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Do mandatory minimum penalties and penalty relief work? Evidence from California’s clean water program

Identification

Public canonical key
radar:r-3fe400956a95e9c8e1aa155453c36981
Authors
Ryan J. Treves · Qiwei Lin · Margaret Hilderbran · Derek Ouyang · Kit T. Rodolfa · Erin Mustain · Daniel E. Ho
Reported year
2025
Reported language
en
Source type
article
First detected
2026-11-14T02:46:02.416441+00:00
Last metadata observation
2026-11-14T02:46:02.416441+00:00
Last HTTP verification
Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

Stanford University · State of California

Reported affiliation countries

US

Documentary abstract — original language

Promoting regulatory compliance in the face of limited resources poses a distinct challenge to regulators, who can find within rational choice theory a diverse toolkit of policy levers – ones that change the likelihood that noncompliance is sanctioned, the size of sanctions, or the cost of compliance – but must look beyond theory to understand how such levers actually work in practice. In 1999, California introduced changes to its clean water program that modified each of these components, and in the present work we explore the impact of these changes using a mixed-methods approach. While the state’s introduction of $3,000 mandatory minimum penalties for certain Clean Water Act effluent and reporting violations by permitted wastewater facilities reflected a significant step-up in enforcement, the policy also allowed small communities with financial hardship to redirect penalties toward investments in compliance. Our results suggest that the increase in sanctions was associated with decreases in violations with relatively low compliance costs (such as reporting violations), but that there may be considerable mismatch between the scale of penalties and compliance costs for keeping many types of pollutants within regulatory limits, and an underappreciation of critical factors like political pressure that are uncaptured by classical theory. We also find suggestive evidence that penalty conversions reduced pollution limit violations, and highlight tensions between their eligibility criteria and environmental justice. Our case study highlights how policy design and implementation fidelity — how closely a policy is carried out as originally intended — shape regulatory effectiveness and equity, with lessons for regulators and researchers across policy domains.

Identifiers

OPENALEX
https://openalex.org/W4411995776
DOI
10.1371/journal.pwat.0000326

Documentary context

Documentary family
article
Source-reported types
article
Publishers
Public Library of Science

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Sources

OpenAlex · Record 1

Cite this reference

Ryan J. Treves; Qiwei Lin; Margaret Hilderbran; Derek Ouyang; Kit T. Rodolfa; Erin Mustain; Daniel E. Ho. Do mandatory minimum penalties and penalty relief work? Evidence from California’s clean water program. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pwat.0000326

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APA
Ryan J. Treves; Qiwei Lin; Margaret Hilderbran; Derek Ouyang; Kit T. Rodolfa; Erin Mustain; Daniel E. Ho. (2025). Do mandatory minimum penalties and penalty relief work? Evidence from California’s clean water program. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pwat.0000326
Chicago
Ryan J. Treves; Qiwei Lin; Margaret Hilderbran; Derek Ouyang; Kit T. Rodolfa; Erin Mustain; Daniel E. Ho. Do mandatory minimum penalties and penalty relief work? Evidence from California’s clean water program. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pwat.0000326
ISO 690
Ryan J. Treves; Qiwei Lin; Margaret Hilderbran; Derek Ouyang; Kit T. Rodolfa; Erin Mustain; Daniel E. Ho. Do mandatory minimum penalties and penalty relief work? Evidence from California’s clean water program. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pwat.0000326

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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Do mandatory minimum penalties and penalty relief work? Evidence from California’s clean water program. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-3fe400956a95e9c8e1aa155453c36981/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed

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Source roles

Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pwat.0000326

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