Moral Categorization and Mind Perception
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-c84a11da93c7e765ea09f090acc0d751
- Authors
- Philip Robbins
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- book-chapter
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:45:59.938454+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:45:59.938454+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
University of Missouri
Reported affiliation countries
US
Documentary abstract — original language
This chapter of the handbook discusses the role of mind perception in the categorization of individuals as moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as individuals that can commit morally wrong actions; moral patients are defined as individuals that can be morally wronged. It is generally agreed that the attribution of moral agency and moral patiency is linked to the attribution of mental capacities and traits. The chapter surveys a variety of models of mind perception, some of which focus on the representation of mental capacities, some of which focus on the representation of mental traits. The dominant model of mind perception in moral psychology is the experience-agency model, which divides the space of mindedness into experiential capacities like sentience and self-awareness, and agentic capacities like deliberative reasoning and self-control. Reviewing the empirical literature on moral categorization, the author argues that neither the experience-agency model nor any of the major alternatives to it captures all the factors to which everyday attributions of moral agency and moral patiency are sensitive.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4407726896
- DOI
- 10.1017/9781108894357.012
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- Book chapter
- Source-reported types
- book-chapter
- Publishers
- Cambridge University Press
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Book bibliographic description
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Reported publication date
- 2025-02-20
Access status unknown
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Philip Robbins. Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. 2025. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Philip Robbins. (2025). Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
- Chicago
- Philip Robbins. Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. Cambridge University Press. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
- ISO 690
- Philip Robbins. Moral Categorization and Mind Perception. 2025. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
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Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108894357.012
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Documentary status
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Library
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