UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

The Complexities of Comparative Climate Constitutionalism

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.1093/jel/eqac008

Auteurs

Navraj Singh Ghaleigh · Joana Setzer · Asanga Welikala

Année déclarée

2022

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

article

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:19:53.091533+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:19:53.091533+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

London School of Economics and Political Science · University of Edinburgh

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

Abstract Climate constitutionalism is a relatively novel legal field that has nonetheless adopted a very distinct character. Picking up on the classical liberal tack, it is marked by a distrust of state power as it relates to climate action or inaction. This is a venerable approach. In his 1967 classic, MJC Vile recounts that the ‘great theme of the advocates of constitutionalism [had been] the frank acknowledgement of the role of government in society, linked with the determination to bring that government under control and to place limits on the exercise of its power’. This mode of distrust has been ported to the climate constitutionalism literature and in particular its focus on adjudication of constitutional rights provisions for climate purposes. This, we argue, is but one aspect of climate constitutionalism that no longer speaks to the needs of the world when we think about the relationship between climate change, the doctrines and institutions of comparative constitutional law, and the underpinning theory of constitutionalism for this relationship. The institutional dimension of the constitutional management of climate change must go beyond courts and rights to processes and institutions in the two political branches of the state. The normative theory of climate constitutionalism—why should climate change be a constitutional subject on a global scale?—should address itself to the matter of how that question can be answered from a wider and more pluralistic set of normative standpoints than simply only liberalism. In other words, how can climate constitutionalism be normatively justified beyond, although not against, liberalism?

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W4286685068

DOI

10.1093/jel/eqac008

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Doctrine

Types déclarés par les sources

article

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqac008
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W4286685068

Relations bibliographiques documentées

Références et liens déclarés par les sources ; ils ne constituent pas une preuve juridique ni une qualification UGLC. Affichage limité à 20 références sortantes.

• openalex:w2063311497 · CITES
• openalex:w2156566634 · CITES
• The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law · CITES
• openalex:w2530220605 · CITES
• openalex:w2740196287 · CITES
• openalex:w2770054338 · CITES
• openalex:w2916375333 · CITES
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• openalex:w4210278727 · CITES
• openalex:w4283805863 · CITES
• openalex:w4301153464 · CITES

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Bibliothèque

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