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Fundamental rights through discourse : on Robert Alexy's legal theory : European and theoretical perspectives

Identification

Clé publique

openalex:w649269245

Auteurs

Agustín José Menèndez · Erik Oddvar Eriksen

Année déclarée

2004

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

book

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:14:22.160422+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:14:22.160422+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

University of Oslo

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

weight of the competing principles, or the empirical facts which determine the graduation of the competing principles. The third section explores the extent to which Alexy’s theory of fundamental rights can be fruitfully applied to constitutional orders other than the German one. Julian Rivers aims at a double target; first, testing whether the first two years of case law on the UK Human Rights 1998 can be reconstructed rationally, and if so, whether they tally with Alexy’s theory; second, assessing whether Alexy’s fundamental rights theory is as structural as the German philosopher claims it to be; by means of applying the theory to the British fundamental rights practice, Rivers is able to detect the hidden institutional assumptions implicit in many elements of Alexy’s fundamental rights theory. This is the case of claim that the formal recognition of fundamental rights plays a central role in any theory of fundamental rights. While the Human Rights Act 1998 does not introduce a catalogue of fundamental rights proper, but the obligation to interpret British law in line with the rights acknowledged in the European Convention of Human Rights (and for that purpose, only some of them), British courts have derived fundamental rights from the Act in a similar way as the German, Italian or Spanish constitutional courts derive fundamental rights norms from their national constitutional provisions. Similar points are raised on what concerns the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (whether this does not call for a rich enough content of rights, which allows them to capture the morality of interpersonal private relationships) and on the relationship between legislature and courts under the principle of proportionality, and more specifically, the second law of balancing as defined in the Postscript to the English translation. Rivers notices that Alexy’s assignment to Courts of the critical decision whether to review or not the knowledge basis on which administrative or state action is based, actually presupposes that the only alternative deciding body is a majoritarian legislature and that the rights are stake are typical individual rights against state action. But both presuppositions might not fit into the facts of the case. In my own chapter (Agustin J. Menendez), I aim at testing the extent to which Alexy’s theory can bring clarity to fundamental rights reasoning in the European Union. It seems to me that this is so on four grounds. First, it is very helpful in understanding the validity basis of European constitutional law. While the validity of fundamental rights norms in national constitutions tends to be positive, that is, based on their enactment by the pouvoir constituent, this is not exactly the case in Union law.

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W649269245

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Livre

Types déclarés par les sources

book

Entités naturelles mentionnées

Fleuve / rivière

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Description bibliographique du livre

Disponibilité non établie

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• Document · http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA75387813
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W649269245

Relations bibliographiques documentées

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• openalex:w3195982806 · CITES

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Statut documentaire

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