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From Surveillance Monocultures to Agroecological Defense: A Sovereignty-centered Framework for Agricultural Cyberbiosecurity

Identification

Clé publique
radar:r-522358cb5edda7402c9d27e07dfc4b14
Auteurs
Rolando Perez · Xavier‐Lewis Palmer · Lucas N. Potter · Dodzi Koku Hattoh · Salomey Afua Addo · Srdjan Lesaja
Année déclarée
2026
Langue déclarée
en
Type source
conference-paper
Première détection
2026-11-13T12:38:28.429078+00:00
Dernière observation des métadonnées
2026-11-13T12:38:28.429078+00:00
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Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

Blue Marble Space Institute of Science · University of Bonn · University of Ghana · University of Cambridge · Virginia Commonwealth University

Pays d’affiliation déclarés

DE · GB · GH · US

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

Agricultural cyberbiosecurity (CBS) scholarship may have overwhelmingly adopted centralized, national-securityorientedframeworks that leave community-governed and agroecologically-grounded alternatives unexplored. Recent AIsafety research demonstrates that provably safe Artificial General Intelligence is mathematically incompatible with trustand alignment, casting doubt on the viability of general-purpose, centralized safety regimes versus bounded ordecentralized ones (Panigrahy and Sharan, 2025). Some leading expressions of the centralized CBS paradigm proposebillions in surveillance architecture spanning unified biological intelligence (BIOINT), national bioaudit systems, andcoordinated governance bodies. Centralized approaches often compellingly diagnose monoculture vulnerabilities,biosurveillance urgency, and the need for novel governance mechanisms. However, in these centralized architectures,communities receive biosecurity services but do not co-govern biosurveillance priorities, data use, or safety specifications,and agriculture remains a critical infrastructure to be defended from above. Even when such centralized paradigmspropose distributed biological sensing, such as engineered sentinel plants and living biosensors, these systems requireroutine community-level care, maintenance, and trust relationships that centralized architectures cannot deliver, and willdemand iterative updating as threat landscapes evolve. The empirical record confirms the costs of centralization: $11million in ransom paid by JBS, 40% of U.S. grain production disrupted by a single cooperative's software failure (Yazdinejadet al., 2021; Cartwright and Cartwright, 2023). Coordination gaps are real, and new institutions are necessary to addressthem. However, coordination without corresponding community-level governance authority reproduces the monoculturepattern at the institutional level. This paper argues that agricultural defense must be rooted in the slowest and mostdurable layers of change identified by Stewart Brand's pace-layer framework: nature and culture. We advance threeinterlocking components: (1) agroecology as defensive architecture, in which biological diversity and functional redundancyconstitute the primary cyberbiosecurity strategy; (2) sovereignty-preserving biosurveillance, in which community-governedfederated sensing networks retain local data authority while enabling collective threat detection through privacypreservingmechanisms; and (3) cooperative assurance from below, in which safety specifications are collectivelydeliberated and verified through participatory guarantee systems rather than centralized certification hierarchies(Dalrymple et al., 2024; Carroll et al., 2023; Manoj et al., 2025). This framework does not preclude centralized pathogendetection where necessary, but insists that top-level and community-level institutions must be in relation so thatcoordination flows bidirectionally rather than exclusively from above. Rather than claiming comprehensive safetyguarantees, we demonstrate how bounded formal assurances, when integrated with agroecological resilience andcommunity governance, can materially improve the security of food systems under real-world constraints.

Identifiants

OPENALEX
https://openalex.org/W7130658988
DOI
10.34190/iccws.21.1.4544

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire
unknown
Types déclarés par les sources
conference-paper

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1

Citer cette référence

Rolando Perez; Xavier‐Lewis Palmer; Lucas N. Potter; Dodzi Koku Hattoh; Salomey Afua Addo; Srdjan Lesaja. From Surveillance Monocultures to Agroecological Defense: A Sovereignty-centered Framework for Agricultural Cyberbiosecurity. 2026. https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.21.1.4544

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APA
Rolando Perez; Xavier‐Lewis Palmer; Lucas N. Potter; Dodzi Koku Hattoh; Salomey Afua Addo; Srdjan Lesaja. (2026). From Surveillance Monocultures to Agroecological Defense: A Sovereignty-centered Framework for Agricultural Cyberbiosecurity. https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.21.1.4544
Chicago
Rolando Perez; Xavier‐Lewis Palmer; Lucas N. Potter; Dodzi Koku Hattoh; Salomey Afua Addo; Srdjan Lesaja. From Surveillance Monocultures to Agroecological Defense: A Sovereignty-centered Framework for Agricultural Cyberbiosecurity. 2026. https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.21.1.4544
ISO 690
Rolando Perez; Xavier‐Lewis Palmer; Lucas N. Potter; Dodzi Koku Hattoh; Salomey Afua Addo; Srdjan Lesaja. From Surveillance Monocultures to Agroecological Defense: A Sovereignty-centered Framework for Agricultural Cyberbiosecurity. 2026. https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.21.1.4544

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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. From Surveillance Monocultures to Agroecological Defense: A Sovereignty-centered Framework for Agricultural Cyberbiosecurity. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-522358cb5edda7402c9d27e07dfc4b14/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée

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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.34190/iccws.21.1.4544

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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature