UDTR — Radar mondial des droits de la Nature

Nature’s Personhood and Property’s Virtues

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3538522

Auteurs

Laura · Eduardo Moises

Année déclarée

2020

Langue déclarée

en · eng

Type source

Article

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:04:47.556692+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:06:39.431099+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

Cornell University · University of New Mexico

Pays d’affiliation déclarés

US

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

In The Colorado River Ecosystem v. State of Colorado, plaintiff asked a federal district court to find that the Colorado River ecosystem is a legal person, arguing that, “[t]he dominance of a culture that defines nature as property enables its destruction.” Plaintiff’s principal claim rested on the assumption that legal personality could do something for the river that a system of property cannot. In making its case, plaintiff relied on the emergence of what it called a “new kind of environmental law,” pointing to examples where nature had been extended elements of personhood by courts and legislatures in India, New Zealand, Ecuador and Colombia. In this essay, we evaluate the basic strategy of claiming personhood for the Colorado River and other natural objects as a way to advance environmental goals in the legal domain. We explore the normative foundation of the claim — elements of nature are legal persons — and the work personhood is being asked to do by plaintiff and other environmental activists. We identify three possibilities: procedural, substantive and rhetorical. Of those, we suggest plaintiff’s strongest case is rhetorical. But we say this not only because it will likely be difficult to convince a judge to extend standing or substantive rights to a natural object, but because we are unconvinced that personhood would achieve the ends desired by plaintiff and other rights of nature advocates. We contrast the rights of nature movement cases with strategies used by plaintiffs in another case, Juliana v. the US, and conclude that existing legal tools rooted in the law of property offer a more certain, and therefore more promising, pathway to achieving many of the goals articulated by rights of nature advocates in the United States.

Identifiants

DOI

10.2139/ssrn.3538522

OPENALEX

W3024725366

OPENAIRE

doi_dedup___::c838872fc097983bb87e702ef80568dd

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Doctrine

Types déclarés par les sources

Article · preprint

Entités naturelles mentionnées

Fleuve / rivière · Écosystème

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAIRE · Document 1

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3538522
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W3024725366

Relations bibliographiques documentées

Références et liens déclarés par les sources ; ils ne constituent pas une preuve juridique ni une qualification UGLC. Affichage limité à 20 références sortantes.

• openalex:w1483950702 · CITES
• openalex:w1514769873 · CITES
• openalex:w1519051354 · CITES
• openalex:w1527163437 · CITES
• openalex:w2084202217 · CITES
• openalex:w2101639466 · CITES
• openalex:w2795392489 · CITES
• openalex:w2797910919 · CITES

3 références entrantes au sein du corpus détecté

Statut documentaire

Validée documentairement

Bibliothèque