Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-31c85fa7ec0d35c39d961f259c17094e
- Authors
- Paul Pecorino · Michael Solomon · Mark Van Boening
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:47:22.763491+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:47:22.763491+00:00
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- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
University of Alabama · Colby College · University of Mississippi
Reported affiliation countries
US
Documentary abstract — original language
ABSTRACT We conduct an experimental analysis of signaling games using three models of arbitration. In the signaling model, the informed party in the dispute makes a settlement demand to the uninformed party. In conventional arbitration (CA), the arbitrator is free to impose her preferred settlement on the disputing parties. In Final Offer Arbitration (FOA), each party submits a proposal to the arbitrator who must choose one of the two submitted proposals. In one version of FOA we consider, settlement bargaining (which occurs separately from proposal submission) occurs prior to the submission of proposals and in one version it occurs after. We find the lowest dispute rate in CA and the highest dispute rate in FOA when settlement negotiations take place prior to the submission of proposals. The difference in dispute rates across these two mechanisms is 10 percentage points, which is about 25% of the average dispute rate. One factor in the lower CA dispute rate is that fewer disputes result from anomalous demands, which in turn may be a function of the simplicity of the mechanism compared with FOA.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4410789489
- DOI
- 10.1111/jels.12420
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Wiley
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OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Paul Pecorino; Michael Solomon; Mark Van Boening. Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12420
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- APA
- Paul Pecorino; Michael Solomon; Mark Van Boening. (2025). Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12420
- Chicago
- Paul Pecorino; Michael Solomon; Mark Van Boening. Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12420
- ISO 690
- Paul Pecorino; Michael Solomon; Mark Van Boening. Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12420
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Research dossiers and documentary relations
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Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12420
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