نظریه عمومی دیون در حقوق اسلام و مقایسه آن با حقوق غرب
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-92e6642a7f48748b4a4a237e780f1948
- Auteurs
- —
- Année déclarée
- —
- Langue déclarée
- fa · per
- Type source
- journal article
- Première détection
- 2026-11-13T15:33:08.405470+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-13T15:33:08.405470+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Abstract Debt, unlike the western law, is considered as a quite independent concept from “obligation” in the Islamic law and is regarded essentially as a kind of intangible personal property which has the characteristics of ownership and is a species of Ein(thing). The conceptual application of this legal institution in the contract and tort law is more extensive than the "obligation" concept. Due to this institution, Nominated contracts such as sale, rent, loan, and guarantee contract which are regarded as promissory contracts in the western law which merely cause obligations, are often considered as possessory in the Islamic law with a different effects. Also in tort law, the relationship between the person suffering the loss and the person causing the loss is not mainly only a personal promissory relationship but injured person is the owner of the equivalent or the value of the property and is its creditor of the tortfeasor and he, as any owner, has full legal control over this property. Thus it, considering the vast application of the debt in various domains of civil law as well as the quite independent and distinguished nature of it from obligation institution, can be suggested a comprehensive theory named “the general theory of debts that is a regulated and coordinated set of legal principles, rules, and concepts including concept, essence, subject, sources, the provisos, effects of debt and causes of debt discharging and fulfilling. This study is an introduction to this theory and represents the necessity of suggesting such theory. It should be noted that this theory which is perfectly consistent with the concepts of Islamic law, is in conflict with the western theory of obligations.
Identifiants
- DOI
- 10.22091/csiw.2017.862
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- article
- Types déclarés par les sources
- journal article
- Éditeurs
- دانشگاه قم
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Sources
OpenAIRE · Document 1
Citer cette référence
نظریه عمومی دیون در حقوق اسلام و مقایسه آن با حقوق غرب. https://doi.org/10.22091/csiw.2017.862
JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·
APA, Chicago, ISO 690 : formats bibliographiques fondés sur les champs disponibles. OSCOLA / Bluebook : données structurées uniquement ; aucune conformité juridique complète n’est revendiquée sans vérification des éléments nécessaires.
- APA
- نظریه عمومی دیون در حقوق اسلام و مقایسه آن با حقوق غرب. https://doi.org/10.22091/csiw.2017.862
- Chicago
- نظریه عمومی دیون در حقوق اسلام و مقایسه آن با حقوق غرب. https://doi.org/10.22091/csiw.2017.862
- ISO 690
- نظریه عمومی دیون در حقوق اسلام و مقایسه آن با حقوق غرب. https://doi.org/10.22091/csiw.2017.862
Warning: Undefined array key "last_link_verified" in /home/clients/e27d81e12f04d2bfd747aa264540ac56/sites/_UDTR_APP/legal_library_reference.php on line 31
UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. نظریه عمومی دیون در حقوق اسلام و مقایسه آن با حقوق غرب. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-92e6642a7f48748b4a4a237e780f1948/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
Données de cette version figée
Dossiers et relations documentaires
Rôles des sources
Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.22091/csiw.2017.862
Un lien vers une autorité ne prouve pas à lui seul une affirmation juridique. Les résumés et les textes intégraux restent soumis aux conditions de leur source.
Statut documentaire
Pertinence à examiner
Bibliothèque
Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.