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Personas, cosas, derechos

Identification

Public canonical key
doi:10.18601/01229893.n54.06
Authors
Fernando
Reported year
2022
Reported language
es · spa
Source type
Other ORP type
First detected
2026-11-09T19:06:37.430722+00:00
Last metadata observation
2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00
Last HTTP verification
Not checked

Institutions reported by the source

University of Chile

Documentary abstract — original language

This article explains the positive, legal concept of person. To do so, it discusses the differences among such concept and the corresponding moral concept and also the legal concept of “a thing”. Indeed, the distinction between personas and things is recognized as a fundamental legal dichotomy which evolved, during the codification, towards a unification of the concept of person and a simplification of the concept of thing. This dichotomy depends on a positive definition of person and a negative definition of thing. The positive definition of person is dependent on the notion of “a right”, which serves to show the superiority of the interest theories right (rights as legally protected interests). Criticisms of this dichotomy and of the unitary concept of person, particularly in the context of discussions about rights of non-human animals and of nature, allow for a better understanding of the positive legal concept of person: a being with the capacity to hold rights. This is taken to mean a recognized perspective from which states of affaires can be judged as advantageous/ detrimental, i.e. from which interests can be identified. Este artículo explica el concepto jurídico-positivo de persona. Se revisan, em consecuencia, las diferencias con el concepto de cosa pero también con el concepto moral correspondiente. Para lo anterior se analiza la dicotomía de persona y cosa como una fundamental para el derecho, que evolucionó, en la codificación, hacia una unificación del concepto de persona y una simplificación del concepto de cosa. Esa dicotomía depende de una definición positiva de persona y una negativa de cosa. La caracterización positiva de persona es dependiente de la noción de derecho subjetivo, lo que sirve para mostrar la superioridad de las teorías del derecho subjetivo como interés protegido. Las posturas revisionistas de esta dicotomía y del concepto unitario de persona, particularmente en la discusión sobre derechos de la naturaleza, permitirán comprender de mejor modo el concepto jurídico-positivo de persona: un ser capaz de ser titular de derechos subjetivos. Esto significa: una perspectiva reconocida desde la cual pueden juzgarse estados de cosas como ventajosos/ desventajosos, es decir, desde la cual pueden identificarse intereses.

Identifiers

OPENALEX
W4310156754
DOI
10.18601/01229893.n54.06
OPENAIRE
doi_dedup___::5556edf782eefe49375a053319555b23 · od______4406::5f341f955096248112f2508a5322ba61

Documentary context

Documentary family
Other
Source-reported types
Article · Other ORP type · article

Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.

Sources

OpenAIRE · Record 1 · Record 2

OpenAlex · Record 1 · Record 2

Documented bibliographic relations

Source-declared references and links; they do not establish legal support or UGLC qualification. Up to 20 outgoing references are displayed.

  • openalex:w1964902249 · CITES
  • openalex:w2145360206 · CITES
  • openalex:w2326580376 · CITES
  • openalex:w2478817797 · CITES
  • openalex:w2494380380 · CITES
  • openalex:w2495969500 · CITES
  • openalex:w2795662760 · CITES
  • openalex:w2901255638 · CITES
  • openalex:w2912061145 · CITES
  • openalex:w2971436342 · CITES
  • openalex:w3090356336 · CITES
  • Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social · CITES
  • openalex:w4238454917 · CITES
  • openalex:w4241286158 · CITES
  • openalex:w4249762824 · CITES
  • openalex:w4366764350 · CITES
  • openalex:w6631651162 · CITES

3 incoming references within the detected corpus

Documentary field provenance

Source-backed values and values with unresolved provenance are kept separately. Bibliographic provenance validates no legal claim.

Title
Documentary source reported
Publication
Documentary source reported
Authors
Documentary source reported
Document type
Documentary source reported
Jurisdiction
Not recorded
Court
Not recorded
Issuing authority
Not recorded
Publisher
Not recorded
DOI
Documentary source reported
ISBN
Not recorded
Official identifier
Not recorded
Source URL
Documentary source reported
Source-reported status
Not recorded
Amendment / repeal
Not recorded

Cite this reference

Fernando. Personas, cosas, derechos. 2022. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06

JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·

APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.

APA
Fernando. (2022). Personas, cosas, derechos. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
Chicago
Fernando. Personas, cosas, derechos. 2022. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06
ISO 690
Fernando. Personas, cosas, derechos. 2022. https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06

UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Personas, cosas, derechos. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-3a614e1930f5d3f4cdaf8a411295b53c/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed

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Field provenance and record version

Version 6248831be9be4f94 · udtr-reference-1.1.2

Title
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Authors
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Multiple reported values; disagreement retained.
Year
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Identifiers
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Multiple reported values; disagreement retained.
Source URL
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:44.321543+00:00
OpenAIRE · source · 2026-11-09T19:07:36.456420+00:00
Multiple reported values; disagreement retained.
Source-reported author ORCID
OpenAlex · source · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00

History tracks record metadata and does not certify the state of the law.

498f7c7460cd5959 · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00

b21285759a612e1d · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00

8a3190a62e3f69d0 · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00

6248831be9be4f94 · 2026-11-09T19:13:58.547083+00:00

Frozen-version metadata

Research dossiers and documentary relations

University of Chile

Fernando

Source roles

Discovery source · https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06

Institutional bibliographic repository · https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25483

Discovery source · https://openalex.org/W4310156754

An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.

Documentary status

Relevance pending

Library

This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.

UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library