Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-9b26a4a48dd1103647aa10afa1714b6b
- Authors
- Xinyu Hua · Kathryn E. Spier
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-13T12:41:15.285358+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-13T12:41:15.285358+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
City University of Hong Kong · Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · National Bureau of Economic Research · Harvard University
Reported affiliation countries
HK · US
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract This paper explores whether platform liability should be strict or negligence-based. Platforms generate revenue by selling products or services to consumers and offering access to consumer data or attention to third parties. There are cross-side network effects: higher consumer participation increases third-party surplus (a positive externality) but magnifies social harm (a negative externality). Both rules motivate platforms to take socially efficient precautions, yet they have differing impacts on consumer participation and social welfare. If network benefits are weak (strong), the price charged to consumers is positive (zero). With intermediate network benefits, negligence can generate more consumer participation and higher social welfare by balancing positive and negative externalities. With large network benefits and zero price, strict liability increases participation by compensating harmed consumers and proves superior to negligence. Overall, the welfare implications of platform liability depend crucially on the strength of network effects and the nature of externalities.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4366431200
- DOI
- 10.1093/jleo/ewag037
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Oxford University Press
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Xinyu Hua; Kathryn E. Spier. Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag037
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Xinyu Hua; Kathryn E. Spier. (2026). Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag037
- Chicago
- Xinyu Hua; Kathryn E. Spier. Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag037
- ISO 690
- Xinyu Hua; Kathryn E. Spier. Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag037
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-9b26a4a48dd1103647aa10afa1714b6b/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag037
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Documentary status
Relevance pending
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