An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-37958540103ccb6fb5fafdcca51a3e42
- Authors
- Ying Xie · Michaël Faure
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:47:53.750039+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:47:53.750039+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology · Maastricht University · University of Indonesia · Erasmus University Rotterdam
Reported affiliation countries
CN · ID · NL
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract Enforcement is crucial for ensuring compliance by regulated entities in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article identifies potential non‐compliance and enforcement issues behind officially reported high compliance rates, emphasising the need to complement existing ETS enforcement strategies to enhance their effectiveness. These issues encompass the Harrington paradox in ETSs, reported quantity‐based compliance rates (which fail to reflect the number of non‐compliant entities), potential ‘black figures’ for unreported GHG emissions and potentially weak implementation of enforcement regimes. Drawing on responsive regulation, this article proposes an ETS enforcement pyramid in which regulatory agencies can adjust enforcement tools based on entities' various, changing motivations and actions. It also highlights that the enforcement regimes of the EU ETS and China's national ETS share certain features of this enforcement pyramid. The reasons why these ETSs do not fully use the pyramid model may reveal limitations in the model. These limitations include relatively high administrative costs associated with the enforcement pyramid, information problems, difficulties in shifting between cooperation and deterrence, potential waste when entities are unresponsive and issues related to regulatory capture, proportionality, equality and consistency.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7225455221
- DOI
- 10.1111/reel.70102
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Wiley
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Ying Xie; Michaël Faure. An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.70102
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- APA
- Ying Xie; Michaël Faure. (2026). An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.70102
- Chicago
- Ying Xie; Michaël Faure. An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.70102
- ISO 690
- Ying Xie; Michaël Faure. An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.70102
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-37958540103ccb6fb5fafdcca51a3e42/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.70102
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Documentary status
Relevance pending
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