Bertrand Russell and The Liberal Tradition (1974)
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-f022b4e75c9be47cec8c1585d8264b28
- Authors
- Richard Wollheim
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- book-chapter
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T01:59:38.240674+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T01:59:38.240674+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract In this paper, published in 1974, Wollheim argues that there are respects in which Russell’s version of liberalism is an improvement on Mill’s account, updating Mill by filling two gaps in at least the standard readings of On Liberty: the theory of human nature and of society. On Wollheim’s account, Russell provides a theory of human nature in which human beings are to a large extent driven by desire and impulse, rather than reason. And although desires are said to be amenable to reason in the limited sense that there is room for discussion about whether desired means will achieve desired ends, impulses are not under any direct control of reason, although impulses can be satisfied in different ways through political action. Impulses and desires divide into those that are creative and those that are possessive (concerned with property and power). According to Wollheim’s interpretation for Russell, creative desires and impulses lead to harmonious society, and so political authorities have no business interfering with them, whereas possessive desires and impulses are intrinsically conflictive and need to be regulated by authority. This position is called by Russell ‘The Principle of Growth’, and Russell also goes beyond Mill by reflecting on the type of social institutions that would provide fertile ground for the Principle of Growth, for, as Wollheim points out, in On Liberty, Mill does not provide an account of the institutions in which liberty would be realized.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4414367342
- DOI
- 10.1093/9780198927600.003.0011
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- Book chapter
- Source-reported types
- book-chapter
- Publishers
- Oxford University Press
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Book bibliographic description
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Reported publication date
- 2025-09-19
Access status unknown
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Richard Wollheim. Bertrand Russell and The Liberal Tradition (1974). 2025. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0011
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- APA
- Richard Wollheim. (2025). Bertrand Russell and The Liberal Tradition (1974). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0011
- Chicago
- Richard Wollheim. Bertrand Russell and The Liberal Tradition (1974). Oxford University Press. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0011
- ISO 690
- Richard Wollheim. Bertrand Russell and The Liberal Tradition (1974). 2025. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0011
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Bertrand Russell and The Liberal Tradition (1974). Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-f022b4e75c9be47cec8c1585d8264b28/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927600.003.0011
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Documentary status
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