Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-44ea91d66cba835383815f19179adbb8
- Auteurs
- Alon Kohalny · Gabriel Sayag
- Année déclarée
- 2026
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- article
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T02:45:58.558710+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T02:45:58.558710+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Institutions déclarées par la source
University of Haifa
Pays d’affiliation déclarés
IL
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Purpose This study aims to examine whether the FCA’s use of in-house compliance functions as a delivery tool for regulation reduces compliance risk and serves the public interest. Design/methodology/approach This study combines doctrinal analysis of the FCA’s systems and controls requirements with examination of selected enforcement decisions. Concepts from regulatory design and incentive-based regulation are used to interpret how expectations are articulated and how responsibility is distributed between firms and individuals. Findings The analysis suggests the presence of a design-enforcement gap. While firms are incentivised ex ante to establish compliance functions as indicators of sound governance, enforcement practice evaluates those functions ex post against indeterminate, outcome-oriented standards. This misalignment may weaken the logic of incentive-based regulation, encourage symbolic compliance and contribute to the individualisation of regulatory risk for compliance officers. Research limitations/implications This study is limited to qualitative analysis of selected enforcement decisions. Its contribution lies in identifying structural features of compliance-based regulation rather than measuring empirical outcomes. Practical implications This study proposes a structured way of assessing compliance functions, focusing on their actual performance. This paper sets out dimensions that could guide supervision and enforcement in a more predictable and preventative way. Originality/value This study links regulatory design, incentive structures and enforcement practice to explain structural weaknesses in the FCA’s current use of compliance functions and offers a framework that could be used by regulators and firms in the UK and beyond.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7167086490
- DOI
- 10.1108/jfrc-02-2026-0098
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- article
- Types déclarés par les sources
- article
- Éditeurs
- Emerald Publishing Limited
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Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Alon Kohalny; Gabriel Sayag. Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2026-0098
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- APA
- Alon Kohalny; Gabriel Sayag. (2026). Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2026-0098
- Chicago
- Alon Kohalny; Gabriel Sayag. Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2026-0098
- ISO 690
- Alon Kohalny; Gabriel Sayag. Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2026-0098
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UDTR — Bibliothèque juridique mondiale des droits de la Nature. Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework. Notice documentaire: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-44ea91d66cba835383815f19179adbb8/ · Dernière vérification HTTP : non effectuée
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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2026-0098
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