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Evaluating the implementation of innovative technology in Japan’s bidding system: a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretical analysis

Identification

Public canonical key
radar:r-fb46cfbaa0a6508533397cffdfa729b6
Authors
Tsunemi Watanabe · Tsunemi Watanabe · Martin Skitmore
Reported year
2025
Reported language
en
Source type
article
First detected
2026-11-14T02:47:12.892568+00:00
Last metadata observation
2026-11-14T02:47:12.892568+00:00
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Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

Bond University · Utsunomiya University

Reported affiliation countries

AU · JP

Documentary abstract — original language

Innovation in construction is crucial for enhancing labour productivity. Effective procurement strategies promote technological advancements. Japan’s Comprehensive Evaluation Method (CEM) includes a multi-parameter bidding system incorporating a substantial lower bound (LB) known as ‘Chosa Kijun Kakaku’ to prevent underbidding. However, this bound can limit innovative practices that reduce costs. Currently, there are no methods to evaluate the impact of this bound or identify optimal parameters to encourage innovation. This study aims to develop a framework for determining the optimal parameter values to maximize benefits for public owners and innovative firms while also deriving an optimal scenario for the current circumstances regarding innovative technology adoption. A Stackelberg game theoretical framework models the sequential decisions of public owners and bidders, framing it as an optimisation problem. Findings include: (i) the method effectively identifies optimal solutions that meet local optimality conditions; (ii) a CEM without substantial LB results in lower award prices, higher winning probabilities, and increased profits for an innovative company. This model fosters innovation and provides new insights into bidding design. Unlike most multi-parametric bidding research that centres on a single objective function, this study investigates two parties with differing objectives, offering a practical perspective on multi-parameter bidding design.

Identifiers

OPENALEX
https://openalex.org/W4410435946
DOI
10.1080/01446193.2025.2493324

Documentary context

Documentary family
article
Source-reported types
article
Publishers
Taylor & Francis

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Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1

Cite this reference

Tsunemi Watanabe; Tsunemi Watanabe; Martin Skitmore. Evaluating the implementation of innovative technology in Japan’s bidding system: a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretical analysis. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2025.2493324

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APA
Tsunemi Watanabe; Tsunemi Watanabe; Martin Skitmore. (2025). Evaluating the implementation of innovative technology in Japan’s bidding system: a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretical analysis. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2025.2493324
Chicago
Tsunemi Watanabe; Tsunemi Watanabe; Martin Skitmore. Evaluating the implementation of innovative technology in Japan’s bidding system: a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretical analysis. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2025.2493324
ISO 690
Tsunemi Watanabe; Tsunemi Watanabe; Martin Skitmore. Evaluating the implementation of innovative technology in Japan’s bidding system: a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretical analysis. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2025.2493324

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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Evaluating the implementation of innovative technology in Japan’s bidding system: a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretical analysis. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-fb46cfbaa0a6508533397cffdfa729b6/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed

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Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2025.2493324

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