Contingent Policy Design: Political Accountability and Environmental Governance in China
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-dc265b13a43c4a6f3dd53e6a91062eac
- Authors
- Juan Du · Hongtao Yi · Xufeng Zhu
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:47:30.636866+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:47:30.636866+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
East China Normal University · Florida State University · Tsinghua University
Reported affiliation countries
CN · US
Documentary abstract — original language
ABSTRACT Existing scholarship often conceptualizes policy design as a static stage in the policy process whereby decision‐makers craft policies based on given institutional settings. Our research contends that the fundamental logic underlying policy design can be contingently reshaped by external shocks such as central institutional change. When the central government restructures political institutions, it reconfigures local officials' decision‐making rationales throughout the policy process. Leveraging a novel dataset encompassing the removal of Drinking Water Source Protection Zones in Chinese cities from 2005 to 2018, this study examines how cities transformed their policy design rationales in response to a newly established political accountability system by the central government. Empirical results reveal that prior to the reforms, policy design followed an “economic performance logic” based on city economic characteristics. After the implementation of accountability in water governance, policy design shifted toward a rationale combining a political accountability logic, aimed at hiding misconduct, with a capacity‐based logic, focused on achieving quick deliverables within capacity constraints. This study advances the understanding of how institutional arrangements shape policy designs among local policymakers in China.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4416133417
- DOI
- 10.1111/psj.70085
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Wiley
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Juan Du; Hongtao Yi; Xufeng Zhu. Contingent Policy Design: Political Accountability and Environmental Governance in China. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70085
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Juan Du; Hongtao Yi; Xufeng Zhu. (2025). Contingent Policy Design: Political Accountability and Environmental Governance in China. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70085
- Chicago
- Juan Du; Hongtao Yi; Xufeng Zhu. Contingent Policy Design: Political Accountability and Environmental Governance in China. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70085
- ISO 690
- Juan Du; Hongtao Yi; Xufeng Zhu. Contingent Policy Design: Political Accountability and Environmental Governance in China. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70085
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Contingent Policy Design: Political Accountability and Environmental Governance in China. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-dc265b13a43c4a6f3dd53e6a91062eac/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70085
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Documentary status
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