How Can One Person Represent Another? (1960)
Identification
- Clé publique
- radar:r-441079092708ee8338e240a941d6fd01
- Auteurs
- Richard Wollheim
- Année déclarée
- 2025
- Langue déclarée
- en
- Type source
- book-chapter
- Première détection
- 2026-11-14T02:03:01.236239+00:00
- Dernière observation des métadonnées
- 2026-11-14T02:03:01.236239+00:00
- Dernière vérification HTTP
- Non effectuée
Résumé documentaire — langue originale
Abstract This paper was a reply to A. Phillips Griffiths’s paper of the same name, both presented in a symposium at the annual Joint Session of The Mind Association and The Aristotelian Society in 1960. Wollheim focuses on political representation, building on a distinction introduced by Griffiths between four types of representation. Descriptive representation: one person represents another by being sufficiently like them, as a sample or specimen might be. Symbolic: a person is chosen as a focus of attributes, such as a King representing his nation. Ascriptive: a person is given the authority to act on behalf of another, in the way in which a lawyer can commit their client. Representation of interests: in which one person is placed in a position to advocate for another. The main part of the paper focuses on the relation between representation of interests and ascriptive representation in democracy, but Wollheim also brings out a tension between legislative and deliberative understandings of democracy. On the legislative interpretation, the point of democracy is to enact legislation in interests of the majority, whereas on the deliberative account, the aim is to ensure that all voices are represented. But if voices are diverse and all are represented, it may be that not enough representatives will be present to represent the will of the majority, which then runs the risk of being outvoted.
Identifiants
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4414367418
- DOI
- 10.1093/9780198927600.003.0006
Repères documentaires
- Famille documentaire
- Chapitre d’ouvrage
- Types déclarés par les sources
- book-chapter
- Éditeurs
- Oxford University Press
Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.
Description bibliographique du livre
- Éditeur
- Oxford University Press
- Date de publication déclarée
- 2025-09-19
Disponibilité non établie
Sources
OpenAlex · Document 1
Citer cette référence
Richard Wollheim. How Can One Person Represent Another? (1960). 2025. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0006
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- APA
- Richard Wollheim. (2025). How Can One Person Represent Another? (1960). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0006
- Chicago
- Richard Wollheim. How Can One Person Represent Another? (1960). Oxford University Press. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0006
- ISO 690
- Richard Wollheim. How Can One Person Represent Another? (1960). 2025. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0006
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Source bibliographique / publication d’origine · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0006
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