Introduction
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- Lindsay O’Connor Stern · Julie Stone Peters
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Documentary abstract — original language
At the center of what we do in the humanities stands the figure of “the human.” Preoccupied with this troubled figure (its tainted past, its arrogant supremacy, its exclusions, its uncertain future in the age of AI), we have let an arguably more powerful concept fly under the radar: “personhood.” A humanities keyword, personhood mostly appears without history or theoretical substrate.1 It is decisive, and yet somehow also vague. Is our personhood primarily psychological, made up of our “needs, desires, and emotions”?2 Or is it “the social and civic components of personal identity”?3 Is it an expression of “human agency,” the full selfhood toward which we continue to strive, the goal of Bildungsroman Bildung?4 Or is it the product of gender coercion, of the regime of homo oeconomicus, of prison-industrial enslavement?5 Is personhood an aspiration or the object of critique? Is it—as in many discussions—merely another word for “the human,” “identity,” or the “self” of “self-expression”?6 As Robert H. Sharf writes, we are “not quite sure what, if anything,…constitutes our personhood.”7And yet there is a domain where—however contested the concept of personhood may be—it has been the subject of ongoing and profound theoretical inquiry for millennia, a domain where personhood has long served as a precise and pragmatic instrument, not just of thought but of action. That domain is law. Ancient legal scholars’ meditations on the nature of personhood generated a rich body of doctrinal debates, taken up by medieval and early modern scholars, and these debates have appeared in new forms in contemporary jurisprudence. And yet contemporary legal discussions of personhood tend to remain highly technical, focused on judicial and legislative debates, policy, or analytical jurisprudence.8 This is surprising, given that “law and humanities” is now a well-established subdiscipline and legal scholarship increasingly interdisciplinary: surprising especially in light of the importance of personhood as a historical concept.9This special issue takes up that concept, examining the techniques that have created personhood’s heterogeneous manifestations: in law; in culture generally; and at the crossroads where law and culture meet. As personhood comes into focus through the essays here, it becomes clear that it is a critical problem for our time, perhaps the critical problem. It is not only at the vortex of political conflict: it is the key to how we think about what has made us who we are, our humanness and thingness, our differences, our inhumanity, the reach and limits of the putative subject at the center of our powers. Looking closely at personhood serves as a means of confronting the conceptual impasse of the human, rendering the set of operations propping up the human suddenly visible while also showing that the kinds of repair we sometimes seek in the human—seek with a sense of grandiose and phantasmatic futility—might in fact be found in the less glamorous, more workaday techniques of personhood.The word “person” began as a term of art adapted from classical poetics, born from the Greek prósōpon, designating the mask worn by actors: the hollow likeness of a human face that concealed and displaced an actor’s physical countenance in order to conjure fictional characters, animals, and gods. It was Latinized—probably by way of the Etruscans—as per-sonare, perhaps indicating the sounding through the mask that was the expression of character.10 This idea—that the person was a mask that emitted a voice expressive of character—soon entered law, where it became a term of art used by Roman judges to differentiate parties to a dispute. The original theatrical meaning of persona continued to inform the Roman law of persons (the ius personarum): a legal “persona” was quite distinct from the human being enacting it. In Roman legal handbooks, the word persona remained operational rather than metaphysical, coming to designate a wide variety of entities and specifying their powers. Often referencing formal duties (officia, offices), the persona might, at different times and places, be a praetor, a senator, a metic, etc. A single individual could operate under distinct legal personae in order to honor multiple contracts. Legal personhood was—definitionally—not natural but crafted: a technology for producing distinctions among, for instance, human, animal, and environment, person, persona, and thing, owner and owned.Roman law’s tripartite scheme, which artificially separated the ius personarum from the law of things, and of actions, was passed down to later European law through Gaius’s Institutes and Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis.11 The very artificiality of legal personhood gave the concept great elasticity: elasticity that ensured both its longevity and the expansion of its purview. Over the centuries, various interests successfully exploited this elasticity to define personhood to their own ends. A wide variety of functions, entities, and things gained personhood: corporate bodies, trading companies, trusts, sacred beings, ships, universities, and more. Though such categories of legal personhood were always subject to challenge, open to contestation and transformation, many became enshrined in black letter law.12Meanwhile, a competing concept of personhood had been developing in Christian theology. One might trace this concept to Tertullian’s discussion of the tripartite persona of God: a single persona whose different identities did not represent different persons but were merely different manifestations of the one God; the persona as unity despite apparent multiplicity (as opposed to the Roman legal model in which the apparent unity of an agent might represent actual multiplicity of function).13 Boethius extended this vision of the persona to the human person more generally—the person (he said) is “the individual substance of a rational nature”—a vision that Thomas Aquinas elaborated in the Summa Theologiae.14Marcel Mauss cast the difference between classical and Christian conceptions of personhood as a transformation: from role without self, to self without role.15 It is a compelling chiasmus, identifying the antinomy with both accuracy and vividness. And it is certainly true that the Christian conception of personhood as a sacred metaphysical entity gained hold over time, both through Christian theology and—stripped of its theological moorings—in secular philosophy. One can see it, for instance, in John Locke’s definition of a “person” as “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider its self as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.” Updated through what we might call vernacular ideology, we can find Locke’s “person” as a prototype for the modern “self.”16 But to speak of a “transformation” from role to self is misleading. For the Roman legal conception of personhood as a technical-operational apparatus endured alongside the Christian metaphysical conception, in law and elsewhere. These constitute two historical traditions of personhood—coterminous, competing, incurably entangled—two traditions that appear behind most visions of personhood today.Under this optic, Thomas Hobbes’s distinction between the “natural” and “artificial” person appears not as a seventeenth-century innovation but as an attempt to parse these two older traditions. In the section of Leviathan that he titles “Of Persons, Authors, and things Personated,” he explains:A PERSON, is he, whose words and actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and action of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall Person.17Here, we find Roman technical-operational personhood in the guise of the “Feigned or Artificiall Person,” and Christian metaphysical personhood in the guise of the “Naturall Person” embodied in the natural human being. However, as Mónica Brito Vieira has pointed out, it would be a mistake to envision Hobbes’s idea of the “Naturall Person” as one free of artifice.18 Hobbes’s insistence on the theatrical etymology of persona as a key to personhood makes it clear that even the natural person is, for him, an actor engaged in an act of representation. The word person in Latin, he explains,signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other.19“For Hobbes” (writes Brito Vieira), “a ‘person’ is always already of the order of artefact: their actions are acts of representation, either of themself or another.”20 That is, personhood is always already a mode of for even when we represent what we envision as our In the Christian metaphysical these and these sacred (he to are even when who to be as “Naturall persons be a they are by and law has both of these visions of sometimes to the Roman technical-operational with the Christian metaphysical, sometimes the and to this as the of in many contemporary judicial which with of personhood but at the same to a vision of the natural person the and other of what the But as the natural legal person is an For (as and the “person” is not “a of the legal but an “a a of As it, “the legal person is a has long been a in the humanities that the things that most natural to us are in fact Over the critical has been on that as in an ongoing of that was just have sometimes this as a by humanities that there are a as and what about But such the As pointed long to that is is not to that it is any less or the may be And the may be very this In the of through at and particularly legal As we have law has generated the most and powerful techniques of It has the the the person, the the just a law, the figure of the person has who was a and who was who could and who could whom the of would and whom it would is not just the domain where such things but the domain where we can see most at the domain where the that personhood and the of most Legal techniques of personhood are to both the and its they their they are At the same time, they how personhood can be In and in its of the nature and forms of law a for techniques of personhood more us to in other where they may be more the is of a is from call and these are from the essays legal they at the same how techniques of personhood and techniques operate through (as we see in of The or through of art (as we see in discussion of by and or through what concealed (as are us as the as personhood has been its we have remained in to its the human, which serves us as both and humanities” in the in part to “the human,” its from the of But the new the at its we were we behind us the of its arrogant and his the a that he as his for the we were we that was a that it had given to a that the of to the its and and to a of that the to the of The human was the in order to in In the age of the we that the human to and the of the natural set us on a to had to and Or we already the of the human and that human what was the human our we been to let And we in we we the the of we we as we also call for it in the face of modern “human also for It to be we envision the of as (the of or the of the that even of our And we find the human, to it, it to it when we are at It the at a of a that us and an from the of not sure over the while the more we tend to and “person” as But in historical they are in fact The are where the human from the is the person the on its the human is an personhood is an the human is personhood is the human is and personhood is in and the human is in a physical personhood is a or the human appears personhood is The person is always a persona the human, personhood be of it is theatrical to the these might to from the human to techniques of personhood is not to the human but to to it with a It is to its history as the of forms of legal One can see for instance, in what has as a set of legal operations that to from the of the but that in fact served operations with through the of showing as a which used legal categories of personhood to under the of the to personhood is to see both the of the human and the somehow in it. it is to see the of for the on In their and such on not only to they a of what we call may their to or they also (as on the of these is into the as the may in fact be as a for techniques of which are at behind it. As “the human is of the human is a political it is personhood that is its political The human is a the of if one behind the one personhood the to appear as an of personhood: its but our focus to personhood the of than to to at we can the of how and identities are what different forms of personhood do or to their and how we might act on is an it be or at is a concept made up of that we can with or The and of to a set of what it the to with whose to remain legal techniques of personhood up their and to the of and into action in the one is into thinking that these are or speak to the of human or to our or the of is and that is its about the nature of being but about things And in it may have a of both and it may of personhood the distinction between and over and for and that have the of (as and in their essays techniques may be in the of the personhood of “the the into the in order to and a future of personhood for that apparatus of and that may legal for the or and the of what we (as But techniques of personhood also gave the a means of for and their (as to and other natural entities, they have the that has and the more (as at us as legal and our (as our and in the of (as the visions of our (as may us to what into might to the that legal personhood as an of what as “the of legal personhood to who had been and the the law’s of by the true personhood of more But as the essays this of personhood be history has been by and of the person is the of a and the of the history our essays we open with Persons, and Legal it is legal is its to such of art as it only in formal such as and or also in the identities law but not In what sense are legal persons of they if are (as or merely with is, out, a between a and a us think through the of legal it also a set of for the of legal personhood that appear in the essays that For instance, personhood on is different from that on or or what as the into being through a is to have been born while the was is different from that into being or These are they us closely different techniques of personhood at as they different kinds of At the same time, personhood’s to and the of its he of the whose legal identities from to and to man, and on the of legal personhood with other the and as of and of legal or of legal in while in can see that and in the essays that which us a history of legal personhood not as but as a set of and In of and the of takes us to the Roman legal of the in which one can see of and that would to modern legal the as of their on their and that somehow to their As the of the a of separated from its an In the the person who used The a model for law’s operations of more its of and Legal is a of (writes a for and a that the of one person for One can see not just the at but the of in the in which and do not merely represent but personhood of his history as that the may have more in than in and in identifying it with the modern one can see techniques of modern corporate personhood coming into focus from by to the and producing “the of that and its the is a prototype for modern corporate at a different the early modern and the at its The was not merely a for the of between the and personhood was key to the of to the of that were at and the and to the between and the that that to the of through the of the the into a person, the law a distinction between and that legal to as for or on the or in the rather than the was and The not only and its it was also to the up of as in At the same time, it a role in what called the of as and as “the of the and who could sometimes by legal personhood In Person, and in the a of legal and how used legal personhood to own and These a very different of and than that in the by the who as a of their to with the in a to legal personhood that contested the of as a legal person in own not in of to not only the distinction between legal personhood as an and or (as It also an of the distinction between the and the that of the was to legal personhood in the a legal or with “a of and with embodied human with the human at the Christian to and law’s (writes an that was not in but in the of to their as legal and to of the modern the Person” us an of that legal what as “a over the of the later and centuries, the early to the from both its to the and the duties that with It did through and the of which on the through a of and legal to contemporary that the key of modern corporate personhood have been in forms of personhood: in for to free speech from and the to The corporate the legal subject from its and writes, it is that that new of personhood personhood may appear in of its it and while from the of and in legal essays that closely at such for their legal their and the and that behind In in the to on of and the on which these for legal personhood were that gained in part to what the of and In the and for the these of as a for legal personhood by classical and early modern visions of for personhood became for for the in the by its legal personhood of in the of these not as the the of from from classical they The the from the of their of law at its yet to it, the way technology and law can in to our and it is conceptions of the that forms of legal In The takes on an political in the figure of the a being but which in in and or and the an of or into the of the a of through which this new of legal persons has been of the personhood of the have “the to how the called is to key in personhood as and of and into law’s of As an of what the being is a being who in a legal of the from the of personhood and the of corporate personhood or the of the the of are the of a new of who in the future of or and their could that the of the personhood of the are in which as the in and to see the of in In The of Legal that this at the of for the personhood of etc. might for the of personhood to natural But for this of which we might be to as a of on the or us to a of and profound by way of these to our sense of with and to other entities, whether they to us or the mask comes into the human is a to and to on and there may in fact be in a mask on nature and the human in it. This is what a concept by his with Legal for and his of an in The is into that natural are to by It us to through the of in legal personhood to the natural while of the on which such personhood In A But Legal as the human of an more in an he In to a concept by in that of being appears to other as it appears to as it already acts by its distinct and animal, or is less a than a an to legal personhood as more and than we might have legal personhood through he may us to to what he a vision of personhood that that we that our are made of and that are part of the yet from one to envision legal personhood as the substance in which we us to see its in where law may to in the of our In that legal personhood our very on his in which he focused on how of with he how law through the of the of as not but also not are in one of the by the classical word he means of law, the of who are not in The of the not only in law but in the that it in the figure of they not as the of a the to the or but
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Lindsay O’Connor Stern; Julie Stone Peters. Introduction. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1525/rep.2025.172.1.1
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