Innovation in Pay‐Performance Sensitivity Estimation: Evidence From the New 2022 SEC 's Corporate Disclosure Rules
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-2fa93107103dc66420b3d14cf7224e89
- Authors
- Steven Balsam · Eli Bartov
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-13T12:43:01.010974+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-13T12:43:01.010974+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
Temple University · New York University
Reported affiliation countries
US
Documentary abstract — original language
ABSTRACT Contrary to the predictions of optimal contracting theory, prior empirical research has struggled to identify a strong economic link between board‐authorised CEO compensation and firm performance—commonly referred to as pay‐performance sensitivity ( PPS ). Is the economically weak PPS due to an unexpectedly small stock‐based component in board‐authorised compensation, or to the omission of CEOs' personal shareholdings from total compensation, as prior studies suggest? Or, as we propose, does it instead stem from a flaw in how board‐authorised CEO pay is measured? To answer this question, we leverage a recent SEC rule requiring the disclosure of a new metric for board‐authorised total compensation—‘Compensation Actually Paid’—and document a strong and economically significant link between board‐authorised CEO total pay and firm performance. The key contribution lies in the findings, which are consistent with the SEC's perspective: the failure of prior research to document economically significant PPS is not attributable to boards' neglect in designing incentive‐compatible CEO pay packages or to the exclusion of CEO s' personal shareholdings. Rather, it stems from the use of an inferior metric in prior studies to measure board‐authorised compensation incentives. Grant‐date stock‐based compensation values, which underlie the old total compensation metric, fail to reflect how the award aligns CEO incentives with shareholder interests. The findings should inform boards, investors, and regulators.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7172300067
- DOI
- 10.1111/acfi.70266
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Wiley
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Steven Balsam; Eli Bartov. Innovation in Pay‐Performance Sensitivity Estimation: Evidence From the New 2022 SEC 's Corporate Disclosure Rules. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70266
JSON · CSL-JSON · BibTeX · RIS · CSV · JSON-LD ·
APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Steven Balsam; Eli Bartov. (2026). Innovation in Pay‐Performance Sensitivity Estimation: Evidence From the New 2022 SEC 's Corporate Disclosure Rules. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70266
- Chicago
- Steven Balsam; Eli Bartov. Innovation in Pay‐Performance Sensitivity Estimation: Evidence From the New 2022 SEC 's Corporate Disclosure Rules. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70266
- ISO 690
- Steven Balsam; Eli Bartov. Innovation in Pay‐Performance Sensitivity Estimation: Evidence From the New 2022 SEC 's Corporate Disclosure Rules. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70266
Warning: Undefined array key "last_link_verified" in /home/clients/e27d81e12f04d2bfd747aa264540ac56/sites/_UDTR_APP/legal_library_reference.php on line 31
UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Innovation in Pay‐Performance Sensitivity Estimation: Evidence From the New 2022 SEC 's Corporate Disclosure Rules. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-2fa93107103dc66420b3d14cf7224e89/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70266
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
Library
This identity is not yet included in the Legal Library.