UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

The Extractivism Trap: Oil, Statutory Dispossession, and the Political Economy of Corporate Divestment in Nigeria

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.5281/zenodo.22843998

Auteurs

Believe Nosakhare

Année déclarée

2026

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

preprint

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:04:47.595184+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:07:04.410593+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

In this paper, I advance a critical legal-institutional and political economy critique of resource-driven underdevelopment in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, centering on what I conceptualize as the 'Extractivism Trap.' Moving past orthodox 'resource curse' econometrics, I argue that persistent immiseration across oil-producing communities is neither an accidental market externality nor a mere administrative failure. Instead, it is policy by design: the structural outcome of a legal framework that privatizes petroleum rents while systematically externalizing ecological ruin. Methodologically, this study is a desk-based critical review and documentary synthesis. I triangulate statutory jurisprudence across a century of Nigerian natural resource law with qualitative content analysis of 42 internal corporate engineering audit memos leaked from Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) via Amnesty International (2026), 124 Joint Investigation Visit (JIV) certificates, and longitudinal data on 10,845 recorded spills from the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA). My analysis uncovers an acute epistemological paradox: while official state records attribute over 75% of spill volumes to third-party 'sabotage,' leaked internal records prove that SPDC operated severely degraded 'basket' pipelines under explicit safety waivers, using structurally captured JIV inspections to convert corporate negligence into community guilt. What makes this particularly insidious is that Section 257(2) of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021 codifies this manipulated attribution into a punitive statutory regime of collective financial forfeiture against impoverished host populations. To establish global benchmarks, I contrast Nigeria's regressive regime against international models that treat host communities substantially better: Alaska's direct citizen dividends, Canada's mandatory Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) under Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), Norway's pre-funded decommissioning escrows, and Ecuador's constitutional Rights of Nature, while critically evaluating institutional transfer barriers. Finally, I interrogate the 2023–2026 onshore divestment wave, disaggregating an $18.4 billion unfunded toxic debt gap ($9.4B physical decommissioning + $14.7B environmental remediation) offloaded onto domestic capital, and confront the political economy dilemma of the state regulator (NUPRC) in a foreign-exchange starved petro-state. I conclude by outlining actionable statutory and judicial counter-weights to dismantle this predatory extractivism trap

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W7213675387

DOI

10.5281/zenodo.22843998 · 10.5281/zenodo.22843999

OPENAIRE

doi_dedup___::213f47bb0f57e740a0ea5baab1813eef

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Working paper

Types déclarés par les sources

Preprint · preprint

Juridictions étudiées — sources explicites

NG

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAIRE · Document 1 · Document 2

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22843998
• DOI · https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22843999
• Document · https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22843999
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W7213675387

Statut documentaire

Pertinence à examiner

Bibliothèque

Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.