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Moral Categorization and Mind Perception

Identification

Public canonical key
radar:r-c84a11da93c7e765ea09f090acc0d751
Authors
Philip Robbins
Reported year
2025
Reported language
en
Source type
book-chapter
First detected
2026-11-14T02:45:59.938454+00:00
Last metadata observation
2026-11-14T02:45:59.938454+00:00
Last HTTP verification
Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

University of Missouri

Reported affiliation countries

US

Documentary abstract — original language

This chapter of the handbook discusses the role of mind perception in the categorization of individuals as moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as individuals that can commit morally wrong actions; moral patients are defined as individuals that can be morally wronged. It is generally agreed that the attribution of moral agency and moral patiency is linked to the attribution of mental capacities and traits. The chapter surveys a variety of models of mind perception, some of which focus on the representation of mental capacities, some of which focus on the representation of mental traits. The dominant model of mind perception in moral psychology is the experience-agency model, which divides the space of mindedness into experiential capacities like sentience and self-awareness, and agentic capacities like deliberative reasoning and self-control. Reviewing the empirical literature on moral categorization, the author argues that neither the experience-agency model nor any of the major alternatives to it captures all the factors to which everyday attributions of moral agency and moral patiency are sensitive.

Identifiers

OPENALEX
https://openalex.org/W4407726896
DOI
10.1017/9781108894357.012

Documentary context

Documentary family
Book chapter
Source-reported types
book-chapter
Publishers
Cambridge University Press

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Book bibliographic description

Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Reported publication date
2025-02-20

Access status unknown

Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1

Cite this reference

Philip Robbins. Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. 2025. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012

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APA
Philip Robbins. (2025). Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
Chicago
Philip Robbins. Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. Cambridge University Press. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
ISO 690
Philip Robbins. Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. 2025. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012

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Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012

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