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Analysis of the 1961 Constitution in the Pendulum of Democracy and Guardianship in Turkey

Identification

Clé publique

doi:10.31297/hkju.25.1.5

Auteurs

Mutlu Yıldırım

Année déclarée

2025

Langue déclarée

en

Type source

article

Première détection

2026-11-09T19:04:47.925733+00:00

Dernière observation des métadonnées

2026-11-09T19:04:47.925733+00:00

Dernière vérification HTTP

Non effectuée

Institutions déclarées par la source

Pamukkale University

Pays d’affiliation déclarés

TR

Résumé documentaire — langue originale

This study systematically analyses the 1961 Turkish Constitution, which was established after the 1960 military coup, by examining its dual structure within the framework of democracy and military tutelage. Using the PRISMA method for systematic literature review and AMOS 22 for qualitative content analysis of expert opinions from YouTube videos, it investigates how this Constitution balances democratic freedoms with institutionalised tutelage. The 1961 Constitution is recognised for expanding fundamental rights, establishing judicial independence, and introducing the concept of a social state, significantly advancing democratic standards in Turkey. It comprehensively guaranteed individual, social, and economic rights, ensured judicial autonomy, and supported freedoms such as unionisation and collective bargaining. However, the same Constitution institutionalised military control and embedded military influence in civilian politics through the establishment of tutelage bodies such as the Senate of the Republic and the National Security Council, which were composed of partially appointed and ex officio members. Measures such as executive decrees and state control over broadcasting further reflected elements of tutelage. The tutelary structures constrained democratic governance by establishing checks on elected civilian authorities. Content analysis of expert discussions revealed critical perspectives that emphasised that the Constitution did not sufficiently reflect the will of the people due to its formation process under military influence. Experts emphasised the role of institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council as entities that perpetuated bureaucratic and military tutelage rather than fully protecting democratic principles. The study highlights the internal contradictions in the 1961 Constitution, showing how it oscillates between strengthening democracy and strengthening tutelage. This dichotomy reflects Turkey’s broader political tension between civilian democratic aspirations and persistent bureaucratic-military influence. The study argues that for a strong democratic evolution, future constitutional reforms must eliminate the remaining tutelary structures, ensure a clear alignment with democratic governance, and reflect popular sovereignty.

Identifiants

OPENALEX

W4410162096

DOI

10.31297/hkju.25.1.5

Repères documentaires

Famille documentaire

Doctrine

Types déclarés par les sources

article

Les mentions d’entités ne constituent pas une preuve de reconnaissance juridique. La juridiction étudiée est distincte du pays d’affiliation des auteurs.

Sources

OpenAlex · Document 1 · Document 2

• DOI · https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.5
• OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W4410162096

Relations bibliographiques documentées

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• openalex:w2960554018 · CITES
• openalex:w4296564729 · CITES

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