UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

Statutory Interpretation in State Courts—A Study of Indiana Opinions

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.18060/2923

Auteurs

William D. Popkin

Année déclarée

1991

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

article

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:04:47.750385+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:04:47.750385+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

Indiana University

Pays d’affiliation déclarés

US

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

Background Prior to 1980, statutory interpretation seemed to be a moribund academic field.The dominant academic approach was established by the Hart & Sacks Legal Process materials,' which reconciled the tra- ditional creative power of common law courts with the policy of deference to legislation.The Legal Process '^solution'* was to presume that statutes were texts with a purpose, that the purpose was what reasonable people would pursue, and that courts, sharing in that reasonable vision, could apply that purpose to resolve uncertainties within statutory gaps.Statutes therefore set the framework within which courts engaged in reasoned elaboration of legislative purpose.This system preserved both legislative supremacy and judicial creativity.Wide acceptance of the Legal Process solution appeared to end academic debate about statutory interpretation.Except for Reed Dickerson's efforts to keep the subject alive,^the literature was sparse.That changed in the last decade, and statutory interpretation became a subject of intense academic interest.In retrospect, it appears that the Legal Process solution matured around the time when new legislative tensions were beginning to render its vision of the legislative process obsolete.The romanticized idea of a reasonable legislature whose pur- pose(s) the court discerns now seems almost quaint after the recent political turmoil over civil rights, income redistribution, budgets, and deregulation.By the 1980s, the literature on statutory interpretation began to catch up with the reality of the legislative process and to put forth new visions of the judicial role.^Two modern academic movements undermined the Legal Process perspective.The Law and Economics perspective described the legislative process as anything but reasonable and purposive.Instead, it depicted the legislative process as one of bargaining by private interests producing

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W1547194773

DOI

10.18060/2923

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Doctrine

Types déclarés par les sources

article

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.18060/2923
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W1547194773

Statut documentaire

Pertinence à examiner

Bibliothèque

Cette identité n’est pas encore intégrée à la Bibliothèque juridique.