Against ethics in law: the problems with applying ethics and integrity rules to doctrinal legal scholarship
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-46eb32e267a73dd6e38a65d11540d134
- Auteurs
- Gareth Davies
- Année déclarée
- 2025
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- article
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T02:38:35.952007+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T02:38:35.952007+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Institutions déclarées par la source
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Pays d’affiliation déclarés
NL
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Legal scholars are increasingly asked to respect research ethics rules, in particular those concerning conflicts of interest, following a trend begun in social sciences after its crises of replication. However, whereas empirical science needs trust, because it rests on potentially falsifiable data, doctrinal legal scholarship consists of arguments which cannot be faked. It is all on the page. The quality of legal scholarship is served by encouraging readers to engage with what is written as robustly as possible, rather than to consider the integrity of the person who wrote it. The ad hominem path moreover leads to incoherent distinctions between people committed to a view for financial or career reasons, and those committed for ideological ones. Both can narrow the mind of the writer and reduce the quality of their output (although the claim that a good argument cannot be made for payment is a surprising one to hear from lawyers). However, the better response is not to try and get inside the author’s motivations, but to read their words and challenge them. Rules on scholarly conflicts of interests are a distraction from the necessary sceptical and robust engagement with texts.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4407929443
- DOI
- 10.1080/1460728x.2025.2470027
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- article
- Types déclarés par les sources
- article
- Éditeurs
- Taylor & Francis
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Gareth Davies. Against ethics in law: the problems with applying ethics and integrity rules to doctrinal legal scholarship. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2025.2470027
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- APA
- Gareth Davies. (2025). Against ethics in law: the problems with applying ethics and integrity rules to doctrinal legal scholarship. https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2025.2470027
- Chicago
- Gareth Davies. Against ethics in law: the problems with applying ethics and integrity rules to doctrinal legal scholarship. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2025.2470027
- ISO 690
- Gareth Davies. Against ethics in law: the problems with applying ethics and integrity rules to doctrinal legal scholarship. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2025.2470027
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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Against ethics in law: the problems with applying ethics and integrity rules to doctrinal legal scholarship. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-46eb32e267a73dd6e38a65d11540d134/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
Données de cette version figée
Dossiers et relations documentaires
Rôles des sources
Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2025.2470027
Un lien vers une autorité ne prouve pas à lui seul une affirmation juridique. Les résumés et les textes intégraux restent soumis aux conditions de leur source.
Statut documentaire
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Bibliothèque
Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.