UDTR Global Radar

UDTR Global Rights of Nature Radar

Documentary registry of records detected across the scholarly, legal and institutional infrastructures monitored by UDTR.

A global documentary infrastructure designed to achieve the broadest verifiable and scientifically defensible coverage of the Rights of Nature.

← Back to Radar

How to Avoid ‘Moralism’ about Obligation

Identification

Public canonical key
radar:r-8e261a96f188fc226c7dd4b065aeec8a
Authors
K. Sekine
Reported year
2026
Reported language
en
Source type
article
First detected
2026-11-14T02:42:20.220375+00:00
Last metadata observation
2026-11-14T02:42:20.220375+00:00
Last HTTP verification
Not checked

Documentary abstract — original language

Abstract Sometimes it seems that no matter how faultlessly we conduct ourselves, we cannot but fail in our obligations, making us apt to feel morally responsible. But according to the popular view I call ‘moralism’ about obligation, we cannot breach our obligations faultlessly, leading moralists to pathologize our feelings, or worse still, to find fault in our conduct. I argue that we should reject moralism, but that we should not do so in the ‘hard’ way, which denies the plausible claim that blameworthiness entails fault. Yet we cannot ‘soften’ our anti-moralism unless we can explain how ordinary agent-regret can rise to a ‘moral’ quality sufficient to do justice to the phenomenology. I offer the outline of a proposal according to which a failure to meet our obligations gives rise to agent-regret with the following ‘moral’ quality: it is extraordinarily hard to let go of or justifiably repress it.

Identifiers

OPENALEX
https://openalex.org/W7215089912
DOI
10.1017/s0031819126101569

Documentary context

Documentary family
article
Source-reported types
article
Publishers
Cambridge University Press

Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.

Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1

Cite this reference

K. Sekine. How to Avoid ‘Moralism’ about Obligation. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819126101569

JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·

APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.

APA
K. Sekine. (2026). How to Avoid ‘Moralism’ about Obligation. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819126101569
Chicago
K. Sekine. How to Avoid ‘Moralism’ about Obligation. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819126101569
ISO 690
K. Sekine. How to Avoid ‘Moralism’ about Obligation. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819126101569

Warning: Undefined array key "last_link_verified" in /home/clients/e27d81e12f04d2bfd747aa264540ac56/sites/_UDTR_APP/legal_library_reference.php on line 31

UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. How to Avoid ‘Moralism’ about Obligation. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-8e261a96f188fc226c7dd4b065aeec8a/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed

Report a correction

Frozen-version metadata

Research dossiers and documentary relations

Source roles

Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819126101569

An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.

Documentary status

Relevance pending

Library

This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.

UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library