Exploring financial and governance drivers of environmental noncompliance
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-4b4a4d064a9b2c63e34acd78b4d3e624
- Authors
- Vishaal Baulkaran · Carlos Jabbour · Isaac Otchere
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:47:23.747932+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:47:23.747932+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
University of Lethbridge · Environment and Climate Change Canada · Carleton University
Reported affiliation countries
CA
Documentary abstract — original language
Using data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), we examine the determinants of corporate environmental noncompliance and find that profitability is associated with lower noncompliance, whereas proxies for ability to pay, cash holdings and interest coverage, as well as leverage, are associated with higher noncompliance rates. Large, financially healthy firms exhibit a higher probability of noncompliance. We further find that firms carrying directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance have higher noncompliance rates and are more likely to reoffend, particularly when executives receive incentive‑based compensation. Furthermore, monetary penalties imposed by regulators are relatively small and therefore do not deter violations. Our results, which remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, have implications for inspectors, regulators, and policy makers, as well as investors and other stakeholders.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7161233932
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.qref.2026.102157
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Elsevier BV
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Vishaal Baulkaran; Carlos Jabbour; Isaac Otchere. Exploring financial and governance drivers of environmental noncompliance. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102157
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Vishaal Baulkaran; Carlos Jabbour; Isaac Otchere. (2026). Exploring financial and governance drivers of environmental noncompliance. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102157
- Chicago
- Vishaal Baulkaran; Carlos Jabbour; Isaac Otchere. Exploring financial and governance drivers of environmental noncompliance. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102157
- ISO 690
- Vishaal Baulkaran; Carlos Jabbour; Isaac Otchere. Exploring financial and governance drivers of environmental noncompliance. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102157
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Exploring financial and governance drivers of environmental noncompliance. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-4b4a4d064a9b2c63e34acd78b4d3e624/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102157
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
Library
This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.