UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

Sustaining off-reserve forests in Ghana: a game-theoretic approach

Identification

Clé publique

openalex:w2936862904

Auteurs

Emmanuel Otutei

Année déclarée

2018

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

dissertation

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:17:04.141953+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:17:04.141953+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

This thesis explores options for resolving the ongoing tenure and compensation conflicts in the off-reserve forests (non-plantation forests outside permanent forest reserves) in Ghana. The ongoing degradation of the forests has been attributed to the prevalent tenure and compensation conflicts among cocoa farmers, the government, and logging concessionaires. Cocoa farmers nurture and preserve naturally growing trees in the off-reserve forests. They even plant indigenous tree species on their farms for the purpose of providing additional shades for their cocoa crops. Yet since 1998, the government has denied farmers any legal rights to the shade trees they retain on their farms. In addition, crops are extensively damaged by logging and transporting activities occurring on cocoa farms. However, most concessionaires fail to adequately compensate affected farmers. Farmers tend to resort to unsustainable forest practices as a result of these tenure and compensation conflicts. They markedly reduce shade tree density when cocoa crops start bearing pods by cutting down or killing many young trees and engaging in illegal (chainsaw) logging. Thus, the key research question investigated by this thesis is: what is the most optimal policy option for minimising unsustainable forest practices among farmers? To respond to this question, this thesis developed game-theoretic models to predict the future behaviour of some key stakeholders under hypothetical policy scenarios. The predictions of the game-theoretic models were then tested with empirical data collected from farmers and concessionaires in Ghana in 2016. The current behaviours of the concessionaires and farmers in the off-reserve forests were found to be consistent with the rational-choice model. These stakeholders are behaving in ways that will maximise their expected values in the off-reserve forests. Both the theoretical and empirical results revealed that farmers are less likely to be fully compensated should they pursue compensation on their own. It was found that a credible threat of litigation by a third-party advocate is likely to be the most optimal option to ensure that concessionaires fully and promptly compensate farmers for crop damage. More importantly, the most optimal policy option to motivate farmers to increase tree density and diversity and minimise farmer-driven illegal logging is a policy mix that concurrently provides 40% of stumpage revenue to farmers; ensures full compensation for crop damage through third-party litigation; and strictly enforces the tree harvesting rule using FC-farmer partnerships.

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W2936862904

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Thèse

Types déclarés par les sources

dissertation

Juridictions étudiées — sources explicites

GH

Entités naturelles mentionnées

Forêt · Espèce

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• Document · http://hdl.handle.net/2440/115372
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W2936862904

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• openalex:w2257177166 · CITES

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