Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence
Identification
- Public canonical key
- openalex:w3199252265
- Authors
- Tetiana Luzan
- Reported year
- 2018
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Documentary abstract — original language
Due to an impressive evolution of the AI technologies within the last few decades it has become an integral part of everyday life called for improving and facilitating it. Yet, as a result of this evolutionary process AI’s activity nowadays contains features which require legal regulation in the course of its application. Such request was recognized by the EU legislator. In 2017, the EP voiced a possibility of introducing of a legal status of electronic person for the sufficiently sophisticated robots. Specialists in this sphere, however, gave a hostile reception to such an initiative claiming that legal personhood of AI cannot be fit into the current legal paradigm. The latest EU initiatives pertaining to the legal regulation of AI application reveal that the electronic person is not on the EU’s agenda anymore. This work is dedicated to a negation of the above claim of AI specialists by demonstrating that there are no unsurmountable obstacles for conferring legal personhood on the sufficiently sophisticated AI even though it should not be considered as a person from the philosophical standpoint. Having accepted a possibility of according legal personhood to AI, the next question to answer is should it be recognized as a natural or artificial person (the existing types) or should it be ascribed a legal status of the electronic person. The answer is found in the analysis of the determining characteristics of sufficiently sophisticated AI and their comparison with the features of humans and corporations, bearers of natural and artificial personhood, respectively. The ascription of legal personhood to AI is not aimed at recognition of exceptional qualities of AI per se. It is, instead, called for resolving the existing legal problems of AI application in the business sphere, namely, in contract and tort law, and intellectual property rights. By the way of the conferral of legal personhood on AI it is possible to properly allocate responsibility or attribute authorship. In such a manner, establishment of legal status of the electronic person is discussed as an umbrella solution for various domains of business law that may establish legal certainty and ensure the EU against legal fragmentation.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- W3199252265
- HANDLE
- 10138/325440
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- Scholarship
- Source-reported types
- article
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1 · Record 2 · Record 3
- Document · http://hdl.handle.net/10138/325440
- Handle · https://hdl.handle.net/10138/325440
- OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W3199252265
Documented bibliographic relations
Source-declared references and links; they do not establish legal support or UGLC qualification. Up to 20 outgoing references are displayed.
- openalex:w2964333534 · CITES
2 incoming references within the detected corpus
Documentary field provenance
Source-backed values and values with unresolved provenance are kept separately. Bibliographic provenance validates no legal claim.
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- Documentary source reported
- Publication
- Documentary source reported
- Authors
- Documentary source reported
- Document type
- Documentary source reported
- Jurisdiction
- Not recorded
- Court
- Not recorded
- Issuing authority
- Not recorded
- Publisher
- Not recorded
- DOI
- Not recorded
- ISBN
- Not recorded
- Official identifier
- Not recorded
- Source URL
- Documentary source reported
- Source-reported status
- Not recorded
- Amendment / repeal
- Not recorded
Cite this reference
Tetiana Luzan. Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence. 2018. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4f19da867bc633a10eef57b619167d84/
JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·
APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Tetiana Luzan. (2018). Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4f19da867bc633a10eef57b619167d84/
- Chicago
- Tetiana Luzan. Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence. 2018. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4f19da867bc633a10eef57b619167d84/
- ISO 690
- Tetiana Luzan. Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence. 2018. https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4f19da867bc633a10eef57b619167d84/
UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4f19da867bc633a10eef57b619167d84/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Field provenance and record version
Version 1296e0562b66310f · udtr-reference-1.1.2
- Title
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
- Authors
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
- Year
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
- Identifiers
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
- Source URL
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
History tracks record metadata and does not certify the state of the law.
83a537be7553ea6c · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
28d2b7be9fdf8373 · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
6dd0ad5ef0641da9 · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
1296e0562b66310f · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.977697+00:00
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Discovery source · http://hdl.handle.net/10138/325440
Discovery source · https://hdl.handle.net/10138/325440
Discovery source · https://openalex.org/W3199252265
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
Library
This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.