome 1 Chang’e-3 2013-12 Success 8 Chandrayaan-3 2023-08 Success 2 Chang’e-4 2019-01 Success 9 SLIM 2024-01 Partial 3 Beresheet 2019-04 Failure 10 IM-1 Odysseus 2024-02 Partial 4 Chandrayaan-2 2019-09 Failure 11 Chang’e-6 2024-06 Success 5 Chang’e-5 2020-12 Success 12 Blue Ghost 1 2025-03 Success 6 Hakuto-R M1 2023-04 Failure 13 IM-2 Athena 2025-03 Partial 7 Luna-25 2023-08 Failure 14 Hakuto-R M2 2025-06 Failure Sources: public releases of the respective mission agencies and the NASA NSSDCA lunar mission catalog [3]; the outcome classification is a judgment made in this study. With a uniform prior Beta(1, 1), k successes, and n total attempts, the posterior is Beta(1 + k, 1 + n − k), and the posterior mean is   (1) Counting “reaching the lunar surface” (success + partial, k = 9), pL = 0.625, with a 90% credible interval of 0.42–0.81; counting “full mission success” (k = 6), pL = 0.4375 (0.24–0.64). Considering commercial missions only (n = 5: one success, two partial, two failures), the posterior mean for full success is 0.29 (0.06–0.58) and for touchdown 0.57 (0.27–0.85), consistent with the statement that “commercial lunar landers have achieved full success only once” (Fig. 4). The small sample makes the intervals wide; this paper subsequently takes pL = 0.625 as the baseline and 0.4375 as the conservative case. Fig. 4. Lunar landing outcomes and posterior distribution of the single-landing success probability 4.3. Coverage Probability and Efficiency Model of a Distributed Sensor Network 4.3.1. Effective coverage model of a single sensor In a local area, neglecting lunar curvature, the ideal sensing radius of a single sensor is r and its ideal coverage area is . A terrain occlusion factor  is introduced to describe the occlusion caused by craters and terrain relief on the lunar surface, so that the effective coverage area of a single sensor in normal operation is . The failure probability of a single sensor is  and its working probability is . The expected effective coverage area of a single sensor is:   (2) If large-scale scenarios on the lunar sphere are considered, the coverage area of a spherical disc is:   (3) where  is the radius of the Moon. When , the spherical formula reduces to the planar formula, with an error of less than 1%. The regional deployment scenarios in this paper use the planar approximation. 4.3.2. Coverage probability at randomly deployed points N sensors are deployed uniformly at random over a region of total area S. The probability that any point in the region is covered by a single normally working sensor is , and after the failure probability is taken into account it is . The probability that the point is covered by at least one sensor is:   (4) When N is large, the Poisson approximation is used, and the effective node density is defined as :   (5) The regional mean coverage equals the point coverage probability:   (6) 4.3.3. Comparison of coverage efficiency per unit payload The coverage efficiency per unit launch mass, , is:   (7) where  is the mass of a single sensor. The efficiency per unit mass of a conventional monolithic rover is:   (8) The efficiency gain factor of the distributed scheme relative to the rover is:   (9) 4.3.4. Numerical simulation example Taking deployment in a local area of a lunar perpetual-daylight zone as an example, the parameter values are given in Table 5. Table 5. Parameters of distributed sensors versus a conventional rover Parameter Symbol Value Remarks Mass of a single sensor mu 0.1 kg Including MEMS sensing, communication, and micro power modules Effective sensing radius r 100 m Low-power wireless communication + multi-parameter environmental sensing Terrain occlusion factor α 0.7 Conservative value for hilly lunar terrain Sensor failure probability pf 0.2 Conservative estimate for extreme temperature/radiation environments Mass of a conventional lunar rover mrover 1000 kg Upper bound for heavy lunar rovers (rounded value of the Soviet Lunokhod rovers, about 756–840 kg); Yutu-2 is about 140 kg Effective detection radius of the rover rrover 1000 m Including roving range and single-point detection range The expected effective coverage area of a single sensor is: The distributed efficiency per unit mass is: The efficiency per unit mass of a conventional lunar rover is: The efficiency gain factor is: That is, for the same launch mass, the detection coverage area of the distributed sensing scheme is about 56 times that of a conventional lunar rover. It should be noted that the magnitude of γ depends on the conventional-rover baseline chosen: Table 5 uses a heavy lunar rover of 1000 kg (the class of the Soviet Lunokhod rovers); if Yutu-2, with a mass of about 140 kg, is used instead (with rrover still taken as 1000 m), then that is, the coverage advantage per unit mass of the distributed scheme falls to about 8 times, but remains significantly greater than 1. For a target region  and a total deployed mass of 1 t ( sensors): When the total deployed mass is raised to 10 t, , , and the mean coverage is: Analysis of results: A payload on the order of 10 t is sufficient to achieve 82.8% sensor coverage of a lunar-surface region of 1000 square kilometers; the system is highly robust, and a 20% sensor failure rate lowers coverage only slightly and does not cause the mission to collapse. Furthermore, a 1:1 physical simulation sandbox is built on the Earth side, using identical backup hardware that is mapped in real time to the lunar-surface devices, so that the asynchrony caused by delay is aligned. Mechanical coordination strategies are debugged by trial and error in the sandbox, and the verified control strategies are solidified into shareable engineering skills (SKILLS) and stored in the consensus system, forming the mutual integration of a distributed Earth–Moon network. 4.4. Diversification Reliability Model Suppose that the total number N of target nodes is divided equally among M independent landing carriers, and that each carrier lands successfully with probability q (taking q = pL; a carrier can release its nodes before touchdown). Define the coverage achievement ratio Φ as the proportion of nodes that are delivered and survive; when the carriers are independent of each other, the probability of reaching coverage φ0 is a binomial tail probability:   (10) If the carriers share common-cause failures (the same design, the same supplier, the same site, or the same software), the number of successful carriers follows a beta-binomial distribution, whose parameters are determined by the common-cause correlation coefficient ρ:   (11) Figure 5 and Table 6 give the results (φ0 = 30%; the sawtooth shape of the curves arises from rounding in ⌈φ0M⌉). M = 1 corresponds to a monolithic design: P(Φ ≥ 30%) = 0.625 and the probability of total loss is 0.375. With independent carriers, M = 5 reduces the probability of total loss to 0.0074 and M = 10 reduces it to 5.5×10−5; but when ρ = 0.5, it is still 0.099 at M = 10. In the conservative case pL = 0.4375, P(Φ ≥ 30%) at M = 10 is 0.886 (ρ = 0), 0.722 (ρ = 0.2), and 0.589 (ρ = 0.5). Therefore, the benefit of diversification depends on the independence of failures—which is precisely the advantage of the open-source route: numerous mutually independent teams, suppliers, sites, and delivery methods naturally lower ρ. Fig. 5. Effect of the number of independent carriers on the target-coverage probability and on the probability of total loss Table 6. Reliability under diversification (pL = 0.625) Number of carriers M P(Φ ≥ 30%) Probability of total loss ρ = 0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.5 1 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 3 0.947 0.891 0.796 0.0527 0.109 0.204 5 0.931 0.842 0.742 0.0074 0.0483 0.151 10 0.992 0.905 0.778 5.5×10−5 0.0129 0.0989 20 0.999 0.907 0.769 3.0×10−9 0.0029 0.0645 4.5. Mass Efficiency, Shock Resistance, and Cost Model Let the payload mass be mpay, the mass of a single node mnode, and the packaging factor κp; the number of nodes that can be carried is   (12) Taking κp = 0.3, each kilogram can carry 769 (1 g), 154 (5 g), 77 (10 g), 38 (20 g), or 15 (50 g) nodes. The Pragyan rover of Chandrayaan-3 has a mass of 26 kg, equivalent to 1000 nodes of 20 g or 4000 nodes of 5 g, which is the quantitative meaning of the statement that “one piece of equipment of the same mass can be converted into more than a thousand sensors”; moreover, the observation area, duration, and number of sites of a single rover are all far smaller than those of nodes deployed in a dispersed manner, whose long-term stationing on the Moon greatly extends the breadth and depth of observation. It should be noted that this section takes chip-scale/micro nodes of 1–50 g as its reference to illustrate how mass efficiency varies with node mass; the 0.1 kg-class nodes used in Tables 5 and 9 (including micro power and communication modules), with a packaging factor of 0.3, can be carried at about 7.7 per kilogram, and Pragyan (26 kg) is equivalent to about 200 such nodes. The touchdown speed and crush-stroke deceleration for low-altitude release are   (13) Table 7. Touchdown speed, crush-stroke deceleration, and nodes per kilogram for low-altitude release Release height h (m) Touchdown speed v (m/s) Deceleration a/g (s = 5 cm) Deceleration a/g (s = 2 cm) Nodes per kilogram (mnode) 5 4.0 17 41 769 (1 g) 10 5.7 33 83 154 (5 g) 20 8.0 66 165 77 (10 g) 50 12.7 165 413 38 (20 g) 100 18.0 330 826 15 (50 g) gMoon = 1.62 m s−2; decelerations are expressed in multiples of standard gravity (9.807 m s−2); dust and slope effects are not included. As Table 7 shows, for release within 100 m and a 2 cm crush stroke, the deceleration does not exceed about 830 g, which is within the range that commercial MEMS sensors and ruggedized electronic-component packages can withstand, but it still needs to be verified by ground shock tests (Table 9). In terms of economics, suppose that a dedicated landing carrier has a fixed cost Cf = US$60 million and a marginal cost cm = US$0.3 million/kg (corresponding to a payload of about 100 kg and a total price of about US$90 million, consistent with the order of magnitude of CLPS contracts, and a rough estimate made in this study from published contract values and payload masses); the cost of delivering a 100 kg payload with M dedicated carriers is MCf + cmmpay. If the nodes are carried as secondary payloads on existing missions (rideshare mode, in which the primary mission bears the fixed cost and the node party pays only the marginal cost plus an integration fee of about 0.1Cf per carrier), the cost falls significantly (Table 8). This shows that the economic logic of diversification does not depend on dedicated landers: it depends on the ability to ride along on existing, diverse missions, as in the rideshare launch mode of CubeSats. Table 8. Cost of diversification: dedicated carriers versus rideshare (100 kg payload) Number of carriers M Dedicated carriers (US$ million) Rideshare mode (US$ million) Relative saving 1 90 36 60% 5 330 60 82% 10 630 90 86% The parameters are scenario assumptions (Cf = US$60 million, cm = US$0.3 million/kg, integration fee 0.1Cf per carrier), used to compare trends and not as price quotations. 4.6. Baseline Design of the Sensor Unit The sensor unit is the smallest functional node of the whole system, and its design goals are “low mass, micro power consumption, low cost, high survival rate, and lifetime orientation”. Table 9 gives the design baseline proposed in this paper. Table 9. Baseline design of the sensor unit Parameter Design value/range Remarks Mass 0.1–0.35 kg Mainly sensor units with a side length of about 3 cm; envelope upper limit ≤ 1U, convenient for batch rideshare Dimensions ≤ 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm (mostly ≤ 3 cm × 3 cm × 3 cm) Standardized interface Photovoltaic power About 0.37 W (30% efficiency, 9 cm2 panel) Charging during the lunar day; powering the node in night zones Energy storage Lithium battery + supercapacitor Supports dormancy during the lunar night and communication bursts Night strategy 0.01 W dormancy; optional RHU/thermoelectric generation The lunar night lasts about 354 h Communication UHF 433 MHz / S 2.4 GHz; in-network transmit power 10 dBm; receiver sensitivity −120 dBm In-network 100 bps–1 kbps; direct-to-Earth bursts calculated at 1 W (30 dBm), see Table 11 Sensing payload Temperature, acceleration, radiation, magnetic field, dust, camera, three-axis microseismic, non-visible-light monitoring, etc. Configurable modules, flexible combination Lifetime Target ≥ 5 years (about 60 day–night cycles) Homogeneous batch + dormancy strategy Cost Manufacturing: on the order of ten US dollars (after mass production); including launch and operations: hundreds to thousands of US dollars (target value) The key to inclusive participation; depends on the unit price of delivery to the lunar surface (see Section 4.11) Shock resistance ≥ 1000 g (roughly equivalent to a 100 m free fall with a 2 cm crush stroke) See Table 7 Identity Unique ID + factory-installed public key; batch registration For ledger signatures and registration under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Ground verification Ground networking, thermal-vacuum, vibration, shock, and radiation tests; indicators meeting the lunar-grade standard Interconnection testing improved before launch; formation of Ver. 1.0 In terms of energy, the solar constant at the Moon is about 1361 W/m2 [35]. Taking a sensor unit with a side length of about 3 cm (a 3 cm × 3 cm panel) as an example, with a photovoltaic conversion efficiency of 30%, a peak power of about 0.37 W is obtained; calculated with a 70% duty cycle over a lunar day of 14.75 Earth days (about 354 h), the accumulated energy is about 9.1×101 W·h; the lunar night is likewise about 354 h long, and if a 0.01 W dormancy mode is used, supplemented by phase-change material for thermostatic control, the energy consumption during the night is about 3.5 W·h, so the surplus energy of the lunar day is sufficient to support multiple charge–discharge cycles. For missions that must traverse permanently shadowed regions near the poles or long-night zones, miniature radioisotope heater units (RHUs) can be used to maintain the minimum temperature, or thermoelectric generation can be used to supplement energy. As for temperature, the maximum daytime temperature at the lunar equator is about 120 °C, and the equatorial night temperature is about −130 °C to −173 °C (about 100–140 K); permanently shadowed regions at the poles can be as cold as about −246 °C [36]. Fixed, sealed sensors are little affected by lunar dust disturbance, and the dormancy strategy can significantly extend their lifetime. With the above design logic of “homogeneous batches, survival through dormancy”, the manufacturing cost of a sensor can be reduced to the order of ten US dollars, and the target total cost including launch and operations is on the order of hundreds to thousands of US dollars (see Section 4.11); a working lifetime of several years can be achieved in harsh environments. 4.7. Comparison of Deployment Modes and Landing Schemes Figure 6 and Table 10 compare four deployment modes. Low-altitude scattering: the carrier is required to release the nodes at an altitude of 10–50 m while maintaining translational motion, and the nodes land at a speed of 6–13 m/s; its core design principle is “release before touchdown”, so that even if the carrier subsequently tips over (as with IM-1 and IM-2), the nodes already released are unaffected. Rover-based seeding: a slow-moving lunar rover lays nodes along its path, and the vehicle doubles as a base station and hub. With an effective seeding swath width of 100 m and a vehicle speed of 0.05 m/s, about 55.6 h of continuous driving is needed per square kilometer; at a 30% duty cycle, about 1.9 km2 can be seeded in each lunar day (14.77 d), comparable to a single cornerstone contract (1.5 km2). Astronaut planting: suited to the core areas of special geological structures, but crewed spaceflight is expensive and unsuitable for multi-region, long-term deployment, and it is better regarded as an “incidental task” outside the main plan. Fig. 6. Schematic of the four deployment modes In addition, large infrastructure with multi-level energy absorption can be established on the lunar surface to receive sensor modules wrapped in airbags and delivered continuously from high lunar orbit by reverse-ballistic delivery. The payload adopts a dispersed packaging scheme in which large numbers of micro sensors are encapsulated in flat cushioning airbag bodies, and precision guidance near the lunar surface achieves a low-angle landing; the orbital platform or delivery capsule must apply active braking (the circular-orbit speed at 100 km is 1.634 km/s) to reduce the touchdown speed to a range that the airbag cushioning can withstand. Table 10. Comparison of deployment modes Mode Release/motion Speed and deceleration Advantages Risks and cost A Low-altitude scattering Carrier releases at 10–50 m altitude; a throwing mechanism is required 5.7–12.7 m/s; 83–413 g (2 cm crush stroke) Large coverage; no rover required High demands on carrier precision and node shock resistance; low cost B Rover-based seeding Rover lays nodes along its path at 0.05 m/s ≈ 0; automated on-board bay Controllable path; can double as hub and base station Landing risk; low throughput (≈ 1.9 km2 per lunar day); medium cost C Astronaut planting Manual “rice-transplanting” of sensor devices ≈ 0 High precision; adjustable deployment High risk, extremely high cost, small coverage (special geological zones, such as rugged ground, valley fissures, pit floors, and rock tunnels) D High-orbit airbag delivery Airbag inflation for shock absorption + multi-level energy-absorbing measures on the ground Very high; rapid energy absorption Continuous delivery possible; lunar-surface infrastructure required High construction cost, but the lowest long-term delivery cost; crew must be stationed for lunar-surface assistance Evaluation: The landing of sensors significantly reduces the difficulty and risk of lunar missions. A comprehensive comparison shows that low-altitude throwing and airbag-cushioned descent are suited to rapid scattering over large areas, with technology based mainly on “one-way, no return needed”, and have the lowest difficulty and cost; the rover soft-landing “seeding” approach, in which the rover doubles as a base station and hub, is an optional path for building the backbone network; manual assistance by astronauts is applicable only to small-scale special-landform areas with rugged terrain that are difficult to scatter mechanically, and has the highest cost. Actual deployment can adopt a strategy of “combining multiple modes, advancing progressively by region”: first dispersal by rover, then dispersal by throwing, to establish the first hotspots in perpetual-daylight zones; once the energy-absorbing infrastructure is complete, airbag delivery is used for scaled-up expansion; and key areas are all supplemented by human assistance. 4.8. Mathematical Modeling of Networking and Coverage Assume that the sensors are distributed on the lunar surface in an approximately hexagonal grid, where Rs is the effective coverage radius of a single node (that is, the circumradius of the equivalent regular hexagon, which is also the side length of the hexagon), the spacing between adjacent nodes is √3Rs, and the node communication range must be no less than this spacing; the area of the equivalent regular hexagon covered by a single node is . Letting the surface area of the Moon be A = 3.793669×107 km2 [37], the number of sensors required for full coverage is:   (14) Figure 7 shows the variation of N with Rs (on log–log axes). When Rs = 5 km, N ≈ 5.8×105; when Rs = 10 km, N ≈ 1.5×105; and when Rs = 20 km, N ≈ 3.7×104. The order of magnitude of the “880 000 cornerstone nodes” in the scheme of this paper is compatible with this: theoretical full coverage can be achieved if Rs ≈ 4.1 km (an adjacent-node spacing of about 7.1 km); taking terrain relief, redundant backup, and hotspot aggregation into account, designing Rs in the range of 5–10 km, with a node count of 1.5×105–5.8×105, is a reasonable engineering baseline, and 880 000 nodes leave redundancy for it (when Rs is taken as 5–10 km, the adjacent-node spacing is about 8.7–17 km, which exceeds the 3–8 km single-hop capability of the gateway/beacon layer and requires aggregation through relays; the 7.1 km spacing corresponding to 880 000 nodes lies within that single-hop capability). Fig. 7. Network coverage model (lunar surface area A = 3.793669×107 km2) The above Rs, taken on the kilometer scale, corresponds to the coverage radius of the gateway/beacon layer, while the node layer is responsible only for local hotspots. The network is interconnected progressively in three layers: (i) the node layer, with single hops of 100–500 m, forming local hotspots; (ii) the gateway/beacon layer, with mast heights of 3–20 m and single hops of 3–8 km, providing addresses and high-precision positioning for hotspots; and (iii) the circumlunar relay layer, responsible for Earth–Moon backhaul and bandwidth expansion. On a smooth lunar surface, the line-of-sight distance of a node with an antenna height of 0.1 m is about 589 m, about 3.2 km for 3 m, about 5.9 km for 10 m, and about 8.3 km for 20 m; terrain occlusion makes the effective distance smaller, which determines the necessity of a layered architecture (Section 4.8). Initially, large numbers of long-lived nodes are deployed in areas with long illumination periods and short night periods (near-permanently illuminated peaks, with an annual illumination fraction of more than 80% [38]) and in polar regions of high detection value; newly added sites adjoin existing hotspots and are easy to integrate; the network permeates from perpetual-daylight zones to perpetual-night zones, from the near side to the far side, and from the maria to the highlands, and into lava tubes and lunar pits [7,8,39–41], finally achieving complete deployment in a jigsaw-like manner. The temperature inside lunar pits is relatively stable (about 17 °C, as observed by Diviner [41]), more than two hundred lunar pits have been cataloged [40], and radar echoes also indicate intact lava tubes extending for tens of kilometers [8]; these are priority targets for the node network to advance deeper. Summary: In terms of structural evolution, the network should be distributed in a “chain-like, block-like” pattern, gradually forming the “neural sensing system” of the Moon: extending from perpetual-daylight zones to perpetual-night zones, spreading from the near side to the far side, and permeating from the maria to the highlands and lunar caves (with particular attention to selecting lunar lava-tube skylights for exploration so as to extend the sensor network deep into the tunnels and form an underground network). 4.9. Communication Links, Delay Compensation, and Earth–Moon Mutual Mapping The mean Earth–Moon distance is 384 400 km, the one-way light time is about 1.282 s (1.189 s at perigee and 1.357 s at apogee), and the round trip is about 2.56 s. The lunar-surface network should adopt DTN/Bundle Protocol version 7 [26,27] and follow the LunaNet interoperability specification [25]. For inter-satellite and Earth-direct links, the free-space path loss is:   (15) Taking a transmit power of 1 W (30 dBm), a 3 dBi sensor antenna, a 44 dBi ground-station antenna, a system noise figure of 1 dB, and BPSK modulation (required Eb/N0 = 10 dB) as an example, Table 11 gives the link budgets of the main frequency bands, and Fig. 8 gives the path loss and achievable data rate of each band. Table 11. Example of a direct-to-Earth link budget (1 W, 3 dBi sensor antenna, 44 dBi ground station, 2 dB additional loss) Parameter UHF 433 MHz S 2.4 GHz X 8.4 GHz Free-space loss Lfs (dB) 196.9 211.7 222.6 Received power Pr (dBm) −121.9 −136.7 −147.6 Thermal-noise power spectral density (dBm/Hz) −174 −174 −174 Maximum supported bit rate R (bps) ≈ 1.3×104 ≈ 4.3×102 ≈ 3.5×101 Engineering conclusion Direct-to-Earth link usable Relay/aggregation required Directional antenna or relay required Fig. 8. Free-space path loss and achievable direct-to-Earth data rate by band (BPSK, Eb/N0 = 10 dB, system noise figure 1 dB) The calculations show that omnidirectional low-power sensors communicating directly with Earth can support only bit rates on the order of kbps or lower (the UHF band is best, at about 1.3×104 bps; the S band about 4.3×102 bps), which cannot support high-throughput services. The system must therefore rely on lunar-surface hotspot aggregation (sensor-to-sensor mesh links), lunar-orbit relay constellations, and DTN store-and-forward [9] to uplink data in tiers; this also confirms the overall idea that “construction of the information backbone takes precedence over applications”. As for delay compensation, the lunar environment is “parameter-minimal” (a “few-token world”—no atmosphere, no weather, low-frequency geological activity, and no biological disturbance), and its physical processes are highly predictable. Model-predictive compensation is adopted:   (16) That is, a local dynamics model f(x, u) is used to predict the system state τ seconds ahead (τ > the one-way delay), and the model parameters are continuously corrected with the actual feedback of the small machines. As sensing density increases, a progression from the real-time picture of the “Moon’s next second” to the predictive picture of the “Moon’s next minute” can gradually be realized, ultimately supporting the Earth-side simulation sandbox, teleoperation, and gamified advance verification. A “digital-twin lunar region” is built on the Earth side and implemented with mature tools such as game engines: because the lunar parameters are minimal, early local data suffice to reproduce real lunar scenes with high fidelity, and through predictive construction this realism is mapped to Earth in advance, so that gamers, commercial organizations, and enthusiasts can explore and experiment by trial and error in the simulated lunar environment; it also provides large models with a physical-world training environment in which behavior and outcomes serve as feedback. For remotely operated lunar-surface equipment, suppose that the unmodeled disturbance acceleration is white noise (power spectral density q, in m2 s−3); then the standard deviation of the position error after an open-loop prediction horizon τ is   (17) A Monte Carlo simulation (4000 runs) agrees with the analytical expression to within 8% over τ = 0.5–5 s (at τ = 2.56 s: 0.02357 m versus 0.02365 m; Fig. 9). For the Earth–Moon round trip of 2.56 s, σx is 2.4 mm, 2.4 cm, and 0.24 m for q = 10−6, 10−4, and 10−2, respectively, far smaller than the meter-level accuracy required for lunar-surface operations, so a digital twin is sufficient to compensate for the delay. When the prediction horizon is extended to 60 s (the “Moon’s next minute”), the open-loop error rises to 2.7 m at q = 10−4, and continuous alignment and correction with measured data are required. If the same method were applied to Mars (minimum round trip of about 6.1 min, i.e., 364 s), the error would reach 40 m at q = 10−4, and 783 m for a round trip of 44 min, so that it could no longer be used for teleoperation and one could only rely on autonomy. The Moon is therefore not only the celestial body with the simplest environment but also the best test bed for verifying the closed loop of “ground mapping—predictive compensation—measurement alignment”, which supports the progressive order of “the Moon first, other bodies afterward”. Fig. 9. Open-loop position-prediction error versus prediction horizon, with Monte Carlo validation 4.10. Lunar Computing and Conditional Justification of Infrastructure Once sensor-network coverage and the machine ecosystem have matured, the Moon will enter the facility-building stage. This paper recommends giving priority to deploying lunar computing: suitable lunar caves (lava tubes) are selected on the basis of the exploration data, and server clusters are delivered into the caves and deployed at scale. In addition to assisting the development of the Moon itself, part of Earth’s computing demand can also be migrated to the Moon, shifting the carbon footprint to the lunar side; to deal with the delay problem, an “inference ladder” can be set up according to the gradient of computing load distribution between Earth and the Moon, with the different needs of urgent results and slow results deployed in tiers between Earth and the Moon; delay-insensitive tasks, such as token factories, can be placed on the lunar side, weaving the full-dimensional information of Earth into an “information tapestry” and providing computational support for human activities. In parallel, beacon and hotspot networking can achieve high-precision positioning and scheduling on the lunar surface, supporting the large-scale operation of autonomous transport networks and unmanned factories, and gradually handing Earth’s production over to the Moon as well, so that Earth can be restored to its original ecology. Electricity consumption by data centers has become an issue for Earth’s energy supply: the IEA estimates about 415 TWh in 2024 and about 945 TWh by 2030 in its base case [42]. The concept of moving computing power to the Moon includes: deploying servers inside lava tubes/lunar pits and mounting them against the walls; using the rock walls as a partial natural heat-dissipation interface, which, together with liquid-circulating heat-conducting pipes inside and outside the rock mass and internal circulation of gas within the cave (from deep to shallow layers), solves the problem of heat dissipation in space; and exploiting the naturally stable environment of about 17 °C inside the tunnels [41] and the shielding provided by the rock mass against cosmic rays and micrometeoroids (the dose-equivalent rate measured on the lunar surface by Chang’e-4 is about 1369 μSv/day [43]). The rock walls inside the cave are not an infinite heat sink: the thermal diffusivity of the rock mass is about 6.3×10−7 m2/s (k = 1.5 W/m/K), the thermal penetration depth over one year is only about 4.4 m, and every 1000 m3 of rock heated by 20 K can absorb only about 13 MWh, equivalent to only a dozen or so hours for a 1 MW load; long-term heat dissipation must still rely on radiation to deep space. The heat flux of the radiator is   (18) Taking ε = 0.9 and Ts = 100 K, the heat fluxes at radiating temperatures of 300, 330, and 360 K are 408, 600, and 852 W/m2, so that each MW requires about 2450, 1670, and 1170 m2 of radiating area, respectively. On the power-supply side, 1 MW requires about 3270 m2 of photovoltaic panels (25% efficiency, illumination factor 0.9), which at 100 W/kg amounts to about 10 t; long-term operation requires the establishment of small nuclear reactors as the energy supply: the United States has proposed deploying a lunar fission surface power station of about 100 kW around 2030 [44], and China and Russia have proposed building a lunar nuclear power plant around 2035 [45]; that is, all parties have proposed building small nuclear facilities on the lunar surface by 2036 at the latest; but the single-unit power currently planned is only on the order of hundreds of kilowatts, and a 1 MW-class computing load would still require multiple units or higher-power units. Conclusion: lunar computing cannot be justified by electricity cost alone; long-term goals must rely on conditional reasons such as in-situ manufacturing (e.g., photovoltaics made from lunar-regolith silicon), resilient backup, heat rejection and the transfer of the carbon footprint, and in-situ support for the development of the Moon itself, and must seek to scale up. This paper lists it as an extension beyond L4, whose preconditions—the locations of lava tubes/lunar pits and their thermal and mechanical parameters—are precisely the information that the sensor network can provide first. 4.11. Engineering Feasibility and Economic Analysis (1) Maturity of sensor technology: Micro-sensor technology is already highly mature on Earth. Technologies such as MEMS (micro-electro-mechanical systems) sensors, low-power wireless communication modules, and miniaturized energy units have all achieved large-scale commercial production. The difficulty and cost of adapting these technologies to the lunar surface (mainly thermal management and radiation hardening) are far lower than developing space-grade integrated equipment from scratch. (2) Technical verification of distributed systems: Distributed sensor networks and self-organizing communication protocols are already widely applied on Earth (such as the Internet of Things and wireless sensor networks). The successful practice of blockchain and distributed-ledger technology in cryptocurrencies has also verified the technical feasibility of decentralized consensus mechanisms [14]. Adapting these technologies to the lunar communication environment (high delay, intermittent connectivity) is an engineering challenge, but not a barrier of principle. (3) Flexibility of launch and deployment: The miniaturization and light weight of sensor modules significantly reduce the demands on launch capability. The mass of a single sensor module is on the order of a hundred grams, and the total mass of thousands of modules is still far lower than that of a conventional lunar lander. This means that a variety of flexible launch methods, such as “rideshare” launches, CubeSat hosting, and group-buying on commercial rockets, can be adopted, greatly reducing the cost and risk of a single mission. (4) Fundamental change in the cost structure: The cost structure of conventional lunar missions is “high fixed cost + concentrated high risk”. With one rocket, one lander, and one mission, the failure of any link means the loss of the entire investment. Small sensor modules, by contrast, are upgraded for space use from mature civilian microelectronics, mass production drives down the unit price, and crowdfunding spreads the launch cost, greatly lowering the financial threshold for individual participation. Its cost structure is characterized by “low marginal cost + risk dispersion”: the cost of a single sensor module can be kept at the order of hundreds to thousands of US dollars (based on upgrading mass-produced sensors on Earth and on the concentration of electronic-device manufacturing; this target includes launch and operations: the delivered-to-lunar-surface unit price roughly estimated from CLPS contract values and payload masses is about US$106/kg, so that the delivery cost of a 0.1 kg-class node (about 0.13 kg with packaging) is about US$105 per node, and the target order of magnitude can be reached only once the delivery unit price falls to about US$103/kg, or the cost is shared through rideshare and crowdfunding); even if some modules fail during landing or operation, the impact on the system as a whole is extremely limited. (5) This paper advocates “thinking one step further”: anchoring physical objects with a consensus ownership-attribution system [46], with the names engraved on lunar-resident devices serving as ownership attribution; siderophile elements are lacking in the lunar crust, and such metals, which are relatively abundant on Earth, are instead very scarce on the Moon; encouraging the manufacture of lunar-resident devices from iron and nickel is in essence building, in advance, a smelting-feedstock store for future lunar construction, converting Earth’s surplus production capacity into fixed assets and a “precious-metal” raw-material depot on the Moon; the economic logic of this strategy is intuitive and attractive as an investment. 5. Golden Consensus: Consensus-Based Assurance and Incentives for Exploration Results 5.1. Problem Definition and Methods The open-source route inevitably brings massive, dispersed, and heterogeneous contributors. Without a reliable mechanism for attributing results and rewarding contributions, public participation will be unsustainable; without assurance of “consensus on exploration results”, collaboration will collapse for lack of mutual trust. For this reason, this paper proposes the “Golden Consensus” system: a contribution-assurance and incentive system that uses the golden ratio as its allocation criterion, a distributed ledger as its technical foundation, and “information-space ownership” as its legal definition, with the goal of converting dispersed exploration contributions into auditable, inheritable, and exchangeable value records on the basis of the consensus that “the Moon belongs to all humankind”; the contract explicitly defines its start and end points as follows: from the time humans have been continuously stationed for more than 365 Earth days, the following 99 Earth years constitute the valid term of the exploration right, which is released upon expiry. The explorers are strangers to one another, differ in geography and conviction, and the nodes are located on a lunar surface that is difficult to reach physically. When complex space missions are broken down into large numbers of lightweight subtasks and ownership of value is attributed through object-attributed value [46], the consensus system must simultaneously solve: (i) ownership attribution and bookkeeping—who contributed what data, hardware, or algorithm, when, and where; (ii) data-value consensus—how to determine that lunar-surface data are credible and how to measure their value; (iii) incentives and allocation—how to safeguard and motivate contributors while preserving the public interest; and (iv) attack resistance—Sybil attacks (forging large numbers of identities), data poisoning, ledger tampering, and centralization of governance. Turning tasks and hardware into nodes and using cryptographic bookkeeping to let people of different geographies and beliefs each take on a share of the challenge toward a common goal is the lesson of the success of the “open-source, distributed” approach of cryptocurrencies [14]; what is special about the lunar version is that node identities and data are anchored to real lunar-surface affairs and things that can be verified by physical means. For example, it records and evaluates the contribution of every participant along the whole chain, including sensor designers, manufacturers, launch funders, commissioning personnel, developers of the simulation system, volunteer data analysts, and so on. The golden-ratio proportion is widespread in natural distributed systems; this mechanism therefore has natural stability and can form a long-term balance between individual incentives and the overall public interest, avoiding the two extremes of excessive privatization and insufficient incentives. 5.2. Mathematical Basis and Sensitivity of the Golden Ratio The golden ratio is:   (19) Its reciprocal is 1/φ ≈ 0.618. Given the difficulty of finding an allocation ratio more “elegant and balanced” than 0.618, this paper explores 61.8% as the benchmark of development returns for early pioneers: of the proceeds from the valuable ownership information formed by explorers’ development of the blank lunar surface, 61.8% belongs to the explorer (of which a further 2.8% serves as a “common allocation” for public facilities, used to build public facilities on the lunar surface, such as observatories, scientific test sites, and public transport corridors), and 38.2% is designated as socially shared, so as to delineate the interface between social wealth and shared wealth (Fig. 10). This ratio is not fixed; subsequent contracts will adjust it dynamically according to actual feedback, forming a “dynamic consensus”. Fig. 10. Allocation of Golden Consensus rights (schematic): explorers 61.8% (including a 2.8% “common allocation” for public facilities) and socially shared 38.2% (i) Self-similar allocation. Consider a nested governance structure (individual—community—block—whole Moon): each level keeps a share p of income for the individuals at that level and puts the remaining (1 − p) into the common pool (with p = 0.618, p is the explorer share, which includes the 2.8% common allocation for public facilities; 1 − p = 0.382 is socially shared). If it is required that “the ratio of the common pool to the individual share equals the ratio of the individual share to the total”, so that the same rule holds at every level (scale invariance), then   (20) The common pool at level k is pk−1(1 − p) and the remainder passed down is pk; the sum over all levels is always 1 (Fig. 11c). The ratio of adjacent Fibonacci numbers Fn/Fn+1 has already converged to 0.6180 at n = 10 (error < 10−4, Fig. 11b), showing that this ratio is also a stable ratio for discrete allocation that can be expressed in integers. (ii) Schelling focal point. When multiple participants cannot communicate beforehand yet must choose the same rule simultaneously, an option that is salient and unique more easily becomes the consensus [19]. The value 0.618 is mathematically unique, interpretable, and widely disseminated across cultures, and is therefore suitable as the focal value for early pioneers; this does not mean that it is welfare-optimal. (iii) Steady-state welfare model and its sensitivity. Normalize the population of potential contributors, with participation cost c ~ U(0, cmax); an individual receives a return of share p, and the common pool raises the productivity of all (amplification factor κ). In the steady state,   (21) The fixed point is solved numerically, and the p* that maximizes welfare W is found: for four representative parameter sets (κ, cmax) = (0.5, 1.5), (1.0, 1.5), (1.5, 1.5), and (1.0, 2.0), the optimal p* is 0.78, 0.65, 0.50, and 0.71, respectively, and the welfare at p = 0.618 is 94.8%, 99.6%, 75.0%, and 97.7% of the maximum, respectively (Fig. 11a); over a 30-set parameter grid with κ ∈ [0.25, 1.5] and cmax ∈ [0.8, 2.0], p* ranges from 0.30 to 0.90 with a median of 0.655, and the p with the smallest mean relative welfare loss is 0.62, yet the mean loss is still 22.6% in that case. The conclusion is that the golden ratio is a reasonable initial value and focal point lying in the middle of the optimal range, but a fixed ratio cannot be optimal for all parameters, and a feedback-adjustment mechanism must be established. This is consistent with the statement on the display panel that “later contracts will inevitably undergo more reasonable consensus adjustments according to actual feedback”. Fig. 11. Steady-state welfare versus retained share, Fibonacci-ratio convergence, and nested allocation (iv) Adjustment rules (recommended). p is restricted to the interval [0.5, 0.75]; in each cycle (e.g., one year), it may be adjusted by at most ±0.02; any adjustment must be approved by more than two-thirds of the BFT committee and publicly announced to the community. The adjustment indicators may include the participation rate, the utilization rate of the common pool, and contribution concentration (e.g., the Gini coefficient), so as to avoid “long-term lock-in by a few pioneers”. 5.3. Cornerstone Nodes and Cornerstone Contracts To give the consensus ledger sufficient resistance to tampering, the scheme sets up 880 000 “cornerstone nodes” (Table 12): nodes that are as dispersed as possible jointly store a consistent master ledger of contracts, which anyone can check and query at any time. Its immutability comes from the dual safeguards of dispersion and cryptographic hardening—just as one should not “put all the eggs in one basket”: devices dispersed across Earth and the Moon form a huge number of consensus-linked replicas, which are far harder to destroy or tamper with as a whole than centralized storage. As an example, each cornerstone contract corresponds to a nominal lunar-surface division of about 1.5 km2; the 880 000 contracts together have a nominal area of about 1.32×106 km2, about 3.48% of the lunar surface area (3.793669×107 km2); considering craters, slopes, and deployability, the actual area covered is expected to be significantly smaller (the design document estimates that it may be below 1%). Contract ownership uses the longitude, latitude, and altitude of the lunar surface as anchoring coordinates, and the order of precedence is determined by launch time, from which explorers choose sites; owing to libration, about 59% of the lunar surface can be observed directly from Earth, and the scheme is designed to encourage broad exploration across the remaining 41% on the far side; once ownership has been anchored by longitude and latitude, the scheme no longer considers changes in landform (the scheme affects how explorers weigh lunar stationing points in terms of altitude values). Table 12. Key parameters of Golden Consensus Parameter Value/setting Remarks Golden-ratio allocation 61.8% / 38.2% Explorer return (including the 2.8% common allocation) / socially shared Of which: common allocation 2.8% Deducted from the explorer return, for building public facilities and providing public services (observatories, scientific test sites, public transport corridors, etc.) Net explorer share 59.0% Obtained as 61.8% − 2.8% Number of cornerstone nodes 8.8×105 Distributed-ledger replicas Nominal area per contract About 1.5 km2 Longitude/latitude projection and altitude anchoring Nominal coverage fraction About 3.48% of the lunar surface The actual deployable area is expected to be lower Ownership space Information space Does not constitute a territorial claim; 99-year exploration right 5.4. Consensus Ledger and Data Valorization The consensus ledger operates in “information space” rather than “territorial space”: ownership anchoring is established by the cornerstone contracts from the moment they begin operating on Earth, and the informatization of the lunar surface is merely an extension of the consensus mechanism to the lunar surface. After the lunar-surface information collected by the sensors has been ownership-attributed by technical means, it can supplement humankind’s lunar knowledge base—for example, by forming high-pixel data portraits of the lunar surface, stratigraphic information, and environmental data; valuable ownership information that has been explored can be transferred for payment to constitute an “information mine”, from which explorers obtain 61.8% of the value return (including the 2.8% common allocation for public facilities); the data also serve as nourishment for artificial-intelligence learning (for example, physical models of the celestial-body world). To achieve decentralized control at the device level, this paper introduces the “consensus module”: a blockchain-based control device with a verifiable Internet-of-Things ID that supports fully decentralized communication and the cross-body control of small electromechanical devices, designed as LEGO-style building-block modules so that ordinary members of the public can program devices on the lunar surface. In the time dimension, because the gravitational fields and relative motions of the various bodies and of different points on the lunar surface differ, time elapses differently; information flow must therefore be “grounded” and “earthed” with Earth as the unified reference and timestamped, and the higher the sensing density and the more thorough the delay compensation, the more accurate the time reference. Two-layer ledger: The nodes and gateways within a lunar-surface block (coverage area) maintain a low-latency “block-local ledger” and periodically anchor the Merkle root hash [17] to a distributed ledger on the Earth side, forming the “Earth-anchored ledger”. The round-trip delay of 2.56 s means that the system should be designed under a partially synchronous model [47], using BFT-type protocols, whose fault-tolerance limit is fewer than one-third malicious nodes [15,16]. Let the malicious fraction be f; the probability that a randomly drawn committee of size k fails (malicious ≥ 1/3) is given in Table 13: for k = 301, the failure probability is 2.5×10−8 at f = 0.2 and 5.5×10−4 at f = 0.25; for k = 1001 it falls to 1.9×10−9 at f = 0.25. The larger the committee, the safer it is, but the higher the delay and communication cost, so the committee should be configured in tiers according to the scenario. Data-value consensus: An observation di = (node ID, time, reading, signature) must be supported by k neighboring independent nodes and by a physical-model consistency check before it enters the “trusted” state. The probability that a majority vote is corrupted by a malicious majority is   (22) For k = 9 and f = 0.2 it is 1.96%, for k = 15 it is 0.42%, and for k = 25 it is 0.037% (Table 13). Resistance to Sybil attacks comes from “proof of physical presence”: the scarcity of node identities derives from the cost of real launch and landing, and a node must have its position confirmed by ranging from at least three certified beacons before it obtains bookkeeping eligibility; the cost of forging a node equals the cost of sending it to the Moon, which deprives the act of any point. Table 13. BFT-committee failure probability and majority-vote misjudgment probability Committee size k Failure probability Arbitration size k Misjudgment probability f = 0.2 f = 0.25 f = 0.2 f = 0.3 21 4.3×10−2 0.130 5 5.8×10−2 0.163 101 9.0×10−4 3.2×10−2 9 1.96×10−2 9.9×10−2 301 2.5×10−8 5.5×10−4 15 4.2×10−3 5.0×10−2 1001 2.8×10−23 1.9×10−9 25 3.7×10−4 1.7×10−2 5.5. Incentive Compatibility and Participation Mechanisms The core of open source is to decompose complex space missions into simple tasks oriented toward public applications. The incentive mechanisms (Table 14) include but are not limited to: (1) educational incentives: scholarships and academic programs encourage student teams to complete the entire process of sensor design, programming, and testing; (2) gamification incentives: digital games set in the real lunar environment, simulation sandboxes, and “lunar treasure hunting” allow achievements and rights to accumulate while the game turns into exploration, converting people drawn in by games into participants in space activities; (3) market incentives: data and computing services are made fee-based, so that launching sensors to the Moon becomes a “borrowing arrows with straw boats” kind of mass public investment; (4) community incentives: communities of collaborators are formed with blocks as units to overcome regional engineering problems and thereby form collaborative communities. In mechanism design, speculation and “land grabbing” must be prevented: coverage areas operate openly to global open-source probes, and the data and services of any entity are recorded under the same consensus rules, so that individual contributions are incentivized while the common property of all humankind is safeguarded. Table 14. Roles and incentives of participants Participant Responsibilities Main incentives Competent space authorities Building simple lunar rovers; building broadband routers on relay satellites; formulating launch plans Industrial layout, talent reserve, enhancing space standing Education authorities Guiding schools in offering open-source courses; organizing competitions and scholarships STEM capability and interest, talent pipeline Schools and student teams Designing, manufacturing, and testing sensors; training specialized models Named credit, scholarships, ledger records Commercial launch providers Carrying nodes and rovers (including rideshare) Growth in launch demand, market expansion Game/software companies Sandbox, digital-twin, and real-lunar-environment applications Content and users, real data Operating alliance (non-profit) Authorization liaison, batch registration, ledger operation, insurance pool Operating fees from the commons fund (the socially shared portion) Individuals, the public, and communities Funding, naming, treasure hunting, collaborative problem-solving Ownership, beneficiary rights, sense of participation 6. Legal and Governance Analysis 6.1. Compatibility with the Outer Space Treaty Article I of the Outer Space Treaty provides that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, that there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies, that there shall be freedom of scientific investigation, and that States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation [31]. An open-source sensor network extended to extraterrestrial bodies is grounded in the key provision that exploration and use “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries”, and falls within the scope of the scientific investigation that the Treaty encourages. Article II prohibits national appropriation of outer space by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means; the “ownership” in this scheme is explicitly defined in information space (data rights and the recording of development contributions), makes no claim of lunar territorial sovereignty, treats the common allocation for public facilities and the 38.2% socially shared portion as the part shared by all humankind, and is limited to an exploration-right term of 99 Earth years (counted from the time humans have been continuously stationed for more than 365 Earth days), after which it is released; it therefore does not conflict with Article II. Article VI requires States Parties to bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and provides that the activities of non-governmental entities shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party [31]; the open-source scheme of this paper is explicitly coordinated by the competent space authorities on Earth, implemented through commercial launch contracts, and landed through State-authorized channels (such as CLPS-type mechanisms [4]), and individuals and school groups are brought into the framework of State responsibility through authorization and supervision, so that the scheme has a clear executable path. The Treaty does not prohibit individual participation in exploration; on the contrary, it leaves room for “public activities conducted by way of State authorization”—which is also the legal premise on which the open-source route can stand. 6.2. Relationship to the Artemis Accords and Other New Frameworks The Artemis Accords establish principles such as safety zones, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, and the utilization of space resources, and expressly reaffirm commitments under the Outer Space Treaty [32]. The Open-Source Moon network can serve as a “public infrastructure layer” for cooperation among multiple countries and multiple actors: the sensor network and the consensus ledger belong to no single country and operate openly to global open-source probes, which is consistent with the Accords’ spirit of transparency and interoperability; its recording of “information-space ownership” is also compatible with the safety-zone mechanism—safety zones coordinate physical activity areas, whereas the information-space ledger records data rights, so that the two are layered and complementary. Golden Consensus is not land title but the attribution of rights to use the results of contributions over 99 Earth years and of derivative proceeds, thereby avoiding the legal red line of claims of sovereignty over celestial bodies. Although the Moon Agreement provides an international regime for the use of lunar resources, it has not yet become universally binding because the major space-faring nations have not ratified it [34]; the mechanism proposed in this paper is still guided in values by its spirit of the “common heritage of mankind”. 6.3. Interpretability and Enforceability of the Open-Source Route The potential conflict between the open-source route and the “old rules of space” centers on its mode of operation, in which individuals and civil groups are the actors. This paper holds that the conflict can be explained and can be enforced: first, at the level of interpretation—the Treaty’s “State responsibility” provision already brings non-governmental activities into the system of State supervision, so individual participation is not outside the law but an authorized activity within the framework of State responsibility; second, at the level of implementation—the leading organization should (a) apply to the competent space authorities of each country for an “open-science mission permit”; (b) establish a coverage-area registry and a frequency-coordination mechanism in the consensus ledger; (c) implement transportation through commercial launch contracts (existing commercial rideshare launches already provide a low-threshold channel, with a list price of about US$300 000 per 50 kg in 2024 [48] and about US$350 000 per 50 kg in 2026 [49]); and (d) implement public participation through scholarships and funding programs, forming a four-party closed loop of “administrative supervision—commercial carriage—public design and manufacture—consensus bookkeeping”. 7. Social and Educational Effects and Implementation Roadmap 7.1. Education and Talent One of the most important social effects of the open-source route is education. By breaking down the technical difficulty of lunar-stationing missions and distributing it in a decentralized way, and by having institutions, civil groups, and schools in different places undertake the design, manufacture, and commissioning of one class of sensors through dedicated courses, aerospace technologies and problems can be “absorbed by the public in the way that food is digested into chyle”. After course outcomes have been verified by test centers, competitions can be organized for selection; high-quality detection tasks and hardware, combined with scholarships and launch funding, allow outstanding designs to actually reach the Moon and be put into practice. In this process, the public will gain a large cohort of future space engineers, designers, space enthusiasts, and practitioners; the scale effect of Galaxy Zoo [11] shows that a large base of citizen-science participants helps give rise to more senior scientists and new research topics. 7.2. Industrial and Market Significance The open-source route can significantly energize the commercial space market: as launch volume grows, the marginal cost of rockets and rideshare services keeps falling [48]; game companies can undertake the initial programming and mapping work, compensating for delay through predictive construction; countries and regions on different technological tracks can all take part, verifying ideas at low cost first and then iterating to expand in scale. As the space industry develops, demand will drive progress in artificial intelligence, machinery development, and mineral exploration, giving rise to new technologies, new materials, and new solutions; the wave of space activity will also act like a stirring rod in the pool of the economy, driving Earth’s development and the training of a new generation of talent, and then carrying out the exploration of celestial bodies in a standardized way. Because of the vast disparity between the numbers of individuals and of celestial bodies, it is necessary to promote human reproduction, encourage having and raising more children, and extend lifespan. 7.3. Staged Implementation Roadmap The evolution of an unfamiliar celestial body from barren bare rock into a smart planet with sensing, execution, and autonomous-operation capabilities is highly isomorphic to the development of a multicellular organism: the organism begins with sensory cells, builds a neural network, relies on effectors to execute actions, forms tissues and organs, integrates into physiological systems, and finally forms a complete organism. Combining the staged model of Section 3 with the engineering constraints of Section 4, this paper gives the following optimistic-estimate route: local programming of the lunar perpetual-daylight zones (hotspot networking and regional autonomy) is completed within 5–10 years; holistic programming of the Earth–Moon system and remote intelligent construction are achieved within 50 years; and large-scale human migration is supported within 70 years (already listed in Table 2). It can be summarized overall as “space construction, information first; improve infrastructure, move in at scale; more celestial bodies, copy and paste”. 7.4. Extension to Other Celestial Bodies This framework takes the Moon as an example and is not specific to the Moon. Mercury, like the Moon, is a rocky body, so deployment methods can be similar; Mars, the moons of Saturn, the moons of Jupiter, and others can likewise adopt a similar path of “sensor dispersal—networked detection—zoned construction” in a targeted manner; for Venus, which has a thick atmosphere, the same principle of “outer layers first, then deeper” is followed: close-range observation stations are set up in the outer layers of the atmosphere, corrosion-resistant sensors are lowered, and an information network is established, without hurrying to land on the Venusian surface at once. Because each celestial body differs, the ways of solving the problems of its particular setting will necessarily differ, but the information-first principle of “first approach and understand preliminarily, then proceed in depth” is universal: with micro sensors as the pioneers, information infrastructure is established on the surface of the celestial body in a large-scale, low-cost, fault-tolerant manner, gradually expanding into an interconnected intelligent network, and finally the celestial body is built up into a “smart planet” jointly developed and built by humankind, with all bodies achieving distributed consensus through “information grounding and earthing”. The exploration parameters vary with the body (Table 15): different gravity determines the release speed, and delay determines the feasibility of teleoperation. Table 15. Release speed and one-way light time for other bodies Body g (m s−2) Release speed at h = 10 m (m/s) One-way light time Remarks Moon 1.62 5.7 1.19–1.36 s No atmosphere, minimal parameters; large day–night temperature difference Mercury 3.70 8.6 ≈ 4.3–12.3 min Rocky; extreme day–night temperature difference Mars 3.71 8.6 (atmospheric drag not included) ≈ 3.0–22.3 min Thin atmosphere; teleoperation infeasible; autonomy, retropropulsion, and parachute descent must be combined Phobos ≈ 0.006 ≈ 0.34 Same as Mars Escape velocity about 11 m/s; nodes may bounce away and must be anchored in the ground Europa 1.31 5.1 ≈ 35–52 min Ice crust; extreme radiation; observe the outer layer first v = (2gh)1/2; light times are rough estimates from orbital distance ranges. The Earth–Mars one-way light time calculated from orbital distances is about 3.0–22.3 min, whereas the typical range cited in Ref. [10] is 4–24 min. 8. Risk Analysis and Countermeasures Technical risks: The landing and deployment phases remain the main sources of risk—there have been many lunar-surface landings in history that failed during the powered-descent phase [3]; landing on other bodies (such as Mars and Venus) is likewise extremely difficult; and integrated spacecraft often see the entire mission reduced to zero because of local damage. Faced with these difficulties, a fundamental question emerges: does there exist an alternative path that can achieve systematic exploration and construction of the Moon, and even of other rocky extraterrestrial bodies, with a lower technical threshold, lower cost, and more dispersed risk? The distributed dispersal scheme significantly dilutes this risk through “large numbers, low prices, and redundancy”: the failure of a single sensor does not affect the whole, and local setbacks do not drag down the mission; delay risk is mitigated by DTN and predictive compensation (see Eq. (16)); lunar dust, radiation, and low temperatures during the night period are addressed through sealed dormancy, hardening, and redundant design: the nodes are stationary and sealed and are only slightly affected by lunar dust, but impact deceleration, terrain occlusion, and spectrum interference require measurement; the lunar night lasts about 14.77 d (354 h), the equatorial night temperature is about 100–140 K, and permanently shadowed regions at the poles are even colder, down to about 25 K [50]; although the energy demand for dormancy is small (about 3.5 W·h, i.e., 0.01 W × 354 h, see Section 4.6), the survival of batteries and electronic components at low temperatures remains the primary technical risk and must be mitigated through low-temperature-tolerant components, thermal insulation, and siting at near-permanently illuminated peaks, and verified through on-Moon tests. Governance risks: These include orbital debris and frequency coordination, deception attacks on the consensus ledger (such as Sybil attacks) and malicious deployment, and disputes over “land grabbing”. Countermeasures include: a coverage-area registry and international frequency coordination; dispersion and cryptographic hardening of cornerstone nodes; institutionalization of the common allocation for public facilities and of the commons fund; and authorization and supervision by the competent space authorities (Section 6). At the ethical level, the scheme upholds the common-property character of “the Moon belongs to all humankind” and channels proceeds back to purposes of peaceful human development. In addition, the ledger may be locked in by a few pioneers over the long term, subjected to social-engineering attacks, or reduced to a speculative tool; ratio adjustment, concentration monitoring, and exit mechanisms must be designed. If “ownership” were misleadingly promoted as land sales, it would damage public credibility and touch Article II, so the promotional messaging must be consistent with Section 6. Limitations and uncertainties: The stage timing estimates in this paper are optimistic; the economic model (costs, benefits, and incentive mechanisms) requires further quantitative demonstration; the security of the consensus mechanism requires engineering-level verification; and the interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty is an academic view, with the final authority resting on the practice of the States Parties and subsequent legislation. 9. Conclusions This paper has proposed and demonstrated a new paradigm for exploring and building the Moon (and other celestial bodies) by an open-source route: “Open-Source Moon” is not only a route scheme but also a design reconstruction of space-exploration technology, jurisprudence, and philosophy. It transforms the Moon from a “landing target” of the few into a “developer platform” for all humankind, turns exploration from a “one-off great adventure” into “continuous small steps”, turns participation from an “elite privilege” into a “public right”, and shifts from “centralized landing” to “distributed infiltration”, putting forward “space construction, information first”. As the history of humans landing on new continents from the sea shows, the most enduring and most thorough exploration often begins with marginal, tentative, seemingly insignificant steps. The arguments are as follows: (1) the development of an unfamiliar celestial body should follow the progressive principle of “information first, from the outside in, sensing before acting”, and sensor dispersal is a reasonable and effective starting point for lowering the threshold of lunar landing and enabling public participation; (2) the staged model whose chain runs sensor network—small-machine ecosystem—medium-sized machines—facility ecosystem—smart planet is decomposable, parallelizable, and iterable in engineering terms, and the Moon is the best starting point for verifying teleoperation and digital twins; (3) the models of network coverage, link budget, energy budget, and delay compensation show that, under existing technical conditions, this path is feasible in engineering terms; its key bottleneck lies in the construction of the information backbone rather than in the lander itself, and the cost depends on the decline of the unit price of delivery to the lunar surface (see Section 4.11); (4) the “Golden Consensus” system based on the golden ratio provides an institutional basis of ownership attribution and incentives for dispersed contributions; 61.8%:38.2% is a reasonable initial value that is both self-similar and a focal point, but the optimal ratio varies with the parameters and must be accompanied by feedback adjustment; (5) under the framework of the Outer Space Treaty, this path can be explained and enforced by limiting ownership to information space (non-sovereign) and bringing it under State authorization and supervision, and can be implemented through a four-party mechanism of “administrative supervision—commercial carriage—public design and manufacture—consensus bookkeeping”; (6) the framework is transferable and can be extended to rocky bodies such as Mars and Mercury, offering a new possibility for human space activity to move from a “national undertaking” to a “universal process”. 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Principal symbols and parameters Symbol Meaning Value/unit A Surface area of the Moon 3.793669×107 km2 Rs Effective coverage radius of a single node (circumradius of the hexagon; the spacing between adjacent nodes is √3Rs) km N Number of sensors required for full coverage Count d Mean Earth–Moon distance 384 400 km λ (Section 4.9, Appendix B) Electromagnetic wavelength m Lfs Free-space path loss dB Pr Received power dBm τ Predictive-compensation delay (prediction horizon) s φ Golden ratio ≈ 1.618 r Effective sensing radius of a single sensor m α Terrain occlusion factor Dimensionless, 0–1 ps, pf Working/failure probability of a sensor (ps = 1 − pf) Dimensionless Ae Effective coverage area of a single sensor in normal operation (Ae = απr2) m2 S Area of the target region km2 λ (Section 4.3) Effective node density (NpsAe/S) Dimensionless C̄ Regional mean coverage % η, ηr, γ Coverage efficiency per unit mass (distributed/conventional rover) and their ratio m2/kg; dimensionless mu, mrover Mass of a single sensor; mass of a conventional lunar rover kg pL Single-landing success probability (touchdown or full mission success) Dimensionless M, ρ, Φ Number of independent landing carriers; common-cause correlation coefficient; coverage achievement ratio — q Carrier landing success probability (Section 4.4); acceleration-noise power spectral density (Section 4.9, m2 s−3) — p, κ Share retained by explorers; productivity amplification factor of the common pool Dimensionless k, f Committee (arbitration) size; fraction of malicious nodes —; dimensionless Appendix B. Derivations of the Link Budget and Coverage Model B.1. Coverage model In a regular hexagonal grid, the area of a regular hexagon whose side length is the effective coverage radius Rs of a single node (the circumradius, which is the hexagon side length) is (3√3/2)Rs2 ≈ 2.598Rs2, and the spacing between adjacent nodes is then √3Rs. The equivalent area served by each sensor in this grid is its coverage area, so the number of nodes required for full coverage is N = A/(2.598Rs2). Example: taking Rs = 10 km, 2.598 × 102 = 259.8 km2, and N = 3.793669×107/259.8 ≈ 1.46×105. B.2. Link budget The free-space path loss is Lfs = 20 log10(4πd/λ). Taking the S band at 2.4 GHz (λ = 0.125 m) as an example: 4π × 3.844×108/0.125 = 3.865×1010, and Lfs = 20 log10(3.865×1010) ≈ 211.7 dB. With a transmit power Pt = 30 dBm, a transmit antenna gain Gt = 3 dBi, a receive antenna gain Gr = 44 dBi, and an additional loss Lm = 2 dB, the received power is Pr = Pt + Gt + Gr − Lfs − Lm = −136.7 dBm. With a required Eb/N0 = 10 dB for BPSK demodulation and a system noise figure NF = 1 dB, the thermal-noise power spectral density is −174 dBm/Hz, and the maximum supported bit rate satisfies 10 log10(R) = Pr + 174 − NF − Eb/N0 = Pr + 163 = 26.3, i.e., R ≈ 4.3×102 bps. This result shows that a low-power omnidirectional sensor communicating directly with Earth can support only bit rates at or below the kbps level, and that high-throughput services require lunar-surface hotspot aggregation and orbital relays.

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Chen, Qin. Open-Source Moon: A Technical Framework for Intelligent Development of Extraterrestrial Bodies Based on Sensor Dispersal and Golden Consensus. 2026. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23963686

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