The Institutional Economics of Granting a River Legal Standing
Identification
- Public canonical key
- doi:10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
- Authors
- Julia Talbot-Jones
- Reported year
- 2017
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- dissertation
- First detected
- 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Documentary abstract — original language
The governance of water is of increasing concern to policy analysts. Several property rights systems, which allow for ownership of water by the individual, community, or state have been advocated, but no approach has been uniformly successful in resolving water quality or scarcity issues. In some cases, identifying alternative property rights arrangements for governing water systems could be useful. This research examines how a river system can be granted legal standing and the institutional economic effects of doing so. It is the first academic treatment of this subject. Focusing on the case of the Whanganui River, New Zealand, a careful critique of the new property rights arrangement - termed resource self-determination - is given. Using Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, game theory, and economic experiments, the economic and socio-ecological outcomes observed under state ownership are compared with the outcomes expected under resource self-determination. To understand how and why the new property rights approach was identified for the Whanganui River, a critical analysis of the institutional variables central to the identification of resource self-determination is also undertaken using a new dynamic version of the IAD framework developed as part of this research. The results of the study suggest that the implementation of resource self-determination is likely to result in an increase in transaction costs and a redistribution of water within the system, but that the new framework could successfully deliver on the objectives of the new legislation. For policy makers interested in replicating the approach for other river systems, words of caution, as well as recommendations, are offered.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- W2765483196
- DOI
- 10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
- HANDLE
- 1885/132935
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- Thesis
- Source-reported types
- dissertation
- Natural entities mentioned
- River
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1 · Record 2 · Record 3
- DOI · https://doi.org/10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
- Handle · https://hdl.handle.net/1885/132935
- OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W2765483196
Documented bibliographic relations
Source-declared references and links; they do not establish legal support or UGLC qualification. Up to 20 outgoing references are displayed.
10 incoming references within the detected corpus
Documentary field provenance
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- Documentary source reported
- Publication
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- Authors
- Documentary source reported
- Document type
- Documentary source reported
- Jurisdiction
- Not recorded
- Court
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- Issuing authority
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- DOI
- Documentary source reported
- ISBN
- Not recorded
- Official identifier
- Not recorded
- Source URL
- Documentary source reported
- Source-reported status
- Not recorded
- Amendment / repeal
- Not recorded
Cite this reference
Julia Talbot-Jones. The Institutional Economics of Granting a River Legal Standing. 2017. https://doi.org/10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Julia Talbot-Jones. (2017). The Institutional Economics of Granting a River Legal Standing. https://doi.org/10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
- Chicago
- Julia Talbot-Jones. The Institutional Economics of Granting a River Legal Standing. 2017. https://doi.org/10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
- ISO 690
- Julia Talbot-Jones. The Institutional Economics of Granting a River Legal Standing. 2017. https://doi.org/10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. The Institutional Economics of Granting a River Legal Standing. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-454562c691008c99cba2fc084144f84e/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Field provenance and record version
Version c9e0f8b73458230c · udtr-reference-1.1.2
- Title
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
- Authors
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
- Year
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
- Identifiers
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
- Source URL
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
History tracks record metadata and does not certify the state of the law.
98fa6ae88fc3093b · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
df7773a5e6575e23 · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
951543d64c58b47f · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
c9e0f8b73458230c · 2026-11-09T19:04:47.934867+00:00
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Discovery source · https://doi.org/10.25911/5d51451ce3a2e
Discovery source · https://hdl.handle.net/1885/132935
Discovery source · https://openalex.org/W2765483196
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
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Library
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