Algorithmic Governance in Financial Institutions
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-b4aba8604ef95578788ab4f91cd8afd3
- Auteurs
- Northon Salomao de Oliveira
- Année déclarée
- 2026
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- preprint
- Première détection
- 2026-11-13T12:41:09.279854+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-13T12:41:09.279854+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Algorithmic Governance in Financial Institutions Author: Northon Salomão de Oliveira Core Problem and Research Gap Financial institutions increasingly delegate consequential decisions—such as credit allocation, market making, fraud detection, and risk classification—to artificial intelligence systems whose inner workings often exceed the interpretive limits of human officers. This creates a severe governance deficit because traditional corporate and prudential laws assume human agency and a discrete moment of decision-making. The core research gap is the lack of a unified doctrinal framework capable of assigning liability and maintaining systemic stability when an automated model is the primary source of institutional harm. Methodology The article employs four complementary research methods: * Comparative Legal Analysis: Evaluates regulatory approaches across six jurisdictions (the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, China, and Brazil) alongside supranational standards from the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board. * Jurisprudential Analysis: Analyzes pivotal legal cases and enforcement actions, including the 2013 Knight Capital trading failure, the CJEU's SCHUFA Holding credit-scoring judgment, and the SEC's predictive analytics rulemaking. * Empirical Institutional Analysis: Draws on primary supervisory data and institutional surveys from financial authorities like the Bank of England and the Financial Stability Board. * Interdisciplinary Conceptual Analysis: Incorporates insights from legal theory, organizational psychology (accountability diffusion), and behavioral economics (automation complacency). Key Findings * Convergence and Divergence: While global regulators universally recognize that AI amplifies third-party dependency, model correlation, and operational risk, they diverge sharply on enforceability and liability allocation (ranging from the EU's hard-law conformity assessments to Singapore's voluntary principles and China's security-first filing rules). * Systemic Vulnerabilities: Financial stability is threatened by heavy reliance on third-party technology vendors, hidden embedded models, and correlated behavior across institutions during market stress. * Institutional Failure Modes: Current oversight suffers from enforcement-capacity asymmetries, bureaucratic fragmentation, regulatory deferrals, and technological blind spots regarding vendor-supplied models. Proposed Solution: The Distributed Algorithmic Accountability Framework (DAAF) To fix the misalignment between law and technology, the author proposes moving accountability upstream across the entire model lifecycle rather than focusing solely on final deployment. The DAAF introduces four enforceable pillars: * Design-Stage Documentation: Requiring lifecycle registries before training begins to record intended functions, data categories, and responsible designers. * Continuous Validation: Mandating statistical drift thresholds that trigger mandatory re-validation upon breach, combating automation complacency. * Tiered Supervisory Access: Granting regulators direct technical access to model documentation and cross-border vendor logs for systemically significant models. * Harmonized Incident Reporting: Shifting the reporting trigger from realized financial or consumer harm to the earlier, more manageable threshold of validated statistical instability. Algorithmic governance, Financial regulation, Artificial intelligence, Systemic risk, Model risk management, Fiduciary duty, Prudential supervision, Comparative financial law, EU AI Act, Basel Committee, Credit scoring, Operational resilience, Corporate accountability, RegTech, Financial stability, Corporate governance, Credit allocation, Market making, Fraud detection, Capital adjustment, Customer risk classification, Algorithmic systems, Governance deficit, Prudential law frameworks, Human agency, Fiduciary and prudential accountability, Distributed decision systems, Probabilistic character, Continuously retrained models, Banking operations, Securities operations, Insurance operations, Knight Capital incident, European Union, United States, United Kingdom, Singapore, People's Republic of China, Brazil, Financial Stability Board, Risk-based classification, Liability allocation, Distributed Algorithmic Accountability Framework, Continuous validation, Supervisory access, Cross-border incident reporting, Business judgment rule, Macroprudential supervision, Comparative legal analysis, SCHUFA Holding, General Data Protection Regulation, Bank of England, Monetary Authority of Singapore, FEAT principles, Veritas Toolkit, Central Bank of Brazil, Behavioral economics, Organizational psychology, Accountability diffusion, Algorithmic aversion, Automation complacency, Digital Operational Resilience Act, Market Access Rule, Predictive data analytics, Senior Managers and Certification Regime, Consumer Duty, Cyberspace Administration of China, Bill 2338/2023, Supervisory Letter SR 11-7, Digital Omnibus package
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7171667950
- DOI
- 10.5281/zenodo.21683002
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- unknown
- Types déclarés par les sources
- preprint
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
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OpenAlex · Document 1
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Northon Salomao de Oliveira. Algorithmic Governance in Financial Institutions. 2026. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21683002
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- APA
- Northon Salomao de Oliveira. (2026). Algorithmic Governance in Financial Institutions. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21683002
- Chicago
- Northon Salomao de Oliveira. Algorithmic Governance in Financial Institutions. 2026. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21683002
- ISO 690
- Northon Salomao de Oliveira. Algorithmic Governance in Financial Institutions. 2026. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21683002
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