Law and Morality: The Decisive Oath as a Means of Resolving Legal Disputes
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-4cb513cab5571bf6d1ab55d77f92933a
- Auteurs
- Metin M. Coşgel · Thomas J. Miceli
- Année déclarée
- 2025
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- article
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T02:29:09.842615+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T02:29:09.842615+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Institutions déclarées par la source
University of Connecticut
Pays d’affiliation déclarés
US
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
How does a society resolve legal disputes lacking evidence? Although such cases would typically be dismissed by modern courts, an interesting but little-known alternative element observed in some legal systems is the option to request a decisive oath in a lawsuit. Distinct from ordinary (testimonial) oaths that are routinely administered to witnesses at trial with the aim of eliciting only truthful testimony, a decisive oath can end a lawsuit in cases where the plaintiff has no evidence. We argue that the oath option may improve on burden-of-proof rules because standard theory overlooks the possibility that some defendants will truthfully admit their guilt after having professed an oath to be truthful. The reason is that people with strong religious or moral beliefs have internalised an ethic of honesty that overrides material consequences. We show that when the fraction of such people is large enough, the oath option achieves a more accurate resolution of disputes than burden-of-proof rules. Evidence from the Ottoman courts in Istanbul during the 16th and 17th centuries supports the argument regarding the positive relationship between religiosity and the use of the decisive oath for dispute resolution. The viability of the decisive oath declined in recent centuries, despite remaining ‘on the books’ in some countries. We suggest that its global demise can be attributed to rising intellectual opposition, increasing complexity of laws and/or legal disputes, falling cost of gathering evidence, and a general trend toward the separation of religion and state.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4406246441
- DOI
- 10.1142/s2737436x25400011
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- article
- Types déclarés par les sources
- article
- Éditeurs
- World Scientific
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Metin M. Coşgel; Thomas J. Miceli. Law and Morality: The Decisive Oath as a Means of Resolving Legal Disputes. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737436x25400011
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- APA
- Metin M. Coşgel; Thomas J. Miceli. (2025). Law and Morality: The Decisive Oath as a Means of Resolving Legal Disputes. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737436x25400011
- Chicago
- Metin M. Coşgel; Thomas J. Miceli. Law and Morality: The Decisive Oath as a Means of Resolving Legal Disputes. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737436x25400011
- ISO 690
- Metin M. Coşgel; Thomas J. Miceli. Law and Morality: The Decisive Oath as a Means of Resolving Legal Disputes. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737436x25400011
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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Law and Morality: The Decisive Oath as a Means of Resolving Legal Disputes. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4cb513cab5571bf6d1ab55d77f92933a/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737436x25400011
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