Limitări rezonabile ale imparțialității. Obligații morale, roluri, relații afective
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-9235294404ac5347fe479656a364ccb5
- Auteurs
- Bogdan Olaru
- Année déclarée
- 2026
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- book-chapter
- Première détection
- 2026-11-13T09:03:06.295048+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-13T09:03:06.295048+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
For most philosophers, morality equates to impartiality.Correct decisions arise only when made from an impartial stand-point. The emphasis on the impersonal and impartial perspective isbest expressed in classical utilitarianism’s concept of a „disinter-ested and benevolent spectator”. This perspective reinforces theperception of moral duties as abstract constraints, paving the wayfor further social constraints. I will present some reasons why theoverlap between morality and impartiality is not always true. This, inturn, creates opportunities for a more nuanced understanding of themoral value of human actions. I will begin by outlining therelationship between impartiality and other moral values (part 2). Iwill then discuss when it is appropriate to think of a moral subject assomeone as good as anybody else (part 3). I will touch upon thedisjunction between impartiality and fairness (part 4) and what itmeans to show preferential behavior (part 5). In the sixth part, I willpresent the tension between impartiality and the requirements thatfollow from close relationships, such as friendship. I will show howthese relationships represent significant opportunities to expressmoral attitudes (part 7). Finally, while stressing the importance ofimpartiality in non-institutional contexts (part 8), I will show thatimpartiality can be conceived as a proximate gender for differentmoral values (part 9).
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7152526119
- DOI
- 10.47743/libautsp.2026.10
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- Chapitre d’ouvrage
- Types déclarés par les sources
- book-chapter
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Description bibliographique du livre
- Date de publication déclarée
- 2026-01-01
Disponibilité non établie
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Bogdan Olaru. Limitări rezonabile ale imparțialității. Obligații morale, roluri, relații afective. 2026. https://doi.org/10.47743/libautsp.2026.10
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690 : formats bibliographiques fondés sur les champs disponibles. OSCOLA / Bluebook : données structurées uniquement ; aucune conformité juridique complète n’est revendiquée sans vérification des éléments nécessaires.
- APA
- Bogdan Olaru. (2026). Limitări rezonabile ale imparțialității. Obligații morale, roluri, relații afective. https://doi.org/10.47743/libautsp.2026.10
- Chicago
- Bogdan Olaru. Limitări rezonabile ale imparțialității. Obligații morale, roluri, relații afective. 2026. https://doi.org/10.47743/libautsp.2026.10
- ISO 690
- Bogdan Olaru. Limitări rezonabile ale imparțialității. Obligații morale, roluri, relații afective. 2026. https://doi.org/10.47743/libautsp.2026.10
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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Limitări rezonabile ale imparțialității. Obligații morale, roluri, relații afective. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-9235294404ac5347fe479656a364ccb5/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.47743/libautsp.2026.10
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