Personas, cosas, derechos
Identification
- Public canonical key
- doi:10.18601/01229893.n54.06
- Authors
- Fernando
- Reported year
- 2022
- Reported language
- es · spa
- Source type
- Other ORP type
- First detected
- 2026-11-09T19:06:37.430722+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
University of Chile
Documentary abstract — original language
This article explains the positive, legal concept of person. To do so, it discusses the differences among such concept and the corresponding moral concept and also the legal concept of “a thing”. Indeed, the distinction between personas and things is recognized as a fundamental legal dichotomy which evolved, during the codification, towards a unification of the concept of person and a simplification of the concept of thing. This dichotomy depends on a positive definition of person and a negative definition of thing. The positive definition of person is dependent on the notion of “a right”, which serves to show the superiority of the interest theories right (rights as legally protected interests). Criticisms of this dichotomy and of the unitary concept of person, particularly in the context of discussions about rights of non-human animals and of nature, allow for a better understanding of the positive legal concept of person: a being with the capacity to hold rights. This is taken to mean a recognized perspective from which states of affaires can be judged as advantageous/ detrimental, i.e. from which interests can be identified. Este artículo explica el concepto jurídico-positivo de persona. Se revisan, em consecuencia, las diferencias con el concepto de cosa pero también con el concepto moral correspondiente. Para lo anterior se analiza la dicotomía de persona y cosa como una fundamental para el derecho, que evolucionó, en la codificación, hacia una unificación del concepto de persona y una simplificación del concepto de cosa. Esa dicotomía depende de una definición positiva de persona y una negativa de cosa. La caracterización positiva de persona es dependiente de la noción de derecho subjetivo, lo que sirve para mostrar la superioridad de las teorías del derecho subjetivo como interés protegido. Las posturas revisionistas de esta dicotomía y del concepto unitario de persona, particularmente en la discusión sobre derechos de la naturaleza, permitirán comprender de mejor modo el concepto jurídico-positivo de persona: un ser capaz de ser titular de derechos subjetivos. Esto significa: una perspectiva reconocida desde la cual pueden juzgarse estados de cosas como ventajosos/ desventajosos, es decir, desde la cual pueden identificarse intereses.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- W4310156754
- DOI
- 10.18601/01229893.n54.06
- OPENAIRE
- doi_dedup___::5556edf782eefe49375a053319555b23 · od______4406::5f341f955096248112f2508a5322ba61
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- Other
- Source-reported types
- Article · Other ORP type · article
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAIRE · Record 1 · Record 2
OpenAlex · Record 1 · Record 2
- DOI · https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
- Document · https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25483
- OpenAlex · https://openalex.org/W4310156754
Documented bibliographic relations
Source-declared references and links; they do not establish legal support or UGLC qualification. Up to 20 outgoing references are displayed.
- openalex:w1964902249 · CITES
- openalex:w2145360206 · CITES
- openalex:w2326580376 · CITES
- openalex:w2478817797 · CITES
- openalex:w2494380380 · CITES
- openalex:w2495969500 · CITES
- openalex:w2795662760 · CITES
- openalex:w2901255638 · CITES
- openalex:w2912061145 · CITES
- openalex:w2971436342 · CITES
- openalex:w3090356336 · CITES
- Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social · CITES
- openalex:w4238454917 · CITES
- openalex:w4241286158 · CITES
- openalex:w4249762824 · CITES
- openalex:w4366764350 · CITES
- openalex:w6631651162 · CITES
3 incoming references within the detected corpus
Documentary field provenance
Source-backed values and values with unresolved provenance are kept separately. Bibliographic provenance validates no legal claim.
- Title
- Documentary source reported
- Publication
- Documentary source reported
- Authors
- Documentary source reported
- Document type
- Documentary source reported
- Jurisdiction
- Not recorded
- Court
- Not recorded
- Issuing authority
- Not recorded
- Publisher
- Not recorded
- DOI
- Documentary source reported
- ISBN
- Not recorded
- Official identifier
- Not recorded
- Source URL
- Documentary source reported
- Source-reported status
- Not recorded
- Amendment / repeal
- Not recorded
Cite this reference
Fernando. Personas, cosas, derechos. 2022. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·
APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Fernando. (2022). Personas, cosas, derechos. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
- Chicago
- Fernando. Personas, cosas, derechos. 2022. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
- ISO 690
- Fernando. Personas, cosas, derechos. 2022. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Personas, cosas, derechos. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-3a614e1930f5d3f4cdaf8a411295b53c/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Field provenance and record version
Version 6248831be9be4f94 · udtr-reference-1.1.2
- Title
- OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00 - Authors
- OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Multiple reported values; disagreement retained. - Year
- OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00 - Identifiers
- OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Multiple reported values; disagreement retained. - Source URL
- OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Multiple reported values; disagreement retained. - Source-reported author ORCID
- OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
History tracks record metadata and does not certify the state of the law.
498f7c7460cd5959 · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
b21285759a612e1d · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
8a3190a62e3f69d0 · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
6248831be9be4f94 · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Discovery source · https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
Institutional bibliographic repository · https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25483
Discovery source · https://openalex.org/W4310156754
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
Library
This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.