Institutional asymmetry in post-conflict property governance: explaining divergent remedies for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot property claims
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-a8258a07f5fd00286c7ee90f04269c15
- Auteurs
- Hakan Çora · Elnur Hasan Mikail · Ali Nazmi Çora
- Année déclarée
- 2026
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- article
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T02:48:41.752817+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T02:48:41.752817+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Institutions déclarées par la source
Kafkas University
Pays d’affiliation déclarés
TR
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Why do some post-conflict societies develop effective institutions for processing property claims while others do not, and what happens when institutional development occurs unevenly across a conflict divide? This article introduces the concept of institutional asymmetry, defined as a condition in post-conflict governance in which competing displaced populations possess unequal access to legally effective and internationally recognised mechanisms for pursuing equivalent claims because institutional development has occurred unevenly across the conflict divide. Rather than testing a universal theory, the article develops this mid-range concept through theory-building grounded in the Cyprus case, following established approaches to concept formation in comparative politics. We argue that institutional asymmetry emerges through a specific causal mechanism: compulsory supranational jurisdiction combined with a local-remedies exhaustion doctrine creates external legal pressure that triggers institutional innovation on one side of a conflict divide; that innovation attracts international validation for admissibility purposes; validation generates path-dependent routinisation; and routinisation produces durable asymmetry. The concept is bounded by contrast with related but distinct constructs, namely institutional capacity, institutional legitimacy, transitional justice, recognition theory, and legal pluralism. The Cyprus conflict provides the primary empirical case, in which the Immovable Property Commission, established under Turkish Cypriot administration and accepted by the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber in Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey as an effective domestic remedy for admissibility purposes, constitutes an internationally recognised pathway for Greek Cypriot property claimants, while Turkish Cypriot claimants in the Republic of Cyprus rely on a less specialised statutory remedy administered through the ordinary courts and accepted by the European Court of Human Rights in more qualified terms. Illustrative comparison extends the framework to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Georgia. The article contributes a portable analytical concept to scholarship on institutional change, post-conflict governance, and the comparative politics of international legal recognition in divided societies.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7204194062
- DOI
- 10.3389/fpos.2026.1928514
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- article
- Types déclarés par les sources
- article
- Éditeurs
- Frontiers Media
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Hakan Çora; Elnur Hasan Mikail; Ali Nazmi Çora. Institutional asymmetry in post-conflict property governance: explaining divergent remedies for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot property claims. 2026. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1928514
JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·
APA, Chicago, ISO 690 : formats bibliographiques fondés sur les champs disponibles. OSCOLA / Bluebook : données structurées uniquement ; aucune conformité juridique complète n’est revendiquée sans vérification des éléments nécessaires.
- APA
- Hakan Çora; Elnur Hasan Mikail; Ali Nazmi Çora. (2026). Institutional asymmetry in post-conflict property governance: explaining divergent remedies for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot property claims. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1928514
- Chicago
- Hakan Çora; Elnur Hasan Mikail; Ali Nazmi Çora. Institutional asymmetry in post-conflict property governance: explaining divergent remedies for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot property claims. 2026. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1928514
- ISO 690
- Hakan Çora; Elnur Hasan Mikail; Ali Nazmi Çora. Institutional asymmetry in post-conflict property governance: explaining divergent remedies for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot property claims. 2026. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1928514
Warning: Undefined array key "last_link_verified" in /home/clients/e27d81e12f04d2bfd747aa264540ac56/sites/_UDTR_APP/legal_library_reference.php on line 31
UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Institutional asymmetry in post-conflict property governance: explaining divergent remedies for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot property claims. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-a8258a07f5fd00286c7ee90f04269c15/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
Données de cette version figée
Dossiers et relations documentaires
Rôles des sources
Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1928514
Un lien vers une autorité ne prouve pas à lui seul une affirmation juridique. Les résumés et les textes intégraux restent soumis aux conditions de leur source.
Statut documentaire
Pertinence à examiner
Bibliothèque
Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.