Green macrofinancial bargains: how economic interests enable and limit climate action
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-8bdc10fa7c0c7ddc6fe40091e694af74
- Authors
- Nils Kupzok · Jonas Nahm
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-13T12:49:50.555517+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-13T12:49:50.555517+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Columbia University · Johns Hopkins University · Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
Reported affiliation countries
US
Documentary abstract — original language
In the late 2010s, countries began to strengthen policies that redirect financial flows into decarbonisation, such as higher carbon prices and new green industrial policies. However, investments remain below what is necessary to reach official climate targets. We argue that the green turn reflects the success and limits of political bargains that attempt to use decarbonisation as a means to fortify countries’ growth models and dominant economic interests. Such bargains have proven effective in overcoming entrenched path dependencies, unlocking policy progress. But these bargains also entail trade-offs that constrain the scope and goals of decarbonisation. Prioritizing incumbent economic interests can slow emission cuts, limit tools to the unpopular and ineffective, and thwart visions of a just transition. To develop this argument empirically, we provide original quantitative estimates of climate policies in the G20 and conduct case studies of the UK, the EU, and South Korea.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4406914685
- DOI
- 10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Routledge
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Nils Kupzok; Jonas Nahm. Green macrofinancial bargains: how economic interests enable and limit climate action. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
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- APA
- Nils Kupzok; Jonas Nahm. (2025). Green macrofinancial bargains: how economic interests enable and limit climate action. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
- Chicago
- Nils Kupzok; Jonas Nahm. Green macrofinancial bargains: how economic interests enable and limit climate action. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
- ISO 690
- Nils Kupzok; Jonas Nahm. Green macrofinancial bargains: how economic interests enable and limit climate action. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Green macrofinancial bargains: how economic interests enable and limit climate action. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-8bdc10fa7c0c7ddc6fe40091e694af74/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
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