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WHY IT IS UNREASONABLE AND UNJUST TO GRANT LEGAL PERSONHOOD TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.2139/ssrn.6378338

Auteurs

UTKARSH RAGHUNATH

Année déclarée

2026

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

article

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:04:47.853800+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:04:47.853800+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

The emergence of Artificial Intelligence has come up with serious controversies concerning whether autonomous technological systems are legally considered or not. Other academics and policy makers have suggested that AI systems should be given the legal status of persons as a way of countering the problem of accountability when autonomous systems malfunction and harm people. This debate entered mainstream legal discourse with a proposal of the European Parliament of 2017 suggesting the idea of electronic personhood. Nevertheless, the concept is still debatable in the field of jurisprudence and regulatory theory. This paper suggests that Artificial Intelligence should not be given legal personhood due to its imprudence as well as unfairness.Historically, legal personhood is a legal fiction designed to accomplish certain social goals like commercial facilitation, religious interests conservation, or environmental resource protection. Corporations, idols and rivers have been given legal identity due to the fact that they safeguard identifiable human or ecological interests. Artificial Intelligence, in its turn, does not have any consciousness, moral agency, and intrinsic interests. It is incapable of having intentions, moral responsibility, and independent rights to be accorded legal status. This paper explores the notion of legal personhood, jurisprudential conditions of identifying non-human beings as legal persons, and the analogy of symbolic personhood in law. The paper will also examine the dangers of AI personhood such as corporate liability caps, lack of responsibility and moral hazards in technology advancement. The paper suggests that the harms caused by AI systems are better regulated by the existing legal doctrines of strict liability, corporate accountability, product liability, and transparency through algorithmic means. Finally, it is concluded in the paper that the legal personhood of AI would be counterproductive to core foundations of justice by placing the burden off on the human agents who create, implement, and make money on AI technologies. An anthropocentric regulatory system is the most consistent and reasonable model of the regulation of artificial intelligence. Keywords: Accountability, Artificial Intelligence, Legal Fictions, Legal Personhood, Responsibility.

Identifiants

DOI

10.2139/ssrn.6378338 · 10.65393/rfcm8213

OPENALEX

W7136070489

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Doctrine

Types déclarés par les sources

article

Entités naturelles mentionnées

Fleuve / rivière

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6378338
• DOI · https://doi.org/10.65393/rfcm8213
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W7136070489

Relations bibliographiques documentées

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• openalex:w1441180700 · CITES
• openalex:w2477904491 · CITES
• openalex:w2619503097 · CITES
• Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons · CITES
• openalex:w2907712694 · CITES
• openalex:w2954266614 · CITES
• openalex:w3093932696 · CITES
• openalex:w3159278388 · CITES
• openalex:w4250113020 · CITES

1 références entrantes au sein du corpus détecté

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Pertinence à examiner

Bibliothèque

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