Artificial Consciousness and Moral Personhood
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-9f1f9d1d9c7c992c9579aaac3abbac0f
- Authors
- Kęstutis Mosakas
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- reference-entry
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:31:38.493144+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:31:38.493144+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Vytautas Magnus University
Reported affiliation countries
LT
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract This article provides a thematic overview and synthesis of selected literature on the ethical implications of artificial consciousness for moral personhood. It brings together key philosophical discussions to support the view that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for machine moral status and personhood, despite significant epistemic challenges and ethical objections involved. The article commences by outlining the conceptual groundwork, which introduces and clarifies the concepts of moral personhood, moral rights, moral status, and phenomenal consciousness. It then connects these concepts together by establishing two key necessity links: (a) moral status is necessary for moral rights (and, by extension, moral personhood) and (b) consciousness is required for moral status. The discussion proceeds by relating the implications of the necessity links to artificial entities like robots, highlighting the moral significance of artificial consciousness, presenting related policy discussions, and engaging with two significant challenges: the epistemic difficulty of determining consciousness in artificial entities and the alternative view that robots could possess moral status without being conscious. In response, the article maintains that the epistemic challenges do not undermine the consciousness criterion but merely constrain its application, whereas the alternative criteria arguably fail to meet a more demanding threshold for moral status that is required for the possession of moral rights and personhood. By synthesizing insights across multiple debates, this article highlights the enduring significance of consciousness in ethical discourse and its important role in guiding future inquires.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4410139542
- DOI
- 10.1093/9780198945215.003.0005
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- unknown
- Source-reported types
- reference-entry
- Publishers
- Oxford University Press
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Kęstutis Mosakas. Artificial Consciousness and Moral Personhood. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0005
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- APA
- Kęstutis Mosakas. (2025). Artificial Consciousness and Moral Personhood. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0005
- Chicago
- Kęstutis Mosakas. Artificial Consciousness and Moral Personhood. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0005
- ISO 690
- Kęstutis Mosakas. Artificial Consciousness and Moral Personhood. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0005
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Artificial Consciousness and Moral Personhood. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-9f1f9d1d9c7c992c9579aaac3abbac0f/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0005
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Documentary status
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