Artificial Intelligence As A Legal Subject: An Existentialist Philosophy Perspective
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-cefe5fbdf9501ff58bd833fef5793608
- Authors
- Chandera Halim · Koleta Donna Indhayana Putri
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-13T08:38:32.288164+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-13T08:38:32.288164+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Atma Jaya University Yogyakarta
Reported affiliation countries
ID
Documentary abstract — original language
The increasing complexity of artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked debates regarding its legal status, particularly whether AI can be considered a legal subject. This study examines the issue through the lens of existentialist philosophy, which emphasizes freedom, consciousness, and responsibility as fundamental aspects of existence. A qualitative approach is employed, utilizing philosophical analysis of subjectivity and existence based on the thoughts of existentialist figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. The findings reveal that although AI can act autonomously and mimic human decision-making, it lacks self-awareness and existential freedom. Consequently, from an existentialist perspective, AI does not qualify as a legal subject, as it does not possess authentic existence and moral responsibility. This conclusion underscores that AI's legal status is more appropriately categorized as a legal object with specific regulations rather than an entity with legal rights and obligations
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7224032395
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Chandera Halim; Koleta Donna Indhayana Putri. Artificial Intelligence As A Legal Subject: An Existentialist Philosophy Perspective. 2025. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-cefe5fbdf9501ff58bd833fef5793608/
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Chandera Halim; Koleta Donna Indhayana Putri. (2025). Artificial Intelligence As A Legal Subject: An Existentialist Philosophy Perspective. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-cefe5fbdf9501ff58bd833fef5793608/
- Chicago
- Chandera Halim; Koleta Donna Indhayana Putri. Artificial Intelligence As A Legal Subject: An Existentialist Philosophy Perspective. 2025. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-cefe5fbdf9501ff58bd833fef5793608/
- ISO 690
- Chandera Halim; Koleta Donna Indhayana Putri. Artificial Intelligence As A Legal Subject: An Existentialist Philosophy Perspective. 2025. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-cefe5fbdf9501ff58bd833fef5793608/
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Artificial Intelligence As A Legal Subject: An Existentialist Philosophy Perspective. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-cefe5fbdf9501ff58bd833fef5793608/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://journal.das-institute.com/index.php/citizen-journal/article/view/712
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Documentary status
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