Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-8a07f4be4ccca9c5df24f069411942b3
- Authors
- Teena Wilhelm · David A. Hughes
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:48:22.262841+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:48:22.262841+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
University of Georgia · University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Reported affiliation countries
US
Documentary abstract — original language
We study the separation of powers between judicial and legislative institutions among the American states. Building upon previous studies, we consider how judicial selection/accountability mechanisms affect the judicial-legislative separation of powers game. We specify game theoretic models that consider these issues. Our formal models demonstrate that judicial elections can empower courts by providing them with direct signals of legitimacy from voters. We then examine the use of judicial review in state supreme courts between 2007 and 2017 both at the institutional and justice level. Our results suggest that electoral institutions empower courts in the separation of powers game, as these institutions are associated with significantly higher odds of invalidating legislative acts compared to unelected courts. Furthermore, we find no evidence that legislative court-curbing efforts constrain judicial independence and argue the time may be ripe to revisit the role court-curbing plays in judicial preemption in American politics.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7135231722
- DOI
- 10.1177/10659129261426540
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- SAGE Publishing
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Teena Wilhelm; David A. Hughes. Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129261426540
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Teena Wilhelm; David A. Hughes. (2026). Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129261426540
- Chicago
- Teena Wilhelm; David A. Hughes. Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129261426540
- ISO 690
- Teena Wilhelm; David A. Hughes. Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129261426540
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-8a07f4be4ccca9c5df24f069411942b3/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129261426540
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
Library
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