From Shirking to Sharing: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responsibility Mechanisms in Digital Environmental Governance
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-a37b36827ba9e8ab06eebb7dcb9da4e2
- Authors
- Mao Chai · Yao Tong · Zi Wang
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:32:26.642194+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:32:26.642194+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Xiangtan University
Reported affiliation countries
CN
Documentary abstract — original language
Government–enterprise collaboration does not automatically produce responsibility sharing in digital environmental governance. Integrating Social Role Theory with evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a role-based evolutionary game model to examine how governments and enterprises adjust responsibility strategies under bounded rationality. The model incorporates legitimacy benefits, role-deviation losses, digital governance capacity, compliance costs, penalties, and governance costs. Results show two possible stable outcomes—mutual responsibility fulfillment and mutual shirking—with threshold-sensitive dynamics. Stronger digital capacity, detection probability, penalties, and legitimacy incentives, combined with lower costs, expand the attraction basin of mutual responsibility fulfillment; weak monitoring, high costs, insufficient penalties, and ambiguous boundaries increase shirking risk. A focused VRBG mechanism—value cultivation, responsibility identification, benefit sharing, and guarantee mechanisms—is proposed to adjust the incentive conditions that make responsibility fulfillment self-reinforcing.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7170448880
- DOI
- 10.3390/admsci16080358
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Mao Chai; Yao Tong; Zi Wang. From Shirking to Sharing: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responsibility Mechanisms in Digital Environmental Governance. 2026. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci16080358
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- APA
- Mao Chai; Yao Tong; Zi Wang. (2026). From Shirking to Sharing: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responsibility Mechanisms in Digital Environmental Governance. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci16080358
- Chicago
- Mao Chai; Yao Tong; Zi Wang. From Shirking to Sharing: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responsibility Mechanisms in Digital Environmental Governance. 2026. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci16080358
- ISO 690
- Mao Chai; Yao Tong; Zi Wang. From Shirking to Sharing: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responsibility Mechanisms in Digital Environmental Governance. 2026. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci16080358
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. From Shirking to Sharing: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responsibility Mechanisms in Digital Environmental Governance. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-a37b36827ba9e8ab06eebb7dcb9da4e2/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci16080358
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Documentary status
Relevance pending
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