UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining: An experiment

Identification

Clé publique

radar:r-821c796814dfcb52916eed671aac58a3

Auteurs

Alice Guerra · Shay Lavie · Enya Turrini

Année déclarée

2025

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

article

Première détection

2026-11-14T02:48:17.193052+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-14T02:48:17.193052+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

University of Bologna · Tel Aviv University · Royal Holloway University of London

Pays d’affiliation déclarés

GB · IL · IT

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

This paper provides experimental evidence on the effectiveness of self-penalizing commitments as signaling mechanisms in pre-trial bargaining under asymmetric information, aimed at reducing trial rates. Using an online experiment (N=2,041), we design a novel two-type signaling game with asymmetric information, where one party possesses private information regarding the strength of its case, and proposes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to an uninformed party. In the baseline scenario, the uninformed party must decide whether to accept the offer, or reject it and proceed to a costly trial. In our novel signaling treatments, the informed party can credibly commit ex ante to a costly monetary penalty contingent upon losing at trial. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our results show that self-penalizing commitments reduce trial rates. Informed parties are more likely to commit when they have strong cases; and uninformed parties interpret the commitment as a signal of merits, and are more likely to settle less-generous offers when these are coupled with a commitment. However, we also document departures from theory: effect magnitudes are generally smaller than expected; the commitment device is both under- and over-used across offer ranges; and, when committing is possible, buyers sometimes penalize its omission by rejecting otherwise generous offers.

Identifiants

OPENALEX

https://openalex.org/W4416807588

DOI

10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107343

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

article

Types déclarés par les sources

article

Éditeurs

Elsevier BV

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1

• Document · https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107343

Statut documentaire

Pertinence à examiner

Bibliothèque

Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.