Zweitbeste (Second-best) Instrumente der deutschen Politik zur Reduktion von CO 2 : Förderung von Energieeffizienz und erneuerbaren Energien
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-52528aeba8e5e81628491d34230af15d
- Auteurs
- Azuma-Dicke, Norbert H.
- Année déclarée
- —
- Langue déclarée
- German
- Type source
- UNKNOWN
- Première détection
- 2026-11-13T09:04:08.504741+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-13T09:04:08.504741+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
The aim of this thesis is an assessment of the German CO2-abatement policy. Criteria used for the evaluation are those which were put forth by the United Nations as well as those provided by the economic theory concerning cost minimal emission abatement. In the empirical part of the thesis, relative and absolute costs of selective instruments of the German abatement policy are ascertained. The first part of the thesis illustrates the problems attributed to CO2-emissions, names the causes of these emissions and what kind of global remedies for emission avoidance were agreed upon. The goals of a global climate policy named in the UN convention on climate change and the following UN conferences on climate change are circumstantiated in detail. These global objectives are confronted with the goals of the European Union and the goals specified by Germany. In the following these abatement targets are taken as given and the further analysis aims solely on the appraisal of abatement policy instruments. Special attention is put on the question how the ranking of environmental policies changes when imperfections – market imperfections as well as political imperfections - are accounted for. The theoretical findings serve as a reference for an appraisal of abatement policies suggested by the UN as well as those carried out or planned by the EU and Germany. It will be shown that the policies foreseen by the UN are quite compatible with the norms put up by the first-best theory. In contrast, there is a high discrepancy of the European and German abatement policies compared to the first-best instruments of environmental economics and therefore with the norms of the international law. The fact is noteworthy that the European and German climate policy bases on the goals of the UN convention and the following climate change conferences, but not on the criterion of economic efficiency of abatement policies which is also defined in the convention. The second part of the thesis deals with two selective instruments of the German climate change policy: for one the programme for energy conservation in buildings and second the programme to promote the use of renewable energies. Of both programmes policy makers anticipate significant contributions to the reduction of CO2-emissions. The analysis of the German feed in tariff for renewable energies shows that the programme entails average marginal abatement costs of 95 € per ton CO2 in 2003. These costs are likely to rise until 2010 if the reduction goals of the Bundesregierung are realized. The instrument holds intra- and intersectoral inefficiencies: - The marginal abatement costs could be lower by setting an identical minimum price for all renewable power generation technologies instead of a price differentiated for each generation technology. The allocation efficiency criterion for which the marginal abatement costs for each source (here power generation technology) has to be equal is not met. - As the Bundesregierung de facto provides a set amount for the power generation from renewable sources the used instrument of a minimum price guarantee is not rational for the purpose. The instrument suitable to reach a quantity goal would be a purchase obligation for a defined quantity (quota) which would guarantee an efficient achievement of the appointed quantity. Of the analysed alternatives of a quantity approach, the bidding model is to be preferred. The abatement costs of the programme to promote the power generation from renewable sources could be lower by avoiding the observed intrasectoral inefficiencies. The programme for energy conservation in buildings uses standards on the energy use in buildings, e.g. by stipulating thermal insulation for buildings. The examination shows that the latest tightening of the energy performances values did not cause additional costs for investors. Assuming complete information concerning the consumption values of buildings, the individual cost minimization already leads to an energy performance of new buildings that are lower than the values required by the German EnEV. Thus the new energy performance standard would be redundant. Considering the new regulation as a means to overcome information deficits of incompletely informed investors or as an instrument to speed up adjustment processes, the regulation entails attitude changes. These result in negative marginal abatement costs for new buildings featuring a certain architecture (compact design) while other building designs (open constructions) show positive while low abatement costs. Concerning the analysed German national abatement policy instruments the results show a high range of abatement costs. While the emission reduction in the building sector is linked with net gains it generates high costs in the area of renewable energies. It stands to assume that the abatement costs of the other 62 instruments of the German national climate protection programme will not be equally high. But the precept of economic efficiency requires choosing least cost options. By following this requirement the promotion of power generation from renewable sources to aim for an emission abatement has to be abandoned, e.g. in favour of the agreed European Emission rights trading scheme. Following the requirement of cost effectiveness set by the UN convention on climate change and by utilizing not only the emission trading but also other flexible instruments - like clean development mechanisms (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) - this reduction goal could be reached with an even lower outlay. Differently put: Germany could increase its contribution to the global CO2-abatement by a multiple at an unchanged employment of resources.
Identifiants
- DOI
- 10.18419/opus-1659
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- unknown
- Types déclarés par les sources
- UNKNOWN
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OpenAIRE · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Azuma-Dicke, Norbert H.. Zweitbeste (Second-best) Instrumente der deutschen Politik zur Reduktion von CO 2 : Förderung von Energieeffizienz und erneuerbaren Energien. https://doi.org/10.18419/opus-1659
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- APA
- Azuma-Dicke, Norbert H.. Zweitbeste (Second-best) Instrumente der deutschen Politik zur Reduktion von CO 2 : Förderung von Energieeffizienz und erneuerbaren Energien. https://doi.org/10.18419/opus-1659
- Chicago
- Azuma-Dicke, Norbert H.. Zweitbeste (Second-best) Instrumente der deutschen Politik zur Reduktion von CO 2 : Förderung von Energieeffizienz und erneuerbaren Energien. https://doi.org/10.18419/opus-1659
- ISO 690
- Azuma-Dicke, Norbert H.. Zweitbeste (Second-best) Instrumente der deutschen Politik zur Reduktion von CO 2 : Förderung von Energieeffizienz und erneuerbaren Energien. https://doi.org/10.18419/opus-1659
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