Professional Liability Under Asymmetric Information and the Market for Experts
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-9b5fc532027d9e9afc10c8e935d40def
- Authors
- Jeong‐Yoo Kim
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:48:17.193052+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:48:17.193052+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Kyung Hee University
Reported affiliation countries
KR
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract In this paper, we consider a market for experts. We argue that the strict liability rule is socially better than the negligence rule, because the expert who knows his own expertise level can internalize the externality due to an accident exactly under the strict liability rule, whereas the legal authority who does not know the individual expert’s expertise level cannot set the accurate due care level of the expert under the negligence rule. We also show that whether the due care of a more capable expert should be higher or lower depends on how the expertise helps the expert. If higher expertise of the expert can reduce the cost of taking care to avoid an accident, (i.e., expertise and effort are complementary), it is socially optimal that a more able expert takes more care to avoid an accident, but if higher expertise decreases the probability of an accident causing damages to the client, (i.e., expertise and effort are substitutable), paradoxically, it is socially optimal that a more able expert takes less care. In the case of market tort in which two experts compete in the market, we show that the invariance results established in the literature do not hold, when the accident probability is private information of experts.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7213892574
- DOI
- 10.1515/ajle-2026-0053
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- De Gruyter
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Jeong‐Yoo Kim. Professional Liability Under Asymmetric Information and the Market for Experts. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0053
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Jeong‐Yoo Kim. (2026). Professional Liability Under Asymmetric Information and the Market for Experts. https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0053
- Chicago
- Jeong‐Yoo Kim. Professional Liability Under Asymmetric Information and the Market for Experts. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0053
- ISO 690
- Jeong‐Yoo Kim. Professional Liability Under Asymmetric Information and the Market for Experts. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0053
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Professional Liability Under Asymmetric Information and the Market for Experts. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-9b5fc532027d9e9afc10c8e935d40def/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0053
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
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