UDTR Global Rights of Nature Radar

Проблема прав и субъектности природы

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radar:r-372aba9b5aff40e6bb31cd319fe811ef

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Russian

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UNKNOWN

First detected

2026-11-13T08:38:35.856429+00:00

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2026-11-13T08:38:35.856429+00:00

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Documentary abstract — original language

The ideas of protection of nature and that of partnership relations between people and natural environment raise the question of nature’s rights and its legal personality. The jurisprudential notion of legal personality cannot be used as far as nature is concerned; so, it excludes nature’s rights and any partnership relations between people and nature. Scientific objectivism which forms the basis of anthropocentrism also rejects the ideas of subject-subject relationship between people and nature and that of the protection of nature’s rights. Nature-oriented scientific approach which makes people and nature equal denies individual’s legal personality. These antagonistic approaches converge in technocentrism and in ecological and ethical nihilism which downplays people’s responsibility for the protection of nature. The authors’ point of view is based on the alternative approaches, i.e., theocentric approach in philosophy and ethics, eco-centric approach in ecological ethics, anthropic principle in science, a concept of implicated communication developed by G.S. Batischev and S.P. Nikanorov’s concept of a legal person as a couple which consists of a legal personality and its repository represented by an individual or a community of people. The main ideas of the authors’ conception are: 1) Nature involves an individual as a legal personality repository and, thus, it becomes an original and universal legal person of the global processes. 2) An individual can consider environmental objects and systems to be some would-be legal personality repositories or some would-be legal persons and, as a result, can build up some partnership relations with them. 3) Legal personality may belong both to its repository and to some attributes of an individual or a community, or to some objects to which their activity can be directed. 4) An object on its own has only a virtual legal personality transferred on it by an individual and, thus, it is an imaginary legal person. 5) Legal personality which is transferred back from an object on its repository makes the latter an object or an appendage of a subjectless self-actuated system. 6) The traditional conception that nature lacks legal personality doesn’t mean that it really lacks legal capacity and legal personality, in general. A responsible legal person who provides nature’s rights and liberties is only an individual as a legal personality repository.

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unknown

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UNKNOWN

Publishers

Государственное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования «Московский государственный университет леса»

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OpenAIRE

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Relevance pending

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